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The Judgment-Proof Society
"As the system currently operates, liability is,
for wrongdoers... voluntary."I

Stephen G. Gilles*
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L Introduction: The Myth of PersonalTort Liability
In theory, tort law requires individual tortfeasors to compensate their
victims for the wrongs they have negligently or intentionally inflicted.
Negligent tortfeasors must pay damages from their own assets, unless they have
purchased liability insurance in adequate amounts. Intentional tortfeasors do
not have the option to insure because liability insurance almost always excludes
intentional torts. Hence they must compensate their victims out of their
personal resources.
Supposedly, this system serves the twin objectives of deterring
wrongdoing and doing justice. The threat of personal tort liability--or, at a
minimum, of increased liability insurance premiums-induces potential
tortfeasors to be more careful. When an accident does occur, corrective justice
is accomplished by shifting the loss from the victim to the wrongdoer. And if

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603 (2006)
the tortfeasor has liability insurance, the welfare loss is spread across the pool
of liability insureds, rather than concentrated on the victim.
Explicitly or implicitly, this account of how the tort system regulates the
2
behavior of individuals is standard fare in torts scholarship and torts courses.
The truth is dramatically different. Most people in our society face little or no
threat of personal liability for any intentional or unintentional torts they might
commit. Many tort claims are not large enough to be worth litigating in the first
place. But even when it comes to larger, litigable claims, many Americans are
"judgment-proof': They lack sufficient assets (or sufficient collectible assets) to
pay the judgment in full (or even in substantial part).3
Knowing that they can collect at best a fraction of the plaintiff's claim even
if they litigate and win, plaintiffs' attorneys typically decline to litigate
meritorious tort claims against uninsured or underinsured individuals. In the
absence of liability insurance, plaintiffs are effectively barred from bringing suit
unless the tortfeasor is an asset-rich corporation or an affluent individual who
neglects to take elementary precautions to protect his or her assets from tort
liability. 4 And precisely because it is so easy to achieve judgment-proof status,
individuals frequently fail to purchase adequate---or any-liability insurance. 5
Perhaps this description seems unremarkable. After all, everyone knows
plaintiffs'
lawyers prefer to sue "deep pockets" such as liability insurers
that
and big companies, and, at the other extreme, that it is pointless to sue persons
living at the subsistence level. True, but what is not generally understood is
that most Americans would have much deeper pockets were it not for a
2. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 275,282 (2001) [hereinafter Baker, Blood Money] ("At least as
taught in law school, tort law assumes in the first instance that it is defendants themselves who
pay.").
3. See Steven Shavell, The Judgment-ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45
(1986) [hereinafter Shavell, The Judgment-ProofProblem] (analyzing the problems resulting
from judgment-proof individuals); STEVEN SHAvELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
167-70 (1987) [hereinafter SHAVELL, EcONOMic ANALYSIS] (discussing tortfeasors' inability to
compensate for losses).
4. See Tom Baker, The View of an American Insurance Law Scholar: Six Ways that
Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law 12 (2005) [hereinafter Baker, Insurance Law Scholar]
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) ("[L]iability
insurance has become an element of tort liability for all but the wealthiest potential
defendants.").
5. See Alan 0. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to
Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique,72 ThX. L. REv. 1345, 1361 (1994) ("Individuals who
are entirely judgment proof... have no reason to purchase insurance at all-it is irrational to
insure against loss if you have nothing to lose."); SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3,
at 240-41 (analyzing the effect of tortfeasors' inability to fully compensate for losses on their
decisions to purchase insurance).

THE JUDGMENT-PROOFSOCIETY
multitude of legal rules that shelter the lion's share of their income and assets
from collection by tort plaintiffs (and other creditors). Most Americans are
judgment-proof not because we are poor, but because state and federal laws
entitle us to be judgment-proof. The paradoxical result is that contemporary
America, one of the most affluent societies in human history, is
simultaneously-and largely by operation of law-a judgment-proof society.
This Article is about how our laws have made being judgment-proof the
rule rather than the exception; about what this implies for the standard
deterrence, corrective justice, and loss-spreading accounts of tort law; and
about whether anything should be done to lower the legal barriers to enforcing
and collecting tort judgments from individual tortfeasors. The Article proceeds
as follows: Part II offers a preliminary overview of the judgment-proof
problem, and of the principal legal barriers to collecting the personal income
and wealth of American tortfeasors. The thrust of the argument is that these
barriers greatly reduce the threat of personal tort liability-what tort lawyers
call "blood money" liability 6-for individuals across the spectrum of income
and wealth. Part IIJ examines the biggest of these barriers-the exemptions for
income, homesteads, trusts, and retirement funds, and the availability of
discharge in bankruptcy.
Part [V asks why-barriers to collection
notwithstanding-individuals with assets (particularly homeowners) ordinarily
carry significant amounts of liability insurance, and considers what this tells us
about the residual risk of personal tort liability. Part V evaluates the case for
lowering the barriers to enforcing tort liability in order to reduce the judgmentproof problem, and responds to a range of plausible objections to this proposal.
Part VI explores an alternative strategy-mandating that individuals purchase
liability insurance in adequate amounts. Part VII considers the political
obstacles to ameliorating the judgment-proof problem by reforms of these
kinds.
11. Rethinking the Judgment-ProofProblem
A. How Big Is the Judgment-ProofProblem, and Why Should We Care?
Let's begin with a closer look at what it means to be "judgment-proof."
Ex ante, a potential tortfeasor is judgment-proof to the extent that his or her
assets and income are insufficient to compensate potential victims in accord

6. See Baker, Blood Money, supra note 2, at 276 (defining "blood money" as "real
money from real people").
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with the normal rules for determining damages.7 As this definition implies,
being judgment-proof is a matter of degree and is contingent on the magnitude
of the expected harm. A person with $20,000 in assets is not judgment-proof if
he or she tortiously causes $10,000 in damages. Let the compensable damages
be $100,000, however, and this same tortfeasor is mostly (80%) judgmentproof. Let them be $1 million, and the tortfeasor is 98% judgment-proof.
As Steven Shavell has explained, the practical importance of the
judgment-proof issue "depends on the size of losses that injurers may cause in
relation to their assets."8 Obviously, most Americans cannot pay a $1 million
tort judgment in full. (The postjudgment interest alone would exceed the aftertax income of most individuals.) 9 But because seven-figure tort claims are rare,
the gap this creates in the tort system is relatively small-and in any event
unavoidable.
Equally obvious, almost everyone could pay a $1000 claim in full-if not
in a lump sum, then in periodic installments. Claims of that magnitude,
however, are normally too small to be worth litigating under the standard
contingent-fee arrangement, which typically gives the plaintiff's attorney onethird of the judgment or settlement.' 0 The rule of thumb here can be expressed
as a formula: Unless the amount in controversy is at least three times the
plaintiff's attorney's expected costs of litigation and collection, a tort claim is
not litigable. I 1 As a rough estimate, claims 2below a threshold of $5000 are
likely to fall into this "unlitigable" category.1
This point is an important one: Millions of low-level torts are committed
each year, and those who commit them, regardless of their assets and income,
7. Ex post, a person is judgment-proof to the extent that his or her assets and income are
insufficient to compensate the actual victim.
8. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 167.
9. Most states have enacted statutes authorizing postjudgment interest on money
judgments. Brian P. Miller, Comment, Statutory Post-Judgment Interest: The Effect of
LegislativeChangesAfter Judgment and Suggestionsfor Construction, 1994 BYU L. REV. 601,
601.
10. 1 ROBERT L. Rossi, ATToRNEY's FEEs § 2:9 (2d ed. 1995).
11. Many states do offer "small claims" courts in which individuals can represent
themselves in cases involving no more than a few thousand dollars. Little is known about how
well these courts work, but it seems clear that most victims of "small" torts do not seek redress
in these fora.
12. See HERBERT M. KRrrZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (2004) (stating that in a survey of attorneys, the

median minimum damages an attorney would require before taking an automobile accident case
was $5000). The threshold will vary with the complexity and closeness of the case. See id. at
87 (noting that many plaintiffs' firms refrain from litigating malpractice claims under
$100,000).
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are litigation-proofwith regard to these wrongs. Given the large numbers of
torts that involve significant harm, and yet fall below the litigation-proof
threshold, efforts to lower that threshold certainly deserve further study. 13
This Article, however, focuses on litigable claims-claims that would be
worth litigating if the alleged tortfeasor had collectible assets sufficient to pay
the expected judgment in full. 14 As already suggested, ordinarily these are
claims that exceed $5000. My descriptive submission as to these claims is
two-fold: (1) in the absence of liability insurance, most Americans are highly
judgment-proof with regard to most tort claims that exceed the threshold of
litigability; and (2) this result is primarily attributable to legal rules that shelter
assets and income from collection, rather than to simple inability to pay.
Assume for the moment that these assertions are correct. What follows?
First, the judgment-proof problem is far bigger and more serious than prior torts
scholarship has recognized. Second, the deterrence, corrective-justice, and
loss-spreading functions of tort law are badly compromised by the
omnipresence of judgment-proof tortfeasors. ff deterrence, corrective justice,
and loss-spreading are taken seriously, a strong case can be made that the legal
barriers to enforcing tort claims should be far lower than they are now.
The proposition that judgment-proof tortfeasors pose a problem for each
of the three leading "principled" accounts of tort law is easily demonstrated.
From an efficiency and deterrence standpoint, judgment-proof persons are
problematic because the tort system cannot effectively deter them from
engaging in tortious conduct. 15 Because their maximum exposure to tort
liability is less than the expected damages should they tortiously cause harm,
judgment-proof persons have diminished incentives to take efficient
precautions. 16 In the extreme case, potential injurers who are completely
13. For example, it would seem in the best interest of a tort victim, rather than simply
forgoing suit, to pay a contingent fee of 60% or more to induce an attorney to litigate a small
case. Yet fees of this magnitude appear to be unheard of and would be unlawful in some
jurisdictions. Alternatively, proposals to make tort claims more freely alienable might facilitate
the enforcement of small claims. See, e.g., Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in PersonalInjury Tort
Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STuD. 329, 329 (1987) (arguing that plaintiffs should be allowed to sell
personal injury claims).
14. On occasion, tort victims are willing to finance litigation for vindication, revenge, or
some other nonpecuniary purpose. In the context of bodily injury torts, these cases seem very
infrequent. In other contexts, such as defamation, they may be relatively common.
15.

SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 167-68.

16. Kyle D. Logue, Solving the Judgment-ProofProblem, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1375, 1375
(1994). For example, imagine a homeowner who could avoid a 1% chance of a $20,000 slipand-fall injury to visitors to the premises by spending $90 on snow and ice removal. Because
these precautions reduce accident costs by $200 at a cost of only $90, it is negligent to omit them.
But if the homeowner's collectible assets are less than $9000, the homeowner's expected liability
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judgment-proof (or litigation-proof) simply face no threat of tort liability at
all.17
Judgment-proof tortfeasors are no less problematic from the standpoint of
corrective justice. Although the tort system can in theory declare that a
judgment-proof injurer has done wrong and should rectify that wrong by
compensating his or her victim, it cannot enforce "the duty of wrongdoers in
corrective justice... to repair the wrongful losses for which they are
responsible."' 8 Even when a tortfeasor has enough collectible assets to make
litigation worthwhile, insofar as those assets are smaller than the expected
judgment, corrective justice cannot be done fully. 19 If indeed corrective justice
obliges tortfeasors to compensate their victims, legal rules that shelter
tortfeasors' assets and income from collection seem anomalous.
From the standpoint of accident compensation through loss-spreading,
judgment-proof persons might not appear to pose a problem. When a victim's
loss is compensated out of an injurer's personal assets, that loss has been
shifted, rather than spread. Indirectly, however, judgment-proof persons pose a
problem for loss-spreading. The principal mechanism for spreading tortiously
caused losses is liability insurance. To the extent they are judgment-proof,
individuals have no incentive to purchase liability insurance.
Given the judgment-proof problem's tendency to subvert accident-cost
minimization, the rectification of wrongs, and loss-spreading, torts scholars
have paid surprisingly little attention to its causes and extent. 20 Ironically, the
will be less than $90 (1% x $9000), and the homeowner may not take the precautions.
17. For deterrence purposes, the interplay between judgment-proof and litigation-proof
status can be thought of in terms of the range of claims over which a person faces a threat of tort
liability, and the magnitude of that threat over this range. For example, a person with only
$20,000 in collectible assets will normally face no threat of liability on claims below $5000;
may face a roughly proportional threat of liability on claims between $5000 and $20,000; and
will face an increasingly smaller-than-proportional threat of liability on claims over $20,000.
18. JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 324 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Gary Schwartz, Auto No-FaultandFirstPartyInsurance: Advantages and
Problems, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 669-70 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, Advantages and
Problems] (suggesting that "tort law fundamentally fails in its goal of providing corrective justice"
when a negligent actor "neither provides compensation to the victim directly, nor arranges for any
insurance policy that can afford this compensation"); Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell:
Intentional Harm and the Quest.for Insurance Funding, 75 Thx. L. REV. 1721, 1748 (1997)
(describing the ability of judgment-proof wrongdoers to escape "the burden of recompensing the
full harm caused by intentional conduct" as "inconsistent with most versions of corrective justice").
20. The canonical law and economics analysis of the judgment-proof problem is Steven
Shavell's. Shavell, The Judgment-ProofProblem,supra note 3, at 45; see also Comment, The
Case of the DisappearingDefendant: An Economic Analysis, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 145
(1983) (analyzing the economic problems resulting from insolvent defendants); Mattias K.
Polborn, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-ProofProblem, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
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best existing treatment of the actual extent and causes of the judgment-proof
problem was written not by a torts scholar, but by a corporate bankruptcy
scholar, Professor Lynn LoPucki. Although LoPucki's principal focus in his
1996 article The Death of Liability was on strategies by which large
corporations can make themselves judgment-proof, he also described numerous
judgment-proofing devices available to individuals and small businesses. He
argued that the liability "system employs a complex web of social, economic,
and legal constructs to determine who can or cannot pay,",2 1 and asserted that
"[p]robably most individuals and businesses are either judgment proof, or
capable of rendering themselves so between commencement of a civil action
against them and the entry of judgment. '22 On this foundation, LoPucki
developed his principal thesis-that large corporations will increasingly be able
to avoid exposure to tort liability through judgment-proofing strategies such as
2
asset securitization, manipulation of subsidiaries, and Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 1
When even large corporations exit the tort system (and cease buying liability
insurance), he warned, we will witness "the death of liability."
LoPucki's apocalyptic predictions spawned a vigorous debate among
corporation-law scholars. 24 The controversy, however, concerned whether large
141, 141 (1998) (examining potential policy responses to the judgment-proof problem). None
of these articles attempts to determine the prevalence of the judgment-proof problem, and all of
them treat being judgment-proof as simply a matter of having insufficient assets (rather than
insufficient collectible assets). In more recent work on the judgment-proof problem, Professor
Shavell notes that individuals and firms "sometimes are able to shield assets from liability," but
does not investigate how widespread the shielding of assets is, or the degree to which legal rules
facilitate it. Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirementsand CompulsoryLiabilityInsurance
as Solutions to the Judgment-ProofProblem 24 (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Center for
Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 456, 2004), available at http://www.
law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/456.pdf; see also SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 168 (noting that the judgment-proof problem is "exacerbated if
parties have the opportunity to shield assets").
21. LoPucki, supra note 1,at 4.
22. Id. at 4-5; see also Kent D. Syverud, On the Demandfor LiabilityInsurance,72 TEx.
L. REV. 1629, 1640 n.37 (1994) ("Most individual defendants in common types of tort
litigation-including automobile accident litigation-lack significant collectible assets other
than their insurance policies.").
23. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 14-37.
24. See James J. White, CorporateJudgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's
The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1364 (1998) (arguing that judgment-proofing is not
likely to become a major problem in the United States); Stephen Schwarcz, The Inherent
IrrationalityofJudgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV.1 (1999) (suggesting that pervasive use of
judgment-proof techniques is improbable). See Lynn LoPucki, The Essential Structure of
Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147, 148-49 (1999), for LoPucki's response to White,
and Lynn LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor
Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REV.55 (1999), for his response to Schwarcz.
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corporations will adopt judgment-proofing strategies along the lines predicted
by LoPucki (an issue outside the purview of this Article, which deals
exclusively with judgment-proof individuals). Absent from that debate was
any further exploration of LoPucki's arresting observations about how
individuals and small businesses could (and routinely did) engage in
judgment-proofing.
One might have expected torts scholars to pick up on these aspects of
LoPucki's seminal work. Instead, they have mostly ignored it. By and large, the
torts literature treats the judgment-proof problem both as a matter of distinctly
secondary importance and as a fact of life-that is, simply a function of how
much wealth actors possess-rather than a variable that is profoundly influenced
by legal rules and strategic behavior in response to those rules.25 Unsurprisingly,
torts scholars tend to focus on those contexts-from products liability to medical
malpractice to automobile accidents-that generate large numbers of claims
against defendants who have liability insurance, substantial collectible assets, or
both. The fact that large numbers of other claims are kept out of the tort system
by the judgment-proof problem goes unremarked, or is attributed to poverty,
rather than to legal barriers to collecting tort judgments.26
The result is that torts scholars frequently proceed on false descriptive
assumptions about the actual operation of our tort system. We write and
teach as if, when a tort is committed, the ordinary result is that the victim has
the option to sue the injurer for money damages. But many tort victims
simply do not have that option, because the tortfeasors who injured them are
judgment-proof and uninsured; many others can expect to recover only a
small fraction of their losses, because their tortfeasors are mostly judgment-proof
and underinsured. As LoPucki intimated-and as this Article will explore in
depth-this situation is emphatically not a "given": It is the result of a series of
25. A May 15, 2005 Westlaw search for "judgment /2 proof/50 corrective /2 justice"
yielded only nine law review articles, none of which makes more than passing reference to the
judgment-proof problem. By contrast, a May 15, 2005 Westlaw search for "judgment /2 proof
/50 deter!" yielded 392 law review articles. As this much larger number of references suggests,
scholars make frequent reference to Shavell's insight that judgment-proof problems tend to
impair deterrence. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report:
Should Tort Law Impose a Duty to Help EndangeredPersonsor Abused Children?,40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 991, 1005-06 (2000) ("[F]or judgment-proof defendants... tort law is
essentially irrelevant."). At least in the context of tort law, however, very few scholars have
focused on the prevalence ofjudgment-proof individuals in our society, and the legal causes of
that phenomenon.
26. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. 1811, 1844 n.85 (2004) (acknowledging that the judgment-proof problem
calls into question the realism of corrective justice accounts of tort law, but implying that the
judgment-proof problem is attributable to "[m]assive inequalities of wealth and power").
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legal choices made by our society about the enforceability of torts judgments
against individuals. Those choices-including, for example, rules exempting
various types of assets and income from collection, rules allowing tort claims to
be discharged in bankruptcy, and rules giving secured creditors priority over
tort claimants-make the judgment-proof problem enormously larger. While
some Americans are judgment-proof infact, far more Americans are judgmentproof in law-they have sufficient assets, but those assets are not collectible
under existing law.
To some readers, this characterization of tort law in operation may seem
incredible on its face. After all, the American tort system is by far the largest in
the world; its direct costs alone are estimated to have been $246 billion in 2003
($845 per capita).2 7 Moreover, Americans are the largest consumers of liability
insurance as well (spending roughly 2% of GNP on it). 28 But there is no
inconsistency. The point is not that our tort system is small-but rather that our
tort system would be far bigger absent the legal barriers to the collection of tort
judgments. 29 A vast array of torts go unredressed because most of the wealth
and income in our affluent society is (or can readily be moved) outside tort
law's reach. As we will see, the judgment-proofing strategies available to
individuals have been enormously popular and successful. In large part, that is
because many of these strategies are, as it were, automatic. Individuals who
accumulate wealth in customary forms such as homes and retirement plans do
not need to resort to more complex strategies such as asset-protection trusts.
Their assets are already sheltered by operation of law.
27. Insurance Information Institute, Hot Topics & Issue Debates: Liability System,
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurancelliability/ (last visited Jan. 6,2006) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. Syverud, supra note 22, at 1629-30. The 2% number seems to have remained fairly
stable for some time. For 2003, the Insurance Information Institute reports that U.S. tort costs
were 2.23% of GDP. Insurance Information Institute, Facts and Statistics: Litigiousness,
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/litigiousness/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. The most recent cost estimates for the U.S. tort system by the Towers PerrinTillinghast actuarial firm support this picture. See TOWERS PERRIN-TILLINGHAST, U.S. TORTS
COSTS: 2004 UPDATE 17 app. 4 (2004), availableat http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/
publications/reports/Tort_2004/Tort.pdf (confirming the relatively low percentage of liability
costs that are paid by the uninsured, both individual and corporate). As of 2003, commercial
(corporate) tort liability constituted $135 billion, or roughly 55% of the $246 billion U.S. tort
system. Id. Personal liability costs, at $84.2 billion, were 34%, and medical malpractice costs,
at $26.5 billion, 11%. Id. at 17 app. 4, 18 app. 5. Of the $84.2 billion in personal liability
costs, the study estimates that a mere 2% ($1.68 billion) represents payments from the personal
assets of uninsured and underinsured defendants. Id. at 17 app. 4. By contrast, over 32% of
corporate tort liability-more than $45 billion-was recovered from the assets (including selfinsurance reserves) of corporate defendants. Id.
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In asserting that the individual judgment-proof problem is largely due to
legal rules that shelter collectible assets, I do not mean to deny that there are
other important barriers (legal and nonlegal) to the collection of tort claims. In
addition to the obstacle posed by litigation costs, which we have already
encountered, many victims simply cannot identify the person who wronged
them, face serious problems of proof, or fail to realize they have suffered
legally cognizable harm. 30 There is also good evidence that, for various
reasons, many tort victims are reluctant
to contact a lawyer, and hence their
31
system.
tort
the
enter
never
claims
Moreover, a disproportionately high percentage of violent and property
crimes in our society-acts that also constitute intentional torts32 -are
committed by offenders who are judgment-proof in fact. According to the
Justice Department's 2003 National Crime Victimization Survey, there were an
estimated 18.6 million property crimes (burglary, motor vehicle theft, and
theft), 5.4 million violent crimes (rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated
assault, and simple assault), and 185,000 personal thefts (pocket picking and
purse snatching). 33 The costs of these "crime-torts" may well exceed the costs
of all unintentional torts. According to a 1996 study by the Justice
Department's National Institute of Justice, personal crime is estimated to cost
$105 billion annually in medical costs, lost earnings, and other direct pecuniary
costs; when pain and suffering and lost quality of life are included (as they
would be in the torts system), the costs rise to an estimated $450 billion
annually. 34 By comparison, the National Safety Council's estimate for the costs
30. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 874 n.7 (1998); SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS supra note 3, at 168.
31. See, e.g., William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformationof Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming... , 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 629, 636, 652 & n.18 (1981)
(suggesting that America's culture of individualism can inhibit people from admitting they have
been injured or "bettered by an adversary"); Richard Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few
Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 447-51 (1987) (noting that underclaiming occurs in some
situations due to social pressures); Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation,in
EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 157-59 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (listing
various reasons injured individuals do not bring claims).
32. The property crimes constitute the torts of conversion or trespass to chattels; the
violent crimes include assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and so on.
33. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the
United States, 2003 Statistical Tables tbl.91 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus03O5.pdf.
34. TED R. MILLER ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS
AND CONSEQUENCES:
A NEw LOOK 1 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdf
files/victcost.pdf. Violent crimes account for $426 billion of the total, property crime only $24
billion (that is, little more than 5%). Id. However, because these figures include deaths and
injuries from drunk driving, they include some unintentionally caused losses. Id.
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of all fatal and nonfatal accidental injuries, whether or not tortiously caused, in
the United States in 2003 was $608 billion.35
The persons who commit these crime-torts are, statistically speaking,
overwhelmingly indigent. Indeed, criminal defendants nowadays are
represented by court-appointed counsel in approximately 80% of cases. 36 There
is also reason to think that the poor commit unintentional torts at a higher rate
than the nonpoor. For example, auto accident rates are generally higher in lowincome urban areas than higher-income suburban ones.37 The high incidence of
intentional and unintentional torts by indigent persons creates a large judgmentproof problem for the tort system, quite apart from legal rules.
Yet the law makes a difference even here. Persons living below or near
the poverty line undoubtedly have low incomes by American standards, but it is
legal rules that almost completely insulate those incomes from tort claimants.
In 2003, the Census Bureau reported that almost thirty-six million Americans
(12.5% of the population) were below the poverty line. 38 Virtually all of the
income received by persons below the poverty line is sheltered from tort
claimants by legal rules. Entitlements such as Social Security and welfare are
exempt from collection; exemptions for personal property, automobiles, and
other possessions shelter a significant fraction of the very modest assets lowincome persons tend to possess; and federal law shields at least 75% of
workers' wages from garnishment.39 While there is obviously an upper bound
on what percentage of a low-income person's income can feasibly be diverted
to make payments to a tort victim, in many instances the line drawn by existing
law falls well short of that limit.
If you doubt that, consider a type of debt that is vigorously enforced even
against low-income debtors: student loans. Since 1998, federal law has made
it extremely difficult for individuals to default on student loans. The Education
Department is authorized to "seize parts of borrowers' pay checks, tax refunds
and Social Security payments without a court order, a power that only the

35. NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTs 2 (2004), available at http://www.nsc.org/
product/samplechapters/if/injuryfactspreview.pdf.
36. William J.Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
CriminalJustice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1997).
37. Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairnessin Insurance Risk Classification,71
VA. L. REv. 403,420 (1985).
38. Poverty Spreads, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 26, 2004, http://money.cnn.com2004/
08/26lnewsleconomy/poverty-survey. The Census Bureau defined the poverty threshold in
2003 as $18,810 for a family of four; $14,680 for a family of three; $12,015 for a family of two;
and $9393 for an individual. Id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2000).
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Internal Revenue Service, among federal agencies, regularly wields."4 Beyond
that, student loans are nondischargeable in bankruptcy (except in cases of
"undue hardship"). 4' The results of these policies have been dramatic: The
annual rate of collections more than doubled between 1998 and 2004, when it
exceeded $5.7 billion in defaulted student loans. 42 A recent Wall Street Journal
feature showed the lengths to which current law goes: The feature concerned
the Education Department's ongoing collection (through a private collection
agency) of $69 a month 43from the Social Security disability payments of an
Oklahoma AIDS patient.
Imagine how the landscape of intentional torts would look if federal and
state law treated tortfeasors, regardless of income, the way it currently treats
persons who default on their student loans. Hardship provisions might ensure
44
that low-income tortfeasors would not starve or be thrown into the streets.
But a substantial percentage of their assets and income, even if it took the form
of welfare benefits or minimum-wage earnings, would be subject to collection
by a tort judgment creditor. Whether you find that scenario appealing or
disturbing, the point is that law, not poverty alone, is responsible for the fact
that low-income tortfeasors are virtually never sued in tort.
My main concern in this Article, of course, is not to subject low-income
Americans to a realistic threat of tort liability-although that might well be
good policy, on both deterrence and corrective justice grounds. As things
stand, indigent tortfeasors have nothing to fear from tort law. Hence their
victims-who are typically poor as well-are largely deprived of the protection
tort law supposedly provides and left to rely on the criminal justice system (or
self-help). 45 But whether or not the poor should be included in the tort system,
40.

John Hechinger, U.S. Gets Tough on Failure to Repay Student Loans, WALL ST. J.,

Jan. 6, 2005, at Al.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000).
42. Hechinger, supra note 40, at Al.
43.

Id.

44. The most widely adopted test for determining "undue hardship" in student loan cases
requires:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a
"minimal" standard of living for [himself] and [his] dependents if forced to repay
the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs
is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student
loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.
In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003).
45. Indeed, the victims' rights movement in criminal law is in part motivated by the
perception that tort law is of little help to most crime victims. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson,
Revisiting Victim's Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 383, 411 (suggesting that the prevalence of
judgment-proof defendants plays a part in the shift of corrective justice from the civil to the
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to a remarkable degree our legal practices expand the judgment-proof category
to sweep in the middle-class and even the affluent. Countless tort claims arise
each year in which the tortfeasor's identity is known, the liability is clear, the
damages are large enough to make litigation worthwhile, the tortfeasor
possesses sufficient assets and income to satisfy the expected judgment (or a
substantial fraction of it)-and yet the legal barriers to tort judgment collection
result in no (or a greatly diminished) recovery. 46 We are now in a position to
get an introductory overview of the legal rules that create these startling results.
B. The Legal Barriersto Collecting Tort Claims: An Overview
Civil money judgments are not self-executing. When a plaintiff obtains a
judgment, the court does not order the defendant to pay; it merely issues an
authoritative declaration that the defendant owes the plaintiff a debt in the
amount of the judgment.4 7 As a result, unless the defendant has adequate
liability insurance, tort claimants must be prepared to undertake postjudgment
litigation to collect theirjudgments. The key issue in that litigation will not be
whether the defendant has assets but whether the defendant has collectible
assets-that is, assets subject to collection under state and federal law.48
The gulf between assets and collectible assets stems from several causesall of them legal in nature. 49 To begin with, a series of legal exemptions, state
and federal, insulate many assets from debt collection. 50 The most important
exemptions are garnishment exemptions, which protect 75% or more of wages;
homestead exemptions, which protect home equity up to the amount specified
criminal process). In recent years, Congress and state legislatures have greatly increased the
availability of restitution to victims of crime-a development that has ameliorated the judgmentproof problem in tort law to some extent. This trend is discussed infra Part V.B.5.
46. In many cases, the blow is cushioned to some extent by liability insurance purchased
by the tortfeasor either voluntarily or pursuant to a legal mandate. Nevertheless, although hard
data are lacking, the sum of cases involving uninsured tortfeasors and cases involving
underinsured tortfeasors is unquestionably very large.

47. See MICHAEL J.HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTcY 30 (2000) (noting that if the
defendant does not pay voluntarily, the plaintiff will have to take further steps to obtain
collection, such as seeking a judicial lien on the defendant's property).
48. In practice, this point is of fundamental importance. As one tort lawyer put it, "I was
taught on my first day of practice there are three things: liability, damages, collectibility. I need
collectibility first. I need damages second. I'm a good lawyer, I'll prove liability." Baker,
Insurance Law Scholar, supra note 4, at 3.
49. I will sometimes use the term "assets" to include income as well as wealth.
50. I will use the term "exemption" broadly, to include any legal rule that insulates a
particular type of asset from a tort judgment creditor.
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in each state statute; retirement plan exemptions, which protect all retirement
savings held in tax-qualified retirement accounts; and trust exemptions, which
(under some circumstances) protect wealth held in trust for the benefit of the
tortfeasor.5 1 These exemptions--each of which we will examine in-depth in
Part rIn-greatly
reduce the collectible assets and income of most individual
52
tortfeasors.

Exemptions from debt collection almost always apply whether the "debt"
originated in a tort claim or a contractual relationship. In an important sense,
therefore, the judgment-proof problem is not peculiar to tort law. Many a
contract creditor has lamented the existence of exemptions from collection, and
the judgment-proof problem undoubtedly undermines the efficacy of breach-ofcontract remedies in some contexts.5 3
Yet this first-cut parity between tort and contract claims is itself a legal
rule that aggravates the judgment-proof problem faced by tort victims. To be a
tort claimant is to be a putative creditor of the alleged tortfeasor. Like contract
creditors, a tort claimant's goals are to obtain a lien on the debtor's assets in
order to liquidate them in satisfaction of the claim and to obtain priority over
the claims of other creditors to these assets.54 But it is much harder for tort
claimants to succeed as creditors. Whereas tort victims are normally in no
position to investigate the financial status of potential tortfeasors prior to being
harmed by them, contract creditors can assess the creditworthiness of those
with whom they deal. Moreover, many contract creditors are able to protect
themselves by obtaining a security interest in property belonging to the debtor.
These differences suggest that exemptions from collectibility should be
narrower in tort than in contract and that tort victims should have priority over
contract creditors with regard to nonexempt assets. Generally speaking,
however, American law refuses to draw such distinctions. With rare
51. Infra Part III.B-D.
52. In addition to these substantive rules, debtors-including tort judgment debtorsenjoy considerably more procedural protection as a result of a line of Supreme Court cases
placing procedural due process restrictions on prejudgment remedies such as garnishment and
replevin. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (holding a Wisconsin
prejudgment garnishment violated procedural due process by failing to give adequate notice and
a prior hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972) (holding ex parte replevin
provisions violated due process by not providing debtors fair hearing prior to seizure); N. Ga.
Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975) (invalidating Georgia
garnishment statute on due process grounds).
53. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Sharar, CredibleCoercion,83 TEx. L. REv. 717,724
(2005) ("[The] judgment-proof problem is a key factor affecting the credibility of a threat to
breach a contract as well as the credibility of any other threat to inflict an illegal outcome.").
54. See A. MECHELE DICKERSON ET AL., THE LAw oF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 6-104 to 6105 (rev. ed. 2005).
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exceptions, exemption laws apply with full force to torts-even intentional
ones. Beyond that, as we are about to see, tort claimants actually fare worse
than contract claimants both before and after judgment.
Prior to judgment, tort claims are deemed unliquidated-that is, of
uncertain amount-as well as unsecured. As a result, the powerful
prejudgment remedies of attachment and garnishment, 5 which are often
56
available for contract claims, are almost always unavailable for tort claims.
Tort claimants would gain considerable leverage if they could attach or garnish
even a portion of a tortfeasor' s personal assets prior to judgment.57 Conversely,
in the absence of prejudgment remedies, tortfeasors typically have several years
after being sued during which to rearrange their assets to minimize their
exposure to tort liability.58
Even after obtaining a judgment, tort victims usually do not become
secured creditors until their attorneys take affirmative postjudgment action to
place liens on tortfeasors' assets. 59 By contrast, other secured creditors (e.g.,
mortgage lenders) ordinarily have prior claims against a tortfeasor's assets that
they perfected shortly after their "deals" were made. Consequently, under the
first-in-time, first-in-right rule, the tort victim's lien will generally be
subordinated to the claims of other secured creditors.6° In effect, then, these
prior security interests operate as further exemptions from collectibility in tort:
Only property that is neither exempt by law, nor subject to a prior security
55. Prejudgment attachment enables the creditor to freeze the debtor's assets by means of
a court order directing the sheriff to seize the specified property pending resolution of the
litigation. Id. at 6-44. Prejudgment garnishment enables the creditor to freeze assets of the
debtor that are held by third parties (e.g., the debtor's bank) or monies owed the debtor by third
parties (e.g., the debtor's employer). Id. at 6-63.
56. See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure
PotentialMoney Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REv. 257, 276 n.79 (1992) (listing illustrative state
statutes limiting prejudgment remedies to contract claims); see also DICKERSON ET AL., supra
note 54, at 6-49 to 6-51 (noting that prejudgment attachments are usually based upon an express
or implied contract); id. at 6-69 to 6-71 (noting that prejudgment garnishment is typically
limited to contract actions). Some states allow tort claimants to seek prejudgment attachment,
but typically only upon a showing that the defendant is hiding assets, about to engage in a
fraudulent conveyance, or the like. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 102(c). A few states allow
prejudgment attachment in tort cases. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-101 (LexisNexis
2005).
57. In addition, prejudgment attachment gives the plaintiff an attachment lien in the
attached property, thereby conferring secured creditor status on the plaintiff. Wasserman, supra
note 56, at 283.
58. Even if prejudgment attachment is available, many statutes include exceptions for
wages and property exempt from execution. Id. at 270-71.
59. HERBERT, supra note 47, at 30.
60. Id. at 27.
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interest recognized by law, is available to satisfy the tort judgment creditor's
claim.
Although these hurdles for tort claimants are daunting, they are only half
the story. Individual debtors also have the option of filing for bankruptcy if
that would be more advantageous to them than simply relying on exemptions
outside bankruptcy. From a tortfeasor's perspective, bankruptcy offers two
major advantages. The first is the "automatic stay": Merely by filing a
bankruptcy petition in bankruptcy court, the debtor automatically obtains a
restraining order forbidding the commencement or continuation of virtually all
noncriminal legal proceedings against the debtor or the debtor's propertyincluding any action to enforce a tort judgment. The second is "discharge":
At the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court normally
awards the debtor a "discharge" that bars creditors from seeking to collect
unpaid pre-petition obligations. 62 Discharge allows bankruptcy to operate as a
fresh start that shields the debtor's entire future income stream from
prebankruptcy creditors. The threat of discharge gives unintentional tortfeasors
63
a powerful advantage in settlement negotiations with a tort plaintiff.
Of course, there are costs associated with bankruptcy as well. The legal
costs of filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7-the most widely used
method-are modest, though they are likely to increase under the 2005
bankruptcy legislation. 64 Far more important is the quid pro quo Chapter 7
demands for the benefits it gives the debtor: The debtor must give up all
nonexempt property to be liquidated for the benefit of creditors.6 5 For the many
tortfeasors
who have little nonexempt property, however, this burden is a light
66
one.

The Bankruptcy Code also offers most debtors another choice: Chapter
13, under which the debtor also obtains an automatic stay, and, eventually, a

61. Id. at 106-07.
62. Id. at 207.
63. Most intentional tort claims are nondischargeable. See infra Part ILl.E (discussing the
nondischargeable torts exclusion and the courts' interpretations of it). Even intentional
tortfeasors, however, may gain leverage from the delaying effects of the automatic stay.
64. See Jeanne Sahadi, Bankruptcy Fees Could Skyrocket, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 14,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/04/12/pf/bankruptcyfees/ (noting that fees of $1000 to
$1500 have been typical in Chapter 7 cases, but are expected to increase substantially as a result
of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act).
65. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 37-38 (3d ed. 2001).
66. Plaintiffs' attorneys may sometimes gain settlement leverage from bankruptcy's
intangible costs, which include impairment of the debtor's ability to obtain unsecured credit and
reputational harm in the community.
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discharge that is potentially ever broader than under Chapter 7.67 Moreover,
under Chapter 13, the debtor is not required to give up nonexempt property 68 for example, a home in which the debtor's equity exceeds the applicable
homestead exemption. In exchange for these benefits, the debtor must make
payments to creditors from the debtor's "disposable income" for three to five
years, pursuant to a payment plan approved by the bankruptcy court, prior to
obtaining discharge. 69 Thus, Chapter 13 tends to be more attractive to debtors
who have substantial nonexempt property they want to keep.
From 1978 until the 2005 bankruptcy reform legislation (the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)), 70 the Bankruptcy
Code allowed debtors to choose Chapter 7 regardless of their income, subject to
a narrow "abuse" of bankruptcy exception applicable only to petitions involving
"primarily consumer debts.",7' BAPCPA greatly expands the abuse of
bankruptcy exception: It will steer many debtors with above-median incomes
into Chapter 13, even if they would prefer Chapter 7, and tighten the standards
to which debtors will be held in fashioning payment plans under Chapter 13.72
These changes will improve the bargaining position of tort victims facing
tortfeasors who threaten to file for bankruptcy-but only if those tortfeasors
have consumer debts that exceed their tort liability. Under BAPCPA, as under
prior law, dismissal for abuse of bankruptcy is available only in cases involving
primarily consumer debts-and tort judgments have been held not to constitute
consumer debts.73

Even after BAPCPA, then, the bankruptcy deck remains stacked against
tort claimants. Most unintentional tortfeasors will still be eligible for a Chapter
7 discharge, and will have few nonexempt assets. These tortfeasors can
credibly threaten to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in which event the plaintiff's
attorney's expected recovery is likely to be less than the costs of litigating and
collecting in bankruptcy. Faced with that threat, and in the absence of liability
insurance, plaintiffs' attorneys will decline to take the case in the first place.
67. See BAIRD, supra note 65, at 54 ("[T]he main advantages of Chapter 13 are that one
can keep existing assets and that one may be able to discharge a greater number of debts.").
Debtors may not file for Chapter 13 if their debts exceed the amounts specified in Code § 109.
Id. at 55.
68. Id. at 53.
69. Id.
70. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23.
71. See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying text (discussing § 707(b) abuse of
bankruptcy test).
72. See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text (explaining the BAPCPA means test).
73. Infra note 228 and accompanying text.
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If the tortfeasor is likely to be ineligible for Chapter 7 under BAPCPA, the
situation becomes more complicated. The tort victim may be able to extract
some settlement money because the tortfeasor would have to pay something to
the tort victim pursuant to the Chapter 13 payment plan. But even in Chapter
13 cases (as in Chapter 7 ones), tortfeasors can almost always time their filings
so as to ensure that tort claimants are merely unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy.7 4 And if the tortfeasor must file under Chapter 13, then the
tortfeasor will ordinarily have other unsecured creditors as well-in which
event each creditor's expected payout in bankruptcy is likely to be a small
fraction of the amount owed. The result is that the tortfeasor will frequently be
able to use the threat of Chapter 13 to deter the tort victim from bringing suit
(or force a lowball settlement).
Above and beyond the obstacles created by exemptions and bankruptcy,
tort claimants are at a disadvantage for a reason rooted in the nature of their
claims. To some extent, potential tort victims can protect themselves from
losses by purchasing first-party insurance. But they cannot strategize in
advance so as to maximize their recoveries in tort. Potential tortfeasors, by
contrast, can engage in judgment-proofing-advance planning to shelter their
assets and income from the potential threat of tort liability.75 These strategies
can take many forms, from converting wealth to exempt assets, to transferring
nonexempt assets to family members, trusts, or family limited partnerships, to
76
using business organizations to reduce the individual's exposure to liability.
Understandably, most tortfeasors do not fully exploit these opportunities.
For poor and working-class individuals, who are already fully protected by
exemptions and bankruptcy, nothing would be gained; and for the middle class,
it is typically cheaper to protect nonexempt assets by buying liability insurance
74. If the tortfeasor files for bankruptcy before the tort plaintiff gets a judgment, the
plaintiff is an unsecured creditor whose wrong is considered a "claim" for bankruptcy purposes,
and is therefore dischargeable. HERBERT, supra note 47, at 162. If the tortfeasor files for
bankruptcy after the tort plaintiff gets a judgment, but before the plaintiff obtains ajudiciai lien
against the tortfeasor's assets, the plaintiff is still considered an unsecured creditor. If the
tortfeasor files for bankruptcy within ninety days after the plaintiff obtains a judicial lien, the
lien will be treated as an avoidable preference in bankruptcy. Id. at 31. Avoidance will once
again relegate the tort judgment creditor to unsecured creditor status. Only in the unlikely event
that the tortfeasor files for bankruptcy more than ninety days after the plaintiff obtains ajudicial
lien will the plaintiff become a secured creditor with an unavoidable lien. Id. at 198.
75. Moreover, of all their creditors, potential tortfeasors are least likely to be concerned
about maintaining good relations with tort victims.
76. With the exception of spendthrift trusts and asset protection trusts, this Article does
not address the range of judgment-proofing techniques available to individuals. For an
introduction to a wide variety of them, see ROBERT J.Miwrz, ASSET PROTECION FOR PHYSICIANS
AND HIGH-RISK BusINEss OWNERS (2002), availableat http://www.rjmintz.com/apptoc.htm.
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than by hiring an asset protection lawyer. But for the affluent, and particularly
for persons in high-risk occupations, asset protection planning is increasingly
important as a substitute for (or in addition to) the purchase of liability
insurance.
Still, in the grand scheme of things, the biggest inflator of the judgmentproof problem is not tailor-made asset protection, but the off-the-rack variety
created by state and federal legislatures. Every potential tortfeasor enjoys
automatic asset protection in the form of exemptions from collection (valid
even against intentional torts) and in the form of an optional bankruptcy
discharge (valid against all but intentional torts). We might think of this as the
"democratization" of asset-protection privileges. The upshot, as Part HI will
demonstrate, is that in most states individuals are entitled to commit torts while
keeping much of their home equity, their retirement savings, most or all of their
income, and their trust fund (if they have one). Granted, these entitlements do
not completely eliminate the threat of tort liability. As we will see in Part LV,
the residual threat is enough to induce many individuals to purchase substantial
quantities of liability insurance in some contexts. But these purchases would be
far higher were it not for the legal barriers to collecting tort judgments from the
personal assets of tortfeasors.
111. The PrincipalBarriersto Collecting Tort Claims
We are now in a position to work through the most important barriers to
tort collection in more detail, focusing one-at-a-time on the "big four"
categories of largely exempt assets: earned income, home equity, retirement
accounts, and trusts. In each instance, we will consider the impact of these
exemptions outside bankruptcy. Then, in Part III.E, we will examine how these
exemptions can be used in conjunction with bankruptcy (or the threat thereof).
Part HLI.F will step back and offer a revised overview of the judgment-proof
problem.
A. How Tortfeasors' Income Is Insulatedfrom Tort Claims
The most important "asset" most people own is their human capital-their
marketable skills, and the income stream those skills can generate. In 2003, the
aggregate after-tax personal disposable income of Americans amounted to an
estimated $8.216 trillion. 7 The median per capita income in the United States
77.

U.S.

CENsus BUREAU, STATISTICALABSTRACTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES:

2004-2005, at
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was roughly $23,000,78 and the poverty line for a single individual was around
$9600. 79 In a world in which 1.2 billion people live on $1 per day and another
2.8 billion live on less than $2 per day, these income levels must be seen as far
above basic subsistence. 80 Even if one shifts from subsistence to some implicit
threshold of "decency" or "adequacy" in food, shelter, housing, education, and
so forth, it seems clear that the overwhelming majority of Americans are well
above that line-and could therefore afford to pay much of their income to
satisfy a tort judgment without suffering undue hardship or deprivation. 8
Nevertheless, as we will now explore, American law shelters most income from
tort claimants in several mutually reinforcing ways.
1. Exempt Income
Several important categories of income are completely exempt from
collection by tort judgment creditors. Federal government social benefits,
including Social Security, disability, and health insurance, equaled $1.332
trillion in 2003.82 Under federal law, these transfer payments may not be used
to satisfy most types of judgments, including tort judgments. 83 Similarly,
following the example set by the federal bankruptcy exemptions, many states
disability
exempt state welfare payments, unemployment compensation,
84
benefits, and workers' compensation benefits from collection.
430 tbl.647 (2005) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2004-05].
78. Carmen DeNavas-Walt et a]., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2003, at 5 tbl. 1 (2004), availableat http://www.census.
gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf.
79. Id. at 39 app. B.
80. Measuring Global Poverty, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0908762.html.
81. Apparently about 40% of adults living in poverty in the United States live in "extreme
poverty," defined as income less than half the poverty level. See Legal Momentum, Reading
Between the Lines: Women's Poverty in the United States, 2003, at 1 (Oct. 2004),
http://www.legalmomentum.org/womeninpoverty.pdf (noting that 12.4% of women and 8.9% of
men lived in poverty, while 5.1% of women and 3.8% of men lived in extreme poverty). The
"extreme poverty" line might be one way to define what constitutes "hardship" for tort
judgment-collection purposes.
82. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2004-05, supra note 77, at 432 tbl.650.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000) ("[N]one of the moneys paid or payable or rights
existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.").
84. Section 522(d)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from the bankruptcy estate a
variety of benefits, including workers' compensation, disability, illness, or unemployment
benefits; alimony; and most payments under retirement and welfare plans. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(10) (2000). This exemption is only available to individuals in states that have not
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Consider the implications of just the Social Security exemption.
Approximately two-thirds of Americans over age sixty-five rely on Social
Security for over half their income, one-third rely on Social Security for over
90% of their income, and the median recipient relies on Social Security for
67% of income. 5 Thus, the principal income source for tens of millions of
elderly Americans is 100% exempt from tort liability. In addition, as we will
see in Part Ill.D, there are also severe restrictions on the collectibility of taxqualified retirement funds, both before and after they are paid out to the
beneficiary. These types of retirement payments, which amount to hundreds of
billions of dollars of annual income, represent the principal source of
supplemental income for Social Security recipients. The effect is that the
fastest-growing (and, on average, highest net worth) demographic group in the
United States-the elderly---enjoys both its public and its supplemental private
retirement income virtually immune from tort liability.8 6 Granted, the elderly
presumably commit fewer torts than most other demographic groups. But as
the population ages, these exclusions will become increasingly important.
2. Restrictions on Garnishment
Since 1968, the traditional remedy of garnishment, which enables
judgment creditors to collect from the debtor's wages before they are paid to
the debtor, has been sharply limited by federal law. 7 The Consumer Credit
Protection Act provides that garnishment may not exceed the lesserof 25% of
an individual's weekly disposable earnings or the individual's disposable
88
earnings in excess of thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage.
opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions. However, some opt-out states have used
§ 522(d)(10) as a model in crafting their own exemptions. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 602312(b) (1994) ("An individual debtor under the federal bankruptcy reform act of 1978 may
exempt.., any property listed in subsection (d)(10) of section 522 of such federal act.").
85. Michael Ettlinger & Jeff Chapman, Social Security and the Income of the Elderly,
Econ. Pol'y Inst. Issue Brief No. 206 (2005), available at http://www.epi.org/content.
cfm/ib206.pdf.
86. In 2001, the highest median net worth group (by age) was persons ages 55-64, at
$181,500, followed by those 65-74, at $176,300, and those 75 and over, at $151,400. By
contrast, the under-35 median was $11,600, the 35-44 median was $77,600, and the 45-54
median was $133,000. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2004-05, supra note 77, at 457 tbl.694.
87. Prior to adoption of the CCPA, there was tremendous variation among state
garnishment laws. See generally COMMERCE CLEARINGHOUSE, INC., HANDBOOK ON ASSIGNMENT
AND GARNISHMENT OF WAGES (1966) (collecting state laws). For example, Wisconsin sheltered

a maximum of 50% of wages, id. at 261, while New York sheltered 90%, id. at 181, and
Massachusetts sheltered a flat $50/week, id. at 138.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2000). The CCPA makes exceptions for debts for state or
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"Earnings" are broadly defined as "compensation paid or payable for personal
services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement
program." 89 The CCPA provides that States may-and a number do-impose
more stringent limitations on garnishment. 9° For example, some states use a
higher multiple of the minimum wage or exempt a higher percentage of
income; 9' Florida exempts all of the income of the "head of a family" from
garnishment (unless the individual agrees otherwise); and Texas forbids
garnishment altogether. 92
The effect of these federal and state provisions is that garnishment offers
the successful tort claimant only a stream of relatively small payments in most
instances. Consider a tortfeasor from a household at the median in money
income (around $43,000 for 2002). 93 After taxes, less than $10,000 per year
would be available for garnishment. And even that number overstates the
available recovery in most cases. Most households contain more than one
wage-earner. But in most jurisdictions spouses are not liable, without more, for
torts committed by the other spouse.94 Consequently, in most cases only the
individual tortfeasor's income would be subject to garnishment. The average
hourly private-sector wage in 2004 was $15.70, 95 or about $628 per week for
full-time workers. After taxes, garnishment would be unlikely to yield more
than $125 per week.
Still, $125 per week is roughly $6000 per year, or about $4000 per year to
the plaintiff and $2000 per year to the plaintiff's attorney. Even after
considering the transaction costs of garnishment-such as monitoring payments
from employers and renewing the writ of garnishment periodically-these
federal taxes, and for court-ordered child support. Id. § 1673(b).
89. Id. § 1672.
90. Id. § 1677(1).
91. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 170/4 (2002) (exempting the greater of 85% of
earnings or forty-five times the minimum hourly wage).
92. See FLA. STAT. § 222.11(2)(a) (1998) (exempting the first $500 of earnings
unconditionally, and exempting earnings above $500 a week unless the person "has agreed
otherwise in writing"); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (b)(l) (Vernon 2000) (prohibiting wage
garnishment in favor of creditors).
93. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2004-05, supra note 77, at 443 tbl.666.
94. See Robert Chapman, Coverture and Cooperation: The Firm, the Market, and the
Substantive Consolidationof Married Debtors, 17 BANKR. DEv. J. 105, 190 n.397 (2000)
(listing cases in which courts considered whether one spouse is liable for the torts of the other).
95. Update on Kerry's "Shrinking Middle Class," Annenberg Political Fact Check
(Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.factcheck.org/article249.html (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics
average hourly earnings data).
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returns might seem sufficient to induce some plaintiffs' attorneys to sue
uninsured median workers who commit torts. Recall, however, that the
plaintiffs' attorney must invest in the litigation from the beginning, and that
collection via garnishment implies a gradual stream of small payments. This
significantly reduces its attractiveness. For successful plaintiffs' attorneys who
expect a return of hundreds or even thousands of dollars per hour,96 few
garnishment cases will be profitable.
But even if high-flying plaintiffs' attorneys are uninterested, one might
think that a lower-end segment of the plaintiffs' bar would emerge, specializing
in cases that require garnishment or other blood-money collection. Even if
these firms did not wish to pursue collection themselves, they could contract it
out to collection firms, or (with the consent of clients) assign judgments to
collection specialists for a fixed sum. 97 And of course, in some cases, the threat
of garnishment might induce a tortfeasor to settle for a lump sum.
I have not undertaken an independent investigation of the size of the
blood-money tort bar, and further research on this topic would clearly be
worthwhile. Judging from the available evidence, there does not appear to be
an extensive legal-services market for tort claims against defendants whose
main collectible asset is earned income subject to garnishment.98 Given a high
enough gamishable income, however, no doubt some plaintiffs' attorneys
would take cases involving substantial injuries.
But there is a simple countermove that sharply limits the ability of
plaintiffs' attorneys to use the threat of garnishment against well-paid
unintentional tortfeasors: the threat that the defendant will file for bankruptcy
and will obtain a discharge of the plaintiff's tort claim, eradicating any risk of
future garnishment. Tortfeasors who earn high salaries, faced with the possible
loss of 25% of their after-tax income to garnishment, will often find it in their
interest to seek a discharge in bankruptcy or to threaten bankruptcy to reduce
their settlement exposure. Bankruptcy, in short, is the trump card that explains
why even well-paid tortfeasors are unlikely to be sued in the absence of liability
insurance (or other collectible, nonexempt assets).
96.

See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency Fee Lawyers:

Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653 (2003) (describing the
current yields from contingent-fee practice).
97. Cf. Suein Hwang, Once-IgnoredConsumer Debts Are Focus of Booming Industry,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2004, at Al (describing the rise of new "debt-buying companies," which,
"[u]nlike old-fashioned collection agencies, .. . pursue debtors on behalf of a client company
and keep a set percentage of what they gather.... typically acquir[ing] large portfolios of bad
debt at a discount").
98. See infra notes 273-95 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Baker's finding
that most personal injury lawyers in Connecticut are reluctant to take blood-money cases).
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3. Other Restrictions on the Efficacy of Garnishment (and Other
Postjudgment Remedies)
The CCPA limits on garnishment and the threat of bankruptcy are not the
only problems with this postjudgment remedy. Garnishment only works well
when there is a third-party payor who can be identified in advance and served
with a court order. In many circumstances, it is not practical to garnish a
tortfeasor's income. The tortfeasor might be paid in cash (e.g., waiters and
waitresses) or paid by a variety of customers rather than a single employer (e.g.,
independent contractors), making garnishment impracticable. In an age of
outsourcing, independent contractors, and under-the-table payments to millions
of low-paid workers,
garnishment poses no threat at all to a significant fraction
99
of the workforce.

B. How Tortfeasors' Real and PersonalPropertyIs Insulated
from Tort Claims
Real and personal property is the second major component of personal
wealth. The most important assets within these categories are home equity,
automobiles, and interest-bearing accounts.l1° Today, home equity represents
over $9 trillion in value,' 0' with automobile equity adding another $1.1
trillion.10 2 Approximately 67% of American households now own their own
home, 86% own a motor vehicle, and 65% have an interest-earning
99. The wages of many low-income and part-time workers are also 100% exempt under
the CCPA's alternative minimum-wage exemption, which shields thirty hours per week at the
minimum wage. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a)(2) (2000). At the current minimum wage of $5.15 per
hour, the first $154.50 of weekly income is exempted from garnishment.
100. Another important-and often exempted-asset is cash value life insurance policies.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 627.6(6) (Supp. 2005) (providing an unlimited exemption for life
insurance cash value); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-54-102(1)(l)(I)(A) (1996) (providing a $25,000
exemption). Space limitations lead me to omit extended treatment of this type of exemption.
But its importance is well attested to by the fact that in most states the life insurance cash value
exemption is unlimited. BUIST M. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON LIFE INSURANCE § 21.4 (1991).
101. The National Association of Home Builders, using Census Bureau data, estimated that
Americans had $4.1 trillion in home equity in their homes in 2000, and that this amounted to
nearly half of the net worth of the average home-owning American family. Picket Fence
Preview, Home Equity Accounts for Most Homeowners' Wealth, http://www.picketfence-vtfsbo.com/homeequity.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006). Since then, home equity has grown
rapidly. According to the Federal Reserve Board, unborrowed home equity in September 2004

was a record $9.3 trillion. James F. Smith, There Is No Housing Bubble in the USA, Bus.
ECON., Apr. 2005, at 29, 31.

102.

STATISTicAL ABSTRACT 2004-05, supra note 77, at 458 tbl.696.
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account.10 3 In addition, of course, there is a catch-all category of personal
property (furniture, appliances, jewelry, and cash) that could be used to satisfy
a tort judgment.
The barriers to collecting each of these forms of wealth are formidable.
But before exploring them, it will be useful to get a better sense for the
distribution of these assets in the United States. Wealthy as our society is, in
2000 the median home equity among homeowners was only $59,000, the
median auto equity among auto owners was less than $6000, and the median
value of interest-bearing accounts among holders of such accounts was
$4000204 Median household net worth in the United States in 2002 was about
$86,000 (far smaller than the average net worth of about $396,000).105 The
median for nonwhite and Hispanic households is far smaller-a mere $17,000;
and even that sum exceeds the $12,000
median net worth of households headed
1°6
by a person under age thirty-five.
As these numbers imply, although private wealth in the United States now
approaches $50 trillion, that wealth is concentrated at the top. 107 According to
one estimate, in 2001 the top 1% of households held 32.7% of all private
wealth; the top 10% held 69.8%; and the top 50% held 97.2%.1°8 Thus, the
bottom 50% of households held only 2.8% of private wealth, 109 and the bottom
20% of households actually have negative net worths. 10 A tort victim who is
injured by someone from the "bottom half," in other words, is unlikely to find
significant wealth, even in the absence of exemptions. And even modest
exemptions from collection will suffice to shelter the wealth of many middleclass individuals.

103. Id. at 456 tbl.691. These figures are as of 2000. In addition, 27% of households own
stocks or mutual funds, 23% have an IRA or Keogh account, and 30% have a 401K or thrift
savings plan. Id.
104. Id. at 456 tbl.692.
105. Id. at 457 tbl.694.
106. Id.
107. Jane Kim and Ron Lieber, Higher Rates Start to Bite Consumers, WALL ST. J., Aug.
18, 2005, at D1 (according to the Federal Reserve, from 1999 to 2005 household net worth
increased from $42 trillion to about $49 trillion; consumer debt increased over the same period
from $6.8 trillion to nearly $11 trillion).
108. United for a Fair Economy, Wealth Inequality Charts, http://www.faireconomy.org/
research/wealthcharts.html.
109. Id.
110. Economic Policy Institute, Facts and Figures, State of Working America 2004/2005;
Wealth 1, availableat www.epinet.org/books/swa2004/news/swafacts-wealth.pdf.
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1. PropertyExemption Laws

Every state has property exemption laws that protect some personal assets
of debtors from creditors, including judgment creditors."' These state laws
have a long history: By the late nineteenth century, most states had exemption
laws that included exemptions for homesteads and various itemized types of
personal property. 12 From the beginning, many of these laws applied to tort
claims as well as contract claims. 3 Nowadays,
that is true of the
4
overwhelming majority of exemption laws."
When Congress enacted the first long-lived bankruptcy law in 1898, it
incorporated these state property exemptions: An individual who filed for
bankruptcy could obtain a discharge from most debts while retaining whatever
property was exempt under the laws of the state in which he or she resided.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 altered this system to some extent. It established
Ila set of uniform federal exemptions that a debtor could choose over his state's
exemptions, except in those states that formally opt out of the federal system.
In states that opt out, debtors must use local exemption laws."" 5 Roughly twothirds of the states have opted out.16
State exemption laws run the gamut from extremely generous to stingy.
Consider the homestead exemption: As of 1996, seven states did not limit the
homestead exemption by dollar amount; nine states exempted more than
$100,000; eight states exempted between $50,000 and $100,000; four states
exempted between $30,000 and $50,000; eighteen states exempted less than
$30,000 (the amount then allowed under the federal exemption); and five states
111. My account here is indebted to Richard M. Hynes et al., The PoliticalEconomy of
Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 23-24 (2004).
112. In some states, including Texas and Florida, the homestead exemption is included in
the state constitution, thus making it impervious to ordinary legislative revision. TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 50; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. Some other states, such as Colorado, have
constitutional provisions calling for generous exemptions. See COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 1 ("The
general assembly shall pass liberal homestead and exemption laws.").
113. In the nineteenth (and early twentieth) century, many exemption laws applied to all
"debts contracted." The courts were split on the interpretation of such language. See Note,
Public Lands-HomesteadExemption-Debts Contracted, 2 MINN. L. REv. 159-60 (1918)
(citing cases that interpreted "debts collected" in a variety of ways).
114. For example, for over a century, Indiana law provided that property exemptions
applied to contract claims, but not tort claims. See Smith v. Wood, 83 Ind. 522, 523 (1882)
(holding that no exemption was allowed because the complaint alleged a tort). In 1986,
however, the Indiana legislature amended the statute to include tort claims. IND. CODE § 34-228-1 (Supp. 1997); see In re Ondras, 846 F.2d 33, 34 n.l (7th Cir. 1988) (noting the change in
Indiana law).
115. Hynes et al., supra note 111, at 24.
116. id.at26tbl.l.
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had no homestead exemption. 1 7 Thus, almost half the states (twenty-four)
exempted at least $50,000 in home equity: In these states, the median
homeowner's $59,000 of home equity was almost completely protected.
Conversely, in just over one-third of the states the exemption represented less
than half of the median home equity, leaving significant potential exposure to
creditors.
It is more complicated to compare personal property exemptions.
However, Hynes estimates the mean personal property exemption at $6187 as
of 1996.' 18 When combined with the estimated mean 1996 homestead
exemption of $48,595, the resulting total (approximately $55,000) represents
about 77% of the 1998 median family net worth of $71,60011 9-a percentage
very reminiscent of the CCPA's 75% exemption for earned income. However,
whereas the CCPA sets a uniform 75% floor in all states, the combined
2
homestead and personal property exemptions vary widely across states.1 0
In light of these variations, one would predict that a resident of, say,
Pennsylvania (combined exemptions $300) is more likely to be sued than a
resident of, say, Massachusetts (combined exemptions $101,400). 12' However,
another factor reduces the variation somewhat. In at least fifteen states, a
conveyance to a married couple creates an estate in land known as "tenancy by
the entirety.' 22 The hallmark of tenancy by the entirety is that only a joint
creditor of both tenant-spouses can foreclose on the property. Consequently, a
tort victim who was wronged by only one spouse-for example, a medical
malpractice claimant-cannot foreclose on a judgment
lien until the tenancy by
23
the entirety is terminated (e.g., by sale or divorce).
117. Id. These dollar amounts are for married couples, for whom the federal government
and most states double the exemptions. Id. at 25.
118. Id.at26tbl.l.
119. Arthur B.Kennickell et al.,
Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Resultsfrom
the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RES. BuLL. 1, 7 (2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/01001ead.pdf.
120. The combined value of the exemptions in 1996 was less than $10,000 in four states,
between $10,000 and $20,000 in another eleven states, between $20,000 and $30,000 in six
states, between $30,000 and $50,000 in five states, between $50,000 and $100,000 in eight
states, and over $100,000 in sixteen states. See Hynes et al., supra note 111, at 26 tbl.1 (listing
data from which these figures can be derived).
121. Id. I know of no study comparing tort litigation rates by state against exemptions by
state, but that might be a promising way to estimate the importance of exemptions.
122. See id. (listing states with the strong form of tenancy by the entirety I describe in text).
123. Most bankruptcy courts have held that a tenancy by the entirety persists after one of
the tenants files for bankruptcy. See In re Spears, 308 B.R. 793, 822 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2004), rev'd on other grounds, 313 B.R. 212 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (rejecting these
decisions, but holding that only joint claims may be asserted against the interest held by the
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In short, tenancy by the entirety operates much like an unlimited
homestead exemption. 24 Interestingly, many of the states that have minimal
homestead exemptions are among those with a strong form of tenancy by the
entirety: this includes four of the five no-exemption states and six of the twelve
states with exemptions of less than $30,000 as of 1996.125 The bottom line is
that all but seven states 26
have either a $30,000-plus homestead exemption or
tenancy by the entirety. 1
2. Barriersto Collectingfrom Nonexempt Home Equity
We have seen that in most states, a majority of the net worth of homeowning families at the median is exempted from collection by tort claimants.
We will now address the barriers to collecting from nonexempt home equity
and personal property, which are also very high.
Consider a $100,000 tortfeasor who owns a home worth $200,000, subject
to a mortgage of $90,000, in a state with a $50,000 homestead exemption. The
mortgage lender, of course, will have priority over the tort judgment creditor.
Nevertheless, there would appear to be $60,000 in nonexempt home equity
available for collection.
To collect that $60,000, however, is easier said than done. In most states,
the tort judgment creditor must initiate a foreclosure action to force the sale of
the tortfeasor's home. Unfortunately, foreclosure sales typically bring
substantially less than fair market value.127 Because the mortgage lender gets
paid first, the risk that home equity will disappear falls primarily on the tort

bankruptcy trustee in property formerly owned by the debtor as a tenant by the entirety).
124. See Hynes et al., supra note 111, at 31 n.20 (noting that tenancy by the entirety can
operate as a substitute for the homestead exemption). Beyond that, "unlike a homestead,
tenancy by the entirety is not limited to the family home. An unlimited amount of commercial
or investment property can be held by the entirety and thus inaccessible to creditors of only the
husband, or only the wife." MATERIALS ON FAMILY WEALTH MANAGEMENT 790 (William J.
Turnier & Grayson M.P. McCouch eds., 2005).
125. See Hynes et al., supra note 111, at 26 tbl. 1 (listing data from which these figures can
be derived).
126. Just as tenancy by the entirety is of no help to unmarried tortfeasors, in some states
single persons may not claim the homestead exemption. DICKERSON Er AL., supranote 54, at 6-

197 (citing

WILLIAM HAWKLAND &PmRRE LOISEAUX, DEBTOR-CREDrrOR RELATIONS 366 (2d

ed.

1979)).
127. Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto
Strict Foreclosure-AnEmpiricalStudy of Mortgage Foreclosureand SubsequentResale, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 850, 877 (1985).

THE JUDGMENT-PROOFSOCIETY

633

plaintiff. If the home nets only $160,000 at a foreclosure sale, our hypothetical
tort victim will receive only $20,000.
To be sure, the threat of foreclosure can give a tort judgment creditor
substantial leverage against tortfeasors with substantial nonexempt home
equity. To avoid having their homes placed on the auction block, some
tortfeasors may be willing to settle by borrowing against their home equity and
transferring the proceeds to the tort victim. As we will consider next, however,
home equity loans are more likely to be part of the problem for tort judgment
creditors than part of the solution.
A tortfeasor who has nonexempt home equity when a suit is filed can
usually make that home equity disappear long before the tort plaintiff can
obtain a judgment and convert it to a judgment lien. As of 2003, when Texas
voters finally approved a constitutional amendment allowing home equity
loans, 128 every state in the Union permits homeowners to borrow against their
home equity for virtually any purpose a lender will tolerate. Thanks to low
interest rates and tax deductibility, homeowners have gobbled up home equity
loans and lines of credit. In 2004 alone,
approximately $431 billion of new
129
home equity loans were originated.
Tort defendants can easily use home equity loans to minimize their
exposure to tort liability. Imagine a tortfeasor with $50,000 in home equity in a
state with a stingy $30,000 homestead exemption. Upon being sued, the
tortfeasor takes out a $20,000 home equity loan and uses the proceeds to pay
off credit card debt. The home equity lender obtains a second mortgage, and
consequently has priority over the tort claimant.
Meanwhile, the homeowner's
30
nonexempt home equity has vanished.
3. Barriersto Collecting OtherPersonalProperty
Space does not permit a full treatment of the ins and outs of collecting tort
judgments from the other personal property of tortfeasors. To capture the
flavor of the problem, there is no better way than to focus on cash-to which
128. TEx. CONST. art XVI, § 50(a)(6).
129. Ruth Simon, Home-Equity Loans Hit Record Levels, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2005, at
Dl. According to Economy.com, the total amount of home equity Americans accessed in
2004-including capital gains and new loans-was $705 billion, up from $266 billion in 1999.
James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, As Prices Rise, Homeowners Go Deep in Debt to Buy Real
Estate, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2005, at A10.
130. After the tort victim obtains a judgment lien, the balance of power shifts because the
lien effectively bars the tortfeasor from selling, borrowing, or refinancing until the lien is
released.
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savings accounts, automobiles, jewelry, and almost anything else can readily be
converted. Here, a different postjudgment remedy (and its weaknesses) comes
to the fore. In most states, a judgment creditor can obtain a writ of execution
from the clerk of the court that issued the judgment.13 ' The writ will direct the
local sheriff to "levy upon" (that is, seize) enough of the debtor's nonexempt
personal property to satisfy the judgment. Usually, the sheriff sells the seized
property and turns over the proceeds to the judgment creditor. In the case of
cash, the sheriff can simply turn the money over to the judgment creditor.
Unfortunately, the writ of execution is usually doomed to fail when it
comes to cash or other highly liquid assets. Because the sheriff is, in the eyes
of the law, merely collecting a debt, his authority to use physical force to wrest
cash from the judgment debtor will be sharply limited. In addition, a sheriff's
search of a judgment debtor's person or home is subject to the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.132 In recent
years, several courts have held that writs of execution do not qualify as
warrants, because they are issued proforma by the clerk of court, rather than
33
issued by a judge after review of the validity of the creditor's claim.
Consequently, the sheriff cannot enforce the writ by entering the debtor's home
unless the debtor consents. If the debtor refuses, the sheriff must apply for an
execution warrant by filing an affidavit reciting that property subject to
execution is located in the debtor's home. But by the time the judge issues a
warrant, the debtor may well have spent the money or hidden it elsewhere. In
short, a judgment creditor's
legal right to seize a debtor's cash is usually
34
worthless in practice. 1

HERBERT, supra note 47, at 31.
132. Searches by government officials are subject to the Fourth Amendment even if the
purpose of the search is the enforcement of civil liability rather than criminal law enforcement.
See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358-59 (1977) (concluding that a
warrantless search to satisfy a levy for delinquent taxes violated the Fourth Amendment).
133. See, e.g., Dorwart v. Caraway, 966 P.2d 1121,1131 (Mont. 1998) (finding the writ of
execution insufficient to overcome the debtor's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
search and seizure); State v. Hinchey, 374 N.W.2d 14,19 (Neb. 1985) ("[Alrming a sheriff...
with a writ of execution is not the same as employing judicial process of a type required for one
to obtain a search warrant .... ").
134. In some states, postjudgment remedies include turnover orders whereby the court
orders the judgment debtor to turn over specified property to the judgment creditor. E.g., CAL.
CI. PROC. CODE § 482.080 (West Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-356b (West
2005); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1402 (West 2003); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 31.002(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Where available, turnover orders should increase
creditors' ability to seize cash or other liquid assets.
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C. How the Affluent Use Trusts to Insulate Their Wealth from Tort Claims
When it comes to wealthy individuals, the United States leads the world.
A 2004 study found that 7.5 million American households had a net worth of
$1 million or more-and it excluded the value of primary residences.' 35 One
would expect that, even in the absence of liability insurance, a tort judgment
creditor could expect to collect substantial sums from these wealthy individuals.
In reality, affluent individuals who engage in advance asset protection planning
can shield millions of dollars in assets from tort judgment creditors. These
strategies are not costless, requiring as they do the services of lawyers,
accountants, trustees, and other intermediaries. For many wealthy persons,
however, the costs are a bargain compared to the costs of tort litigation and the
risk of a large tort judgment. 36 Indeed, there is an entire cottage industry of
asset protection specialists whose core mission is to systematically devise ways
clients' assets from civil liability. Their services are increasingly
to shelter their
37
in demand. 1
1. Spendthrift Trusts
One time-honored and widely used asset protection strategy employs
trusts. A property owner (the settlor) transfers legal title to the property to a
trustee, while directing the trustee (usually in writing) to manage or invest the
property for the benefit of one or more "beneficiaries." Unless the transfer of
property to the trust was a fraudulent conveyance, the settlor' s creditors cannot
reach the "corpus" of the trust-because the settlor has parted with both legal
and equitable ownership.1 38 Moreover, the beneficiary's creditors will not be
able to reach the trust's assets because they have not yet been distributed to the
beneficiary, who normally has no immediate right to receive them. All but a

135. Robert Frank, MillionaireRanks Hit New High, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2005, at Dl.
136. Of course, the wealthy can use liability insurance to cover both tort liability and direct
litigation defense costs. But the indirect costs of litigation (time, inconvenience, disruption, loss
of privacy, reputational harm, etc.) can be very large-and purchasing liability insurance can
actually increase the risk of being sued and incurring those costs.
137. In a recent survey of individuals with more than $1 million in assets, 35% of those
surveyed had some form of asset protection plan, compared with just 17% in 2000. And of
those who did not have a plan in place, 61% expressed an interest in creating one. Rachel
Emma Silverman, Litigation Boom Spurs Efforts to ShieldAssets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,2003, at
D.
138. The fraudulent conveyance doctrine is discussed infra notes 150-56 and
accompanying text.
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few states have traditionally permitted such "spendthrift trusts,"'39 which
typically provide that the beneficiary's interest may not be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred before payment by the trustee.140 There is, however,
an equally settled exception: Spendthrift trusts cannot be "self-settled"-the
settlor of the trust cannot also be a beneficiary. Thus, wealthy individuals can
establish a spendthrift trust for a spouse or other family members, but not for

themselves. 141

142

The Maryland Court of Appeals' recent decision in Duvall v. McGee
illustrates the stubbornness with which American courts have adhered to the
spendthrift trust doctrine in the face of powerful arguments by tort victims.
After James McGee was convicted of felony murder for his participation in the
robbery-murder of Katherine Ryon, the administrator of Ryon' s estate (Duvall)
obtained a tort judgment against him for battery and conversion. Duvall then
tried to enforce the judgment by invading the $877,000 corpus of a spendthrift
trust McGee's mother had established for McGee's benefit. 143 Duvall argued
that the spendthrift trust doctrine should be limited to commercial creditors,
who can protect themselves by consulting the public records in which trusts
must be listed. Although this argument has been endorsed by distinguished
trust scholars, 144 the Maryland Court of Appeals flatly rejected it. The court
reasoned that the rule rests not on notice, but on the proposition that the
settlor' s interest in dictating how (and for whose benefit) the settlor' s property
will be used outweighs the interests of ordinary creditors of the beneficiary.
Like contract claimants (and unlike claimants for alimony and child support),

139. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?, 85
CORNELLL. REV. 1035, 1042 n.45 (2000).
140. GERRY W. BEYER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 355
(3d ed. 2005).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000) provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law
is enforceable" in bankruptcy. "Therefore, if a bankrupt debtor is the beneficiary of a trust that
includes an enforceable spendthrift provision, the debtor's beneficial interest and the underlying
property supporting that interest remain beyond the reach of creditors." John K. Eason,
RetirementSecurity Through Asset Protection: The Evolutionof Wealth, Privilege,andPolicy,
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 206-07 (2004). Here, too, federal bankruptcy law defers to state
law, preventing creditors from reaching trust assets that they could not seize in a nonbankruptcy
action in state court.
142. Duvall v. McGee, 826 A.2d 416 (Md. 2003). The decedent's representative was
represented by Allen W. Cohen of Annapolis, MD. I thank Attorney Cohen for agreeing to
discuss Duvall with me, and for his illuminating explanations of various features of the
litigation.
143. Id.at417.
144. See id. at 422-23 (discussing the positions taken in Scorr ON TRuSTS § 157.5 (4th ed.
1987) and BOGERT ON TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 224, at 478 (2d ed. 1992)).
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tort victims were deemed to be ordinary creditors who are merely owed "a
45
debt"-not "a duty" that would justify disregarding the spendthrift provision. 1
Of course, once a beneficiary receives payments from a spendthrift trust,
those funds are subject to collection remedies. 46 But multiple obstacles to
effective collection remain. Spendthrift trusts frequently include a provision
giving the trustee broad discretion over whether, when, and how much to pay
the beneficiary. 147 If the trustee believes that a distribution will be seized by a
tort judgment creditor, the trustee can defer it until the threat of collection
recedes. Or the trustee can make payments on behalf of the beneficiary to third
parties who have supplied the beneficiary's needs. The tort victim has no right
to recoup these trust funds, because there has been no distribution to the
beneficiary. 48 Even if the trustee does make periodic payments to the
beneficiary, it will not be easy for the tort judgment creditor to seize those
payments. The beneficiary can simply cash the trustee's check and spend or
hide the money. Unless the beneficiary makes a mistake (e.g., depositing the
49
funds in a garnishable account), he or she should be able to defeat collection. 1
2. The (Largely Ineffective) Doctrineof FraudulentConveyances
The longstanding rule that creditors may challenge fraudulent conveyances
sometimes stands as an effective obstacle to the schemes of tortfeasor-settlorsbut generally not if the tortfeasor plans in advance. In its original form, the
doctrine of fraudulent conveyances reached only cases of actual fraud-that is,
transfers made with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay creditors. Almost every
state has adopted the early twentieth-century Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act (UFCA) or its successor, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). 50

145. Id. at 429-30. This is an extraordinarily revealing contention. It is, of course,
hornbook law that every tort involves a breach by the tortfeasor of a duty imposed by law. But
because the tort victim has obtained a judgment, the court treats this breach of duty as irrelevant.
The tort victim has become a "mere judgment creditor... of the beneficiary." Id. at 426.
146. BEYER, supra note 140, at 355.
147. Telephone Interview with Allen W. Cohen, Member, Cohen & Greene (attorney for
Duvall), in Annapolis, Md. (July 26, 2004).
148. See BEYER, supra note 140, at 355 (noting that if the trust permits the trustee to make
payments to third parties for the beneficiary's maintenance and support, creditors will not be
able to interfere with such payments).
149. Id. at 355-56.
150. UNtF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT (withdrawn 1984), 7A-H U.L.A. 2 (1999);
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A-II U.L.A. 28 (Supp. 2005).
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constructive
include
These statutes enlarge the common-law foundation to 15
1
fraud, which does not require proof of fraudulent intent.
Wealthy settlors who establish a bona fide trust for the benefit of other
family members before the settlors are sued or threatened with suit are unlikely
to lose on actual fraud grounds. 52 The more likely roadblock to an assetprotection trust is the doctrine of constructive fraud. The first requirement for
constructive fraud-that the debtor failed to receive reasonably equivalent
value for the transferred property 153 -will obviously be satisfied when a settlor
establishes a trust. The second, sometimes known as the "insolvency"
requirement, snares debtors who knew or should have known, at the time of the
transfer, that they would incur debts beyond their ability to pay as the debts
became due. 54 Tortfeasors who establish trusts after committing a tort (or
being sued) are likely to run afoul of this requirement as well.
By contrast, tort claimants have little chance of success in piercing trusts
established before the settlor committed the tort in question (or before suit was
brought). Imagine a physician who establishes a family trust soon after
entering practice and who commits malpractice several years later. Under the
"insolvency" test, the physician is likely to prevail:' 55 Many physicians are
never sued for malpractice; many of those who are sued are exonerated at trial;
and even of those who lose, many have incomes high enough that they could
pay a judgment "when due." If (as many states require) the physician carries
some professional liability insurance, it is even less likely that the physician
"should have known" at the time the trust was established that an excess
56
judgment would render him or her insolvent. 1
151. The UFTA protects more creditors than the UFCA. At common law, and under the
UFCA, only present-as contrasted with future---creditors could challenge a conveyance on
grounds of constructive fraud. The UFrA alters this result by providing that fraudulent
transfers are void as to a creditor "whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred." UNiF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a), 7A-ll
U.L.A. 301 (1999).
152. Actual fraud is determined using the traditional badges of fraud, which include such
factors as whether the debtor retained possession or control of the transferred property, whether
the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets, whether the debtor had been
threatened with suit before the transfer, and whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent
value for the assets transferred. Id. § 4(b), 7A-II U.L.A. 302.
153. Id. § 4(a)(2), 7A-H U.L.A. 301.
154. Id.
155. The fraudulent conveyance claim may also be barred by UFTA's four-year statute of
limitations. Id. § 9(b), 7A-II U.L.A. 359 (stating that claims under UFTA's constructive fraud
provisions must be brought "within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred").
156. See John E. Sullivan III, Future Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers, 22 DEL. J. CoRP.
L. 955, 1001 (1997) ("[T]he retention of insurance should... be a powerful indicator of a
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The bottom line, then, is that fraudulent transfer law is relatively tough if
the tortfeasor transfers assets after committing a tort (and particularly after a tort
claim is filed), but relatively lax if the tortfeasor transfers assets before a tort
occurs. Once again, the planning advantage that potential tortfeasors enjoy
turns out to be decisive.
157

3. Offshore Asset Protection Trusts

From the standpoint of asset-protection planning, the rule against selfsettled spendthrift trusts is a major drawback to the basic spendthrift trust
strategy. To avoid this and other unfavorable aspects of American law, an
increasing number of wealthy individuals have turned to offshore asset
protection trusts (OAPTs) located in countries that have enacted extremely
debtor-friendly legislation. Few jurisdictions are more debtor-friendly than the
Cook Islands, an English-speaking enclave located near New Zealand in the
South Pacific. Consider the obstacle course for creditors erected by the Cook
Islands' International Trusts Act of 1984:
58
* Self-settled spendthrift trusts are fully enforceable;1
" The Cook Islands courts will not recognize a U.S. fraudulent
conveyance judgment, because
U.S. fraudulent conveyance law is
59
inconsistent with the Act.'
*

If the U.S. judgment creditor litigates the fraudulent conveyance
claim in the Cook Islands, the creditor must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the settlor acted with actual intent
to
6
defraud and that the transfer rendered the settlor insolvent.,

•

Because a transfer is deemed not fraudulent if it took place before
the creditor's claim arose, 161a tort victim cannot possibly succeed
if the OAPT was established before the tort occurred.

transferor's good faith and lack of bad intent. Due to that good faith, the [transferor's asset
protection] plan is far more likely to withstand attack.").
157. My account of OAPTs and related issues draws liberally on Sterk, supra note 139, at
1035.
158. Id. at 1048.
159. Id. at 1050. Because the trust is not a party to the tort judgment, the plaintiff must
advance a fraudulent conveyance claim against the trust.
160. See id. at 1049 n.82 (describing section 13(B) of the Act).
161. Id.
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Creditors must bring suit in the Cook Islands within one year from
the date of the fraudulent transfer. 16 2 Because it is virtually
impossible to litigate a tort case to judgment in a year, this
provision will be fatal unless the trust was established after the
tort judgment was awarded.

Like the Cook Islands, many other offshore jurisdictions authorize selfsettled trusts, dilute fraudulent transfer law, and refuse to enforce foreign
judgments. Setting up an offshore asset protection trust is not cheap-attorneys
who specialize in the field normally charge $15,000-$30,000, and
administrative costs for the foreign trustee are likely to be several thousand
dollars per year.' 63 But persons who want to shelter a million dollars or more
may find these fees worth paying to minimize the risk that they will lose the
settlors have
bulk of their wealth. Current estimates are that American
164
trusts.
offshore
in
assets
in
trillion
$1
least
deposited at
American judgment creditors have tried to fight back, but with only
65
modest success. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla,1
due process would probably preclude an American state court from asserting
personal jurisdiction over an OAPT trustee who has not solicited business
outside the trustee's own jurisdiction.166 In the absence of personal jurisdiction,
the American court can use civil contempt sanctions to pressure the settlor to
use trust assets to repay judgment creditors. To forestall this tactic, however,
self-settled offshore trusts typically include a "duress" provision directing the
if that person is
trustee not to make any distributions to the settlor-beneficiary
167
The settlor can then
under "duress," which is defined to include court orders.
argue that contempt for failure to comply with a turnover order is excused by
impossibility.

162. Id. at 1050.
163. David Aronofsky et al., Roundtable Discussion: Symposium: The Rise of the
InternationalTrust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 779, 798 (1999). For the adventurous, cut-rate
options are also available; one website offers Panamanian OAPTs for only $850. My Privacy
Club, http://www.offshoremanual.comPanamanianTrust.html (last visited Jan. 6,2006) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
164. Sterk, supra note 139, at 1051.
165. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
166. Sterk, supra note 139, at 1090. This result is particularly likely if the settlor directs
the OAPT trustee to hold only cash or intangible investments, rather than tangible property that
could serve as a basis for in rem jurisdiction if located within the forum state. Id. at 1096-97.
167.

Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset Protection: Trust Planning,in ALI-ABA COURSE OF

STUDY: PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES 21, 62 (Nov. 15-19, 2004), available at

Westlaw, SK032 ALI-ABA 21, 62.
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In recent cases, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have refused to honor
duress provisions and have held settlors in contempt after finding that they
retained sufficient control over the trust to repatriate assets in compliance with
the court's order.168 In one of these cases, the settlors retained broad powers as
"protectors" of the trust; 169 and in the other, the settlor retained the power to
appoint trustees.170 Settlors who do not reserve such powers may have a better
chance of prevailing on a duress claim. On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit
held in the alternative that an impossibility defense will not succeed when the
settlor has created the impossibility by adopting duress provisions.1 7' If other
courts agree with that reasoning, duress provisions will invariably fail.
But even if courts are willing to use their contempt powers to coerce
compliance with turnover orders, the effectiveness of this remedy is open to
question.
Civil contempt is supposed to be coercive, not punitive.
Consequently, most courts are likely to release a determined debtor who refuses
to comply after a substantial period of incarceration.1 72 Other debtors may
simply flee, secure in the knowledge that failure to comply with a court's order
173
to turn over assets is usually not an extraditable offense.
Some bankruptcy courts have also denied discharge to debtors who have
used OAPTs to avoid creditor claims. 174 This policy may deter some
individuals from adopting an OAPT, because they are unwilling to have a tort
judgment hanging over their heads indefinitely.17 5 On the other hand,
intentional torts are nondischargeable whether or not the tortfeasor has

168. FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239-44 (9th Cir. 1999); Lawrence v.
Goldberg (In re Lawrence), 279 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (11 th Cir. 2002).
169. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1242.
170. Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1299.
171. Id. at 1300.
172. See id. at 1301 ("If the bankruptcy judge determines that, although Lawrence has the
ability to turn over the Trust res, he will steadfastly refuse to do so, the judge will be obligated
to release Lawrence because the subject incarceration would no longer serve the civil purpose of
coercion.").
173.

Cf Tammy Joe Evans, Comment, FairTrial vs. Free Speech: CanadianPublication

Bans Versus the United States Media, 2 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 203,221-22 (1995) (stating that
contempt of court is not listed as an extraditable offense in the extradition treaty between the
United States and Canada).
174. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 692-701
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (relying on the "continuous concealment" doctrine to deny discharge
under § 727(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, even though the initial transfer to an OAPT occurred
more than a year before the petition was filed).
175. See Sterk, supra note 139, at 1112 (discussing the effect of potential denials of
bankruptcy discharge on debtors' decisions whether or not to make use of offshore trusts).
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established an OAPT, and fear of liability for intentional torts (e.g., securities
fraud) probably accounts for a large segment of the OAPT market.
Overall, it seems clear that American courts are hostile to OAPTs and are
likely to do whatever they can to assist tort judgment creditors in gaining access
to funds located in these asset protection shelters. Under existing law,
however, the courts' powers are insufficient to overcome the advantages
OAPTs offer many wealthy individuals.176
D. How Retirement Funds Are Insulatedfrom Tort Claims
Since its inception in 1935, Social Security has been designed to ensure
77
ex-workers do not live in poverty during their retirement years.
elderly
that
Most workers, however, aspire to a postretirement standard of living that not
only avoids poverty but also enables them to maintain the lifestyle they enjoyed
during their working years. For its part, Congress has long tinkered with the
federal tax code to encourage employers, employees, and (more recently) the
self-employed to supplement Social Security with a variety of private, taxqualified retirement plans. 178 These tax-favored accounts are often referred to
as "qualified" retirement plans.' 79 In the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), Congress imposed vesting, participation, and other
regulatory requirements on many (but not all) types of qualified plans. In so
doing, Congress drew on (and democratized) spendthrift trust law: Most
Americans now have a "trust fund"-their tax-qualified retirement savings.
176. In recent years, the traditional rule that spendthrift trusts cannot be self-settled has
also begun eroding within the United States. Since 1997, five states, including Alaska,
Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Utah, have adopted statutes authorizing self-settled
spendthrift trusts. Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Professional Responsibility Issues Associated with

Asset Protection Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561, 569-70 (2004). But it is far from
clear whether they will actually have much effect because there is serious uncertainty over
whether other states will honor self-settled spendthrift trusts. See Sterk, supra note 139, at
1081-89 (discussing the effect of courts' choice-of-law decisions on the enforceability of spendthrift provisions). If, as Professor Sterk predicts, most state courts "are unlikely to enforce the
spendthrift provisions in self-settled asset protection trusts, regardless of the effect that those
provisions might have under the law of the trust situs," id. at 1089, these domestic rivals to
OAPTs may wither away.
177. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 1, 49 Stat. 620, 620 (1935).
178. For the history of tax preferences for retirement plans, see JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY ch. 1 (2004).

179. To simplify considerably, the most common form tax benefits take is that
contributions to a tax-preferred plan are tax deductible, and neither the contributions nor
earnings thereon constitute taxable income to the beneficiary until retirement benefits
commence.
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The cumulative savings in qualified plans are enormous-exceeding even
the value of home equity. According to the Employee Benefit Research
Institute, in 2002, total retirement plan assets stood at $10.13 trillion, including
$1.54 trillion in private defined benefit plans, $1.97 trillion in private defined
contribution plans, $2.45 trillion in individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and
Keogh plans, $1.31 trillion in private insured plans, $1.96 trillion in retirement
plan assets of state and local governments, and $897 billion in federal
government plans.180 It is only a slight exaggeration to say that none of these
funds are available to satisfy a tort judgment while they are held in a qualified
retirement plan or account. Even after the beneficiary begins to receive
payments, retirement monies are uncollectible as a matter of law in many states
and difficult to collect as a practical matter in the others. This section will
describe the complicated-and increasingly
seamless-web of state and federal
81
laws that shelter retirement funds.'
But before turning to the legal arcana of exemptions, ERISA, and the rest,
consider the following example. After O.J. Simpson was acquitted of the 1994
murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman, the Brown and Goldman
families brought civil suits against Simpson for wrongful death and battery. In
February 1997, a civil jury found that Simpson had killed both victims
"willfully and wrongfully, with oppression and malice,"'182 and awarded a total
of $33.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Simpson appealed,
arguing that the judgment would financially ruin him. As the California Court
of Appeals explained, however, "this award will not destroy Simpson
economically. He has pensionfunds worth $ 4.1 million that are exempt from
execution to pay this award."'8 3 That is still true today: Simpson's pension
funds-which began paying him approximately $300,000 per year when he
reached age 55 in 2002-were and are beyond the reach of his tort creditors.
Simpson is now a resident of Florida, and under Florida
law, payments from a
84
qualified retirement plan are exempt from collection.'
180. Employee Benefit Research Inst., Assets in QualifiedRetirement Plans1985-2002:
Revised, FACTS FROM EBRI, Sept. 2004, at 2, availableat http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/
facts/0904fact.pdf.
181. For fuller treatments of these issues, see John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through
Asset Protection: The Evolution of Wealth, Privilege,and Policy, 61 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 159
(2004); Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against Creditors,74
IND. L.J. 355 (1999).

182. Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
183. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
184. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.21(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005 First Regular Sess.)
(stating that "any money or other assets payable to" a participant in a qualified retirement "fund
or account is exempt from all claims of creditors").
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What legal rules are responsible for results such as this? The story begins
even before ERISA, with the application of traditional spendthrift trust
doctrines to employer-sponsored retirement plans. Many courts held that
retirement funds held in trust for employees were exempt from collection,
provided that the trusts contained restrictions on alienation sufficient to qualify
them as spendthrift trusts. 8 5 (Implicit in these rulings was a rejection of the
argument that, unlike a gratuitous spendthrift trust, retirement plans should be
viewed as part of an employee's bargained-for compensation-and hence "selfsettled.") Based as they were on traditional trust principles, these rulings
applied only to funds held in trust. Once retirement payments to the beneficiary
commenced, creditors could attempt to collect them. Here again, however,
federal law set an expansive precedent: The CCPA's definition of "earnings,"
75% of which are exempt from garnishment,186"includes periodic payments
pursuant to a pension or retirement program."
In enacting ERISA, Congress's overriding objective was to increase the
likelihood that employees would actually receive retirement benefits promised
by their employers. Consistent with this goal, ERISA's anti-alienation
provision, section 206(d), provides that "each pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."'187 The
Supreme Court has held that section 206(d)-which reads like a typical
spendthrift-trust provision-bars attempts to collect judgments from pension
plan benefits by garnishment or imposition of a constructive trust. 188 The
statute, the Court explained in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers NationalPension
Fund, "reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to
safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents, who may
be, and perhaps usually are, blameless), even if that decision prevents others
from securing relief for the wrongs done them."'189 One consequence of that
185. See, e.g., Judson v. Witlin (In re Witlin), 640 F.2d 661, 662-63 (5th Cir. 1981)
(treating a Keogh retirement plan established by a self-employed pension as a self-settled trust
whose assets could be reached by creditors, but indicating that the plan's spendthrift provisions
would have been effective if the plan had been established by an employer for an employee);
Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Wash. County Nat'l Sav. Bank, 467 A.2d 758, 766 (Md. 1983)
(concluding that "a spendthrift trust can effectively protect retirement benefits"); Hildreth Press
Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 295 A.2d 54, 56 (Conn. C.P. App.
Div. 1972) (refusing to allow garnishment of pension fund on spendthrift trust grounds).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a) (2000).
187. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 206(d), 88
Stat. 829, 864 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2000)).
188. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 372 (1989).
189. Id. at 376. As the Court pointed out, "[tihe garnishment of retirement benefits is
[also] prohibited by the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Act, the Civil Service
Retirement Act, and the Veterans' Benefits Act." Id. at 372 n. 13 (citations omitted).
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"policy choice," however, has been to exempt from collection retirement plans
that seem almost indistinguishable from self-settled trusts. 190
In the aftermath of Guidry, the question arose whether ERISA also bars
alienation of benefits after they are distributed to the beneficiary. Although one
court of appeals has so held, 191 the weight of authority is that ERISA permits
postpayment garnishment. 19 2 So, for example, ERISA allows a tort judgment
creditor to garnish a checking account into which a tortfeasor has deposited
payments from a pension plan. Savvy tortfeasors, however, will not choose
"direct deposit" of their pension payments-they will convert those payments to
hard-to-collect cash whenever possible.
Moreover, although ERISA permits creditors to pursue retirement benefits
after disbursement to the beneficiary, these payments are still exempt from
collection to the extent provided by state law. 193 Almost every state exemption
statute includes a provision covering retirement plans. In some states, these
190. See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 6
(2004) (holding that a working owner qualifies as a "participant" in a pension plan covered
under ERISA). The issue in Yates was whether a physician could claim the protection of
ERISA's anti-alienation provision for his retirement plan benefits, despite the fact that he was
the sole shareholder and president of the professional corporation that maintained the retirement
plan. Id. Reasoning that Congress intended working owners to be able to participate in ERISA
plans on equal terms with other employees, the Supreme Court held that a working owner may
invoke the protections of ERISA so long as the plan covers one or more employees other than
the business owner and his or her spouse. Id. This seems analogous to a rule that a self-settled
trust is permissible, so long as the settlor and the settlor's spouse are not the sole beneficiaries.
191. See United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 682-84 (4th Cir. 1995) (arguing that 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) bars alienation of postretirement annuity benefits after distribution to the
beneficiary).
192. See Hoult v. Hoult, 373 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that "ERISA's antialienation provision does not apply where, as here, the funds have already been disbursed to the
plan beneficiary"); Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 921 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a
state agency is not precluded from deducting funds pursuant to state statute from benefits
received from ERISA qualified pension plans); Robbins v. DeBuono, 218 F.3d 197, 203 (2d
Cir. 2000) (finding that ERISA protects benefits "only while they are held by the plan
administrator and not after they reach the hands of the beneficiary"); Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 39 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (concluding that
the anti-alienation provision was not intended to apply to benefits following distribution to and
receipt by the beneficiary); Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Colville, 16
F.3d 52, 54-56 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that the anti-alienation provision did not bar the
recovery of overpayments, where the funds were no longer in the possession of the plan trustee
and had been distributed to a beneficiary). As the Court of Appeals in Guidry pointed out,
Congress has expressly provided that Social Security and veterans' benefits are exempt from
collection even after payment to the beneficiary. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1083; see 42 U.S.C.
§ 407(a) (2000) (stating that Social Security "moneys paid or payable" may not be attached or
garnished); 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (2000) (stating that veterans' benefits "shall not be liable to
attachment... either before or after receipt by the beneficiary")
193. Guidry, 39 F.3d at 1083.
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exemptions are limited to funds held in trust for the debtor by a retirement
plan. 194 Many states, however, including California, Florida, and Texas,
exempt from collection both funds held in trust and payments distributed to the
plan participant, 195 and the trend in recent years has been to adopt these broader
exemptions.196
ERISA applies to many types of tax-preferred retirement plans, but does
not encompass IRAs and Keogh plans. 197 Most states (including California,
Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Texas), however, exempt 100% of
monies held in retirement plans, defined broadly to include IRAs and Keogh
plans. 198 Moreover, the same state statutes that forbid postpayment
garnishment of retirement benefits usually apply to both ERISA and nonERISA plans. Thus, outside bankruptcy, funds in both ERISA and non-ERISA
plans are sheltered from collection before payment to the beneficiary, and
frequently sheltered from collection even after payment is made.
Let's now consider the treatment of retirement savings in bankruptcy, first
under the 1978 Code, and then under BAPCPA. Code § 541(c)(2) entitles a
debtor to exclude from the bankruptcy estate any interest in a trust that contains

194. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205(c) (McKinney 1998) (exempting from satisfaction of a
money judgment all property held in a trust created by a person other than the judgment debtor);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:2-1 (West 1998) (exempting qualifying trusts from claims of creditors).
195. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 704.115(b), (d) (West 1987) (exempting funds held
in trust and payments to plan participants from collection); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.21(2)(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2005 First Regular Sess.) (stating that "any money or other assets
payable to" a participant in a qualified retirement "fund or account is exempt from all claims of
creditors"); Bergman v. Bergman, 888 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Tex. App. 1994) (applying the Texas
law of exemptions, which has an underlying policy favoring debtors over creditors).
196. For example, prior to 1991, Connecticut law exempted payments from a retirement
plan, but only to the same extent as wages (that is, 75%). Since 1991, Connecticut law has
exempted all payments from a retirement plan. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-352b(m) (2004)
(exempting "[a]ny assets or interests of an exemptioner in, or payments received by exemptioner
from, a plan or arrangement").
197. Exemptions for IRAs have become increasingly common in recent years, while IRAs
have become extremely popular. According to one recent estimate, as of 2005, Americans held
$3.5 trillion in IRAs, and assets held in IRAs are increasing on average 13% a year. Kelly
Greene, How RetireesAre Blowing TheirNest Eggs, WALL ST. J., June 27,2005, at RI (quoting
an estimate by the Investment Company Institute, a mutual-fund industry group). Some 45
million households (or 40% of the total) now have at least one IRA, and the median value of a
traditional IRA account (of which there are 37 million) is $24,000. Id. at R3.
198. See WLIAM HOUSTON BROWN Er AL., BANKRUTncy EXEMPTION MANUAL 349-53
(2005) (summarizing common state exemptions). A handful of states limit these exemptions "to
[the] extent reasonably necessary for support." Id. Another handful have dollar caps on the
exemption, ranging from $500,000 (Nevada), id. at 351, to an annual income of $17,500
(Virginia), id. at 352; and a few states appear to have no exemption, id. at 349-53.
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a transfer restriction enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law. ' 99 In
Patterson v. Shumate, the Supreme Court concluded that ERISA's antialienation provision qualified as "applicable nonbankruptcy law," and therefore
2
excluded funds held in an ERISA-qualified plan from the bankruptcy estate. 00
Because assets that are excluded from the bankruptcy estate are not available
for distribution to creditors, this exclusion is functionally equivalent to an
exemption.
The bankruptcy treatment of retirement accounts not covered by ERISA,
such as IRAs and Keoghs, is more complex, but almost as debtor-friendly. If,
as is now the case in many jurisdictions, state law provides that IRAs and
Keoghs are exempt from collection, that exemption (like any other) will apply
in bankruptcy. 20 1 Alternatively, if applicable state law restricts the
transferability of retirement funds, those funds will be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate by § 541(c)(2). 20 2 Finally, in the small minority of states that
have not opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, debtors may use Code
§ 522(d)(10)(E), which exempts the debtor's right to receive "a payment" under
a retirement plan, but only "to the extent reasonably
necessary for the support
20 3
of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor."
BAPCPA has further expanded the protection of retirement funds in
bankruptcy under federal law, by amending § 522 to provide for a preemptive
federal retirement-fund exemption that applies even in opt-out states. New
§ 522(b)(3)(C) exempts "retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a
fund or account that is exempt from taxation" under the Internal Revenue
Code. 204 This exemption includes every major type of tax-qualified retirement
fund: defined benefit and defined contribution plans, annuity plans, IRAs and
Roth IRAs, Keoghs, and so on. 2 ° 5 The only limitation on the protection of tax199. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000).
200. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,757-66 (1992).
201. See, e.g., In re Watson, 192 B.R. 238, 242 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996) (allowing
exemption if plan qualified as exempt under applicable state law); In re Ritter, 190 B.R. 323,
325-27 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (permitting exemption under Illinois statute).
202. See Orr v. Yuhas (In re Yuhas), 104 F.3d 612, 616 (3d Cir.1997) (finding the New
Jersey statute restricted debtor's ability to transfer funds, that § 541 (c)(2) requirements were
met, and that the IRA was excluded); Meeham v. Wallace (In re Meehan), 102 F.3d 1209, 1211
(11 th Cir. 1997) (holding that state statute exempting IRA funds from garnishment constitutes a
restriction on transfer sufficient to satisfy § 541(c)(2)).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (2000). The Supreme Court recently held that this
provision applies to IRAs. Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S. Ct. 1561, 1568 (2005).
204. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(3)(C) (West 2006).
205. See WILLAM HOUSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE R. AHERN, 111, 2005 BANKRUPTCY
REFORM LEGISLATION wrrH ANALYSIS 50 (2005), available at Westlaw BAPCPA database.
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20 6
qualified funds in bankruptcy is an inflation-adjusted $1 million cap on IRAs.
Thus, under the post-BAPCPA Code, unintentional tortfeasors can completely
shield their retirement assets until they receive a discharge in bankruptcy.
Intentional tortfeasors who file for bankruptcy will not be able to discharge their tort
liabilities, but they will be able to shield their retirement assets in bankruptcy. Once
intentional tortfeasors begin actually receiving benefits, those payments will
nominally be subject to collection. But as we have seen, in many states retirement
benefit payments remain exempt from collection even after they are distributed to
the beneficiary.

E. Bankruptcy (orthe Threat of Bankruptcy) as a Toils-Evasion Strategy
From 1978 to 2005, federal bankruptcy law made it easier than ever before for
tortfeasors to use bankruptcy to avoid tort liability. To some extent, the enactment
of BAPCPA will increase the costs and reduce the benefits of bankruptcyalthough it remains to be seen how these changes play out in practice. I will first
examine the key torts-avoidance strategies under the 1978 Code, which have
indirectly shaped the culture and practices of the torts system for almost thirty years.
I will then consider the likely impact of the 2005 reform legislation.

1. The Treatment of Exempt Propertyin Bankruptcy
As explained in Part II, the Code gave debtors a choice between filing under
Chapter 7 (a "liquidation" bankruptcy) and filing under Chapter 13 (a "payment
plan" bankruptcy). Both routes share a fundamental tilt against tort judgment
creditors. Bankruptcy law gives full effect to state property exemption laws.
Consequently, whether they elect Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, unintentional and
intentional tortfeasors can expect to keep their exempt property. Under the Code,
therefore, choosing bankruptcy almost never makes a tortfeasor worse off.

2. Chapter7: Dischargefor Anyone Who Applies
Against this backdrop, let's look now at how Chapter 7 makes debtors better
off. The automatic stay stops collection efforts in their tracks, and the attendant
delay gives tortfeasors additional leverage. More importantly, a Chapter 7 discharge
extinguishes unintentional tort judgments insofar as they are not satisfied from the

206.

11 U.S.C.A. § 522(n) (West 2006).
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bankruptcy estate. For working tortfeasors, therefore, the biggest attraction of
Chapter 7 is that it protects the 25% of their paychecks that would otherwise be
garnishable under the CCPA.2 °7
One might think, however, that tortfeasors with incomes high enough to pay
most of their debts would not be eligible for Chapter 7 in the first place.
Unfortunately for tort victims, under the 1978 Code, any individual--regardlessof
solvency, income, or ability to repay-was eligible for Chapter 7 discharge,
provided he or she gave up all nonexempt assets. 8 Consequently, except for
nondischargeable intentional torts, a Chapter 7 discharge was available to tortfeasors
even if their income would enable them to pay a tortjudgment without hardship. To
be sure, some tort victims were still able to extract token settlements, because
Chapter 7 bankruptcy imposes costs on tortfeasor-debtors. But filing fees and
attorneys' fees have long been modest (usually no more than a total of $2000), and
209
the credit-related costs of bankruptcy have clearly fallen over the past thirty years.
Under the 1978 Code, then, unintentional tortfeasors with few nonexempt assets
faced virtually no threat of liability.
For unintentional tortfeasors who do have significant nonexempt assets, the
bankruptcy picture has been more complicated. The greater a debtor's nonexempt
assets, the higher the cost of obtaining a Chapter 7 discharge. On the other hand,
insofar as higher levels of nonexempt assets are correlated with higher incomes
subject to garnishment, the gains from bankruptcy will also be greater.
Consequently, Chapter 7 has often been advantageous even for tortfeasors with
substantial nonexempt assets, provided they also had relatively high incomes. Tort
victims can expect to recover something in such cases--but considerably less than if
discharge were not available.
3. The Narrow NondischargeableTorts Exclusion
We have seen that Chapter 7 is a powerful torts-evasion tool for many
tortfeasors. It is now time for a closer look at the exclusion of certain tort
207. This protection attaches even before discharge, because a Chapter 7 debtor's
postpetition income is not part of the bankruptcy estate.
208. See BAiRD, supra note 65, at 8 ("There is no explicit requirement that a debtor be in
financial distress or insolvent."); see also Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households File
for Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205 (1998) (estimating that at least 15% of
households would gain from filing for bankruptcy).
209. Indeed, we now have an entire sub-branch of the credit industry that specializes in
loans to persons who have been through bankruptcy. See Mitchell Pacelle, Pushing Plastic:
Combative Banker Faces State Suits over Credit Cards, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2004, at Al
(discussing low-end loans).
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claims from dischargeability. Section 523(a)(6) excludes claims for
"willful and malicious injury" by the debtor to the person or property of
another. 210 Depending on how it is interpreted, this provision could
exclude both intentional and some unintentional torts from Chapter 7
discharge. Until recently, the lower federal courts were split over whether
this language requires an act intended to cause injury, or merely an
intentional act that results in injury. 1 ' In Kawaauhau v. Geiger,21 2 the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that only torts done with actual intent to
cause injury are nondischargeable under the "willful and malicious injury"
exception. 213 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court's decision
seems clearly right. As the opinion pointed out, the broader reading
adopted by some lower courts would mean that a traffic accident caused by
deliberately making a left turn, or a knowing breach of contract, constitutes
"willful and malicious" injury. 1 4 The Court's interpretation is also
supported by the House and Senate Reports on the 1978 Code, which
explain that "'willful' means deliberate or intentional," and assert that
§ 523(a)(6) overrules lower court cases that "apply a 'reckless disregard'
standard." 21 5 But although2 the
statute may be clear, the appropriateness of
16
not.
is
policy
the statutory

210. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2000). Chapter 7 also contains several other exclusions from
discharge. See id. § 523(a)(2) (preventing discharge of debts incurred by fraud, false pretenses,
or misrepresentation); id. § 523(a)(4) (excluding claims arising from defalcation in a fiduciary
capacity, or from embezzlement or larceny); id. § 523(a)(9) (excluding claims for wrongful
death or personal injury from driving while intoxicated). These exclusions, while important in
particular cases, are quite narrow in scope.
211. Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392, 393 (6th Cir. 1987).
212. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
213. Id. at 61. It should be noted, however, that Kawaauhau leaves open an important
question: Suppose a tortfeasor intends to injure the victim, but that a greater-than-foreseen
injury results? The ordinary tort rule is that an intentional tortfeasor is liable for the
unforeseeable consequences of his or her intentional wrongs. See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 47
N.W. 99, 99-100 (Wis. 1890) (holding defendant liable for the plaintiff's loss of the use of his
leg resulting from a kick by defendant that was so slight plaintiff did not feel it). Because there
is language in Kawaauhau roughly equating "willful and malicious injury" with an "intentional
tort," Kawaauhau,523 U.S. at 61, one might predict that the Court will resolve this question in
favor of tort victims.
214. Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 62.
215. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 (1977), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5963,
6320-21; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 79 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5865.
216. Infra PartIV.
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4. The "Abuse of Bankruptcy" Debate
Having lost the nondischargeability battle over unintentional torts, tort
victims turned instead to the "abuse of bankruptcy" argument. The core
idea was simple: that it is an abuse of the bankruptcy fresh start for a
tortfeasor with substantial disposable income to seek a Chapter 7 discharge for
the primary purpose of evading a tort judgment. The hard question, however, is
whether there is any reliable statutory basis in the Code for this argument.
The first potential vehicle is Code § 707(b)-added in 1984 at the behest
of the credit card industry-which authorizes the bankruptcy court to dismiss21a7
petition without granting discharge in cases of "substantial abuse."
Numerous courts have found "substantial abuse" in situations in which a debtor
could, without undue hardship, repay creditors a large part of the debts that
Chapter 7 would discharge.218 Unfortunately, § 707(b) also provides that the
"substantial abuse" test applies only to cases in which the debtor's liabilities are
"primarily consumer debts., 2 19 The Code, in turn, defines "consumer debt" as
"debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household
purpose.',220 The few courts to rule on the issue have held that tort judgments
are not consumer debts, and therefore that § 707(b) does not help tort-judgment
creditors.2 21 Section 707(b) thus stands as a striking example of the political
impotence of tort victims as compared to consumer lenders.2 2
Excluded from § 707(b)'s protection, tort judgment creditors turned
instead to § 707(a), which provides that the court may dismiss a bankruptcy
petition "for cause," and enumerates three situations that constitute "cause":
217. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). "Substantial abuse" has been replaced with "abuse" in the
Code as amended by BAPCPA. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (West 2006).
218. For example, in In re Vesnesky, 115 B.R. 843 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), two school
teachers with a combined income in excess of $57,000 (in 1988) sought bankruptcy to escape
about $35,000 in unsecured debts. The court found that allowing discharge would constitute a
"substantial abuse" because the debtors could have paid off all or most of these debts from their
salaries merely by modestly reducing their monthly expenses. Id. at 848-49.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
220. 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (2000).
221. See In re Marshalek, 158 B.R. 704, 707 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that tort
liability arising from a vehicular accident was not a "consumer debt" and therefore that the
debtor's petition was not subject to dismissal under § 707(b)); In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 872-73
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985) (same).
222. This is not to claim that § 707(b) was a big victory for creditors. David Skeel notes
that consumer bankruptcy advocates viewed the 1984 amendments as "a major success," not
only because they defeated a stronger means-testing proposal, but also because the "substantial
abuse" standard does not significantly constrain the discretion of bankruptcy judges. DAVID A.
SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPrCY LAW IN AMERICA 196 (2001).
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(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; (2) failure
to pay required fees; and (3) failure to file schedules of debts and assets within
the required time.223 Although each of these enumerated "cause[s]" for
dismissal is procedural, some courts have held that § 707(a) also authorizes
dismissal for "cause" of any petition filed in "bad faith"-and that a debtor's
ability to pay, combined with other indicia of unfairness to creditors, can
225
establish bad faith. 224 Other courts have interpreted "cause" more narrowly.
The weight of authority appears to be that dismissal for bad faith is appropriate
in "egregious cases that entail concealed or misrepresented assets and/or
sources of income, and excessive and continued expenditures, lavish lifestyle,
and intention to avoid a large single debt based on conduct akin to fraud,
misconduct, or gross negligence. ''226 This test provides tort victims with
protection against the worst abuses, but may not reach cases in which the debtor
does not conceal assets or manipulate income, yet invokes Chapter 7 for the
purpose of227sheltering disposable income that could be used to satisfy a tort
judgment.
As a matter of policy, it seems absurd that debtors should be denied
Chapter 7 protection if they can repay large "consumer debts" without undue
strain, yet afforded Chapter 7 protection although they could easily pay at least
part of a tort judgment. As a matter of statutory interpretation, however, it is
unclear who has the better of the argument. 228 The case law suggests that the
judiciary has more sympathy than Congress for the predicament of tort victims
223. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2000).
224. See, e.g., Cassell v. Kurily (In re Cassell), No. 99-70200, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13349 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 1999) (dismissing the Chapter 7 petition of a surgeon who was able
to pay the malpractice judgment against him, had no other major debts, was continuing to pay
his other creditors, and stipulated that his sole reason for filing was to avoid the judgment),
affd, 230 F.3d 1357 (6th Cir. 2000).
225. Huckfeldt v. Huckfeldt (In re Huckfeldt), 39 F.3d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that "cause" should be "limited to extreme misconduct falling outside the purview of more
specific Code provisions, such as using bankruptcy as a 'scorched earth' tactic against a diligent
creditor, or using bankruptcy as a refuge from another court's jurisdiction"). The Ninth Circuit
has construed § 707(a) even more narrowly, finding that bad faith per se cannot constitute
"cause" to dismiss a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Neary v. Padilla (In re Padilla), 222 F.3d
1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000).
226. Indus. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Zick (In re Zick), 931 F.2d 1124, 1128 (6th Cir. 1991).
227. See, e.g., Deglin v. Keobapha (In re Keobapha), 279 B.R. 49,49-54 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2002) (allowing discharge to a debtor with modest disposable income whose sole debt was a
large wrongful death claim).
228. See Katie Thein Kimlinger & William P. Wassweiler, The Good Faith Fable ofll
U.S.C. § 707(a): How Bankruptcy Courts Have Invented a Good FaithFilingRequirementfor
Chapter 7 Debtors, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 61, 63 (1996) (arguing that neither the language nor
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code require good faith in filing a Chapter 7 petition).
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whose tortfeasors file for bankruptcy. 229 But despite this boost from judges,
Chapter 7 has been a nightmare for victims of unintentional torts, because
ability to pay a tort judgment, without more, does not bar discharge.

5. Superdischargein Chapter 13
For another important category of tortfeasors, however, Chapter 7 is not
nearly as attractive. Intentional tortfeasors cannot discharge their tort debts in
Chapter 7 (though they may be able to shed other unsecured debts). Enter the
other route to bankruptcy discharge: Chapter 13, which requires at least three
years of planned payments to creditors, but which, under the 1978 Code, also
offered the notorious "superdischarge." A debtor who completed payments
under a Chapter 13 plan received a discharge that encompassed claims for
willful or malicious injury and money or property obtained by fraud.230
Interestingly, although the Code leaves no doubt that debtors can obtain a
Chapter 13 discharge of willful and malicious torts, several courts have invoked
Chapter 13's requirement that each debtor file a plan in "good faith" to limit the
ability of intentional tortfeasors to obtain discharge. 231 A debtor whose primary
debt is a tort judgment that would be nondischargeable under Chapter 7, and
whose Chapter 13 plan proposes to make only minimal repayments, is likely to
fail this "good faith" requirement. 22322 Here again, the courts softened the harsh
treatment meted out to tort victims by the pro-debtor 1978 Congress.
Nevertheless, under the 1978 Code, many intentional tortfeasors were able to
obtain a discharge under Chapter 13.

229. Of course, bankruptcy judges also have self-interested reasons to interpret the Code as
giving them discretion to deny discharge on grounds of bad faith or the like. Discretion is one
form of power, and power is part of judges' nonpecuniary compensation.
230. DICKERSON ET AL., supra note 54, at 17-69.
231. See, e.g., Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1349(8th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (finding that in determining good faith, "factors such as the type of debt sought to be
discharged and whether the debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7... are particularly relevant").
But see In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the Code requires only
that the Chapter 13 plan be "'proposed in good faith'..., not that the debt was incurred in
good faith") (emphasis supplied).
232. See, e.g., In re Mattson, 241 B.R. 629, 637-38 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1999) (finding that
the debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in bad faith because their principal motivation was
to delay payment); In re Tomheim, 239 B.R. 677, 687-88 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that
debtors' Chapter 13 plan was brought in bad faith to delay payments); In re Ramii, 166 B.R.
288, 290 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (finding evidence of bad faith in filing Chapter 13 plan
because debtor had ability to pay all his creditors in full from his income, in a reasonable length
of time).
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6. Combining Bankruptcy and Asset Protection Strategies
Strategies such as trusts and asset transfers are designed to protect existing
wealth (and the passive income thereon) from creditors. Bankruptcy, by
contrast, is a strategy that works best to protect the debtor's future earned
income stream from prebankruptcy debts. But these strategies are not mutually
exclusive. Potential tortfeasors can use asset protection to make their wealth
harder for plaintiffs' lawyers to reach, while holding in reserve the threat of
bankruptcy should the plaintiff sue. Exemption-maximizing is a particularly
popular technique. By shifting assets from nonexempt to exempt categories,
the tortfeasor lowers the plaintiff s expected gain from litigation both in and
outside bankruptcy. The homestead exemption is the most widely used vehicle
for this purpose.
One might argue that fraudulent conveyance law should block these
strategies, at least if the debtor is insolvent when the assets are converted to
exempt types.23 3 Most courts, however, hold that it is not fraudulent for "an
individual who knows he is insolvent to convert a part of his property which is
not exempt into property which is exempt, for the purpose of claiming his
exemptions therein, and of thereby placing it out of the reach of his
creditors." 234 This rule does not apply if there is "extrinsic evidence of fraud,"
such as misleading or deceiving creditors about the debtor's position.23 5 But
the mere conversion of assets from nonexempt to exempt categories is not a

233. Many of the disputes concerning conversion of assets from nonexempt to exempt
types of property arise in the context of bankruptcy. Section 727(a)(2) of the Code provides that
the bankruptcy court shall deny discharge if, within one year of filing the petition, the debtor
transfers property "with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor." 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)
(2000). Whether discharge should be denied on this ground is a question of federal law.
However, the prior question of whether the exemption is available under state law is controlled
by state law in opt-out states. Murphey v. Crater (In re Crater), 286 B.R. 756, 763 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2002); see, e.g., Jensen v. Dietz (In re Sholdan), 217 F.3d 1006, 1008, 1011 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that the conveyance would be treated as fraudulent, and hence outside the
homestead exemption, under Minnesota law); Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill (In re Hill), 197 F.3d
1135, 1144 (11 th Cir. 1999) (certifying to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether the
Florida Constitution exempts a homestead, where the debtor acquired the homestead using
nonexempt funds with the specific intent of hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors).
234. Forsberg v. Sec. State Bank, 15 F.2d 499,501 (8th Cir. 1926). The legislative history
of the 1978 Code endorses this rule: "As under current law, the debtor will be permitted to
convert nonexempt property into exempt property before filing a bankruptcy petition. The
practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the
exemptions to which he is entitled under the law." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 361 (1977), as
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6317; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 76 (1978), as reprintedin
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5862.
235. Panuska v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 880 F.2d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1989).
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fraudulent conveyance, even if done for the sole purpose of defeating
collection.
The recent bankruptcy decision in Murphy v. Crater236 exemplifies this
strategy. After being sued, the Craters sold their principal nonexempt asset$40,000 in stock-and used the proceeds to pay down a second mortgage on
their home,thereby increasing their exempt equity under Arizona's $100,000
homestead exemption from $25,000 to $65,000. They then filed for
bankruptcy in Chapter 7. The bankruptcy court rejected the plaintiffs
fraudulent transfer claim and granted discharge, reasoning that the Craters
were permissibly attempting to maximize
the value of exempt property by
237
timing the payment of a valid debt.
When tortfeasors relocate to unlimited-exemption states, the results of
exemption-maximizing can be especially dramatic. For instance, in Havoco
ofAmerica v. Hill, Havoco won a $15 million tort judgment against Hill.238
Two days before the judgment became enforceable, Hill-a long-time
resident of Tennessee-paid $650,000 in cash for a home in Destin, Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court held that, under the express terms of the Florida
Constitution, "the use of the homestead exemption to shield assets from the
claims of creditors is not conduct sufficient in and of itself to forfeit the
exemption, ''239 even if the debtor acts with the specific intent to defraud
creditors. 24
7. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct
of 2005
We have just taken a whirlwind tour of the highly pro-debtor (and
hence, highly pro-tortfeasor) provisions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. In
2005, with the enactment of BAPCPA, the pendulum swung back somewhat
in favor of tort victims and other creditors. As we will see, however, even
after BAPCPA many of the bankruptcy-related obstacles to collecting tort
judgments are as formidable as ever.

236. Murphy, 286 B.R. at 763.
237. Id.
238. Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hill, 790 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla.2001).
239. Id. at 1028.
240. Id. at 1030; see also Conseco Servs., LLC v. Cuneo, 904 So. 2d 438,440 (Fla.Dist.
Ct. App. 2005) (acquiring homestead property with intent to defraud does not remove
homestead protection under Florida Constitution).
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a. The Means Test
From the standpoint of tort victims, one might think the most important
feature of BAPCPA is its controversial requirement that debtors whose income
is greater than the state median income pass a means test in order to qualify for
discharge under Chapter 7. Under the means test, the debtor is usually
ineligible for Chapter 7 if the debtor's disposable income, after taxes and
payments on secured and priority debts, is greater than $ 100/month. 241 Debtors
with income in excess of that level must choose between dismissal of their
242
petition, or being shifted to a five-year repayment plan in Chapter 13.
If it applied to all individual debtors, this means test would significantly
alter the balance of power between many tortfeasors and their victims. High7
income tortfeasors with few nonexempt assets-persons for whom Chapter243
bankruptcy.
forgo
or
13
Chapter
use
to
forced
be
has been ideal-would
Under Chapter 13, the tort victim would share with other creditors in the
tortfeasor's disposable income for five years-and the CCPA limits on
garnishment do not apply to Chapter 13 plans. 244 Tort victims would no longer
face the threat that a high-earning unintentional tortfeasor could reduce their
recovery to a pittance by filing under Chapter 7.
Regrettably, however, BAPCPA's means test does not apply to all
individual debtors. Instead, Congress grafted the means test onto § 707(b)the abuse of bankruptcy provision we have already encountered-while
retaining that section's proviso that it applies exclusively to "a case filed by an
individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer

241. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2006) (providing that the court shall presume
abuse if the debtor's monthly disposable income "multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser
of--(I) 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,000,
whichever is greater; or (II) $10,000").
242. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Supp. 2006). Moreover, the criteria for determining
disposable income are much less generous to debtors than under prior law, which defined
disposable income as income "which is not reasonably necessary" to "the maintenance or
support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (2000).
243. Of course, most debtors who file for bankruptcy are below the median income level
for their state. Only "[s]ome 3.5 percent of creditors who filed for Chapter 7 would be forced to
shift their case to a Chapter 13 filing based on the new income standards imposed by the bill,
according to a 1998 study sponsored by the American Bankruptcy Institute, a research group."
Riva Atlas & Eric Dash, Bracingfor a Bankruptcy Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at CI.
244. The CCPA's limits on garnishment are expressly inapplicable to Chapter 13
bankruptcies. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(1)(B) (2000). States apparently remain free, however, to
create state exemptions that track the CCPA and do apply in bankruptcy. See In re Jones, 318
B.R. 841, 847 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that Ohio exemption law incorporates the
CCPA limits and makes them applicable in bankruptcy).
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debts., 245 Nor does BAPCPA alter the Code's definition of "consumer debt" as
"debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household
purpose." In light of the pre-BAPCPA case law holding that tort judgments are
not "consumer debt," it will be difficult for tort victims to argue that
BAPCPA's means test applies to tortfeasors whose debt consists principally of
one or more tort judgments.2 4 Once again, then, Congress appears to have
excluded tort victims from the protections against bankruptcy abuse enjoyed by
more politically potent groups such as credit card lenders.
To be sure, the exclusion is not total. BAPCPA's means test will force
high-income tortfeasors who have more consumer debt than tort liability into
Chapter 13,247 thereby increasing some tort victims' recoveries. But although
BAPCPA's selective elimination of Chapter-7-on-demand helps some tort
victims, the vast majority still face the same old Chapter 7 threat. As already
noted, high-income tortfeasors with more tort liability than consumer debt may
freely choose Chapter 7. In addition, all tortfeasors with incomes below their
state's median retain the right to elect Chapter 7 without means testing. In all
245.

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (Supp. 2006).

246. Still, there is some room for argument. In light ofthe statutory definition of consumer
debts as debts "incurred ... primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose," the courts
have distinguished between consumer debts and business debts incurred for the purpose of
making a profit. See, e.g., Stewart v. U.S. Trustee (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 808 (10th Cir.
1999) (distinguishing consumer debt from "non-consumer debt" "incurred with a 'profit
motive''). If that distinction were applied to tort judgments, the purpose of the activity in which
the tortfeasor was engaged would presumably be decisive. For example, a tortfeasor who
negligently injured someone while driving to the store for groceries would thereby "incur" a
consumer debt, whereas if the tortfeasor were an employee who drove negligently while on the
job, the resulting tort liability would be nonconsumer debt. The sparse case law on point rejects
this argument on the ground that the Code's reference to consumer debt as "incurred" for a
consumer "purpose" implies that consumer debt is by definition voluntary debt purposely
acquired-hence excluding tort liability, which is imposed involuntarily by operation of law.
See In re Marshalek, 158 B.R. 704, 707 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (arguing that, to qualify as
consumer debt, the indebtedness "must necessarily be voluntarily 'incurred' by the debtor for
the purposes specified in § 101(8)"); In re White, 49 B.R. 869, 872 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985)
("to be a consumer debt within the meaning of § 101(7) the liability must have been acquired
first and foremost to achieve a personal aim or objective"). Perhaps this reasoning is correct,
but extending the purpose-oriented approach seems a plausible alternative.
247. Courts have interpreted the "primarily consumer debts" requirement to mean that more
than half of the debtor's scheduled debts are consumer debts. See, e.g., Stewart, 175 F.3d at
808 (defining "'primarily' in the context of § 707(b) as meaning consumer debt exceeding fifty
percent of the total debt"); Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1988)
(same). For purposes of this calculation, both secured and unsecured debts are included. See
Price v. U.S. Trustee (In re Price), 353 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cit. 2005) (holding that consumer
debt includes "all secured debt incurred for personal, family, or household purposes"). For
example, a tortfeasor who listed a $100,000 tort judgment, a $100,000 mortgage and some
credit card debt would have "primarily consumer debts."
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likelihood, there are many more unintentional tortfeasors below the median
than above it. Even if not, it appears that under BAPCPA only the tortfeasor' s
income-and not that of the tortfeasor's spouse-counts for purposes of
applying the means test. 248 Obviously, far fewer than half of individual workers
have incomes at the household median for the state in which they reside.
Moreover, Social Security benefits are excluded from BAPCPA's definition of
income-meaning that the elderly will be able to elect Chapter 7 unless their
private income alone exceeds the state household median. 249 The bottom line,
then, is that BAPCPA's expanded abuse-of-bankruptcy provisions will help
only a small minority of tort victims.
b. Restrictions on Homestead Exemptions
BAPCPA also places new limits on the use of property exemptions in
bankruptcy. In order to elect a state's exemptions, a debtor must have lived in
that state for two years prior to the bankruptcy.25 ° In addition, regardless of the
level of state exemptions, a debtor may not exempt more than $125,000 in
equity in a homestead acquired within 1215 days (about 3 1/3 years) of filing
for bankruptcy. 251 And, to the extent the homestead was obtained through
fraudulent conversion of nonexempt assets during the ten-year period before the
filing, the exemption is reduced by the amount attributed to the fraud. 5 2
These provisions will certainly deter tortfeasors from moving to
exemption-rich states like Florida and Texas shortly before filing for
bankruptcy. Some tortfeasors, however, may move in anticipation of litigation.
If the plaintiff goes forward with the suit, the tortfeasor can litigate, confident
in the knowledge that most tort cases take several years to go to trial. By that
time, BAPCPA's restrictions on homestead exemptions will no longer apply to
the tortfeasor's Texas or Florida residence.
As for the fraudulent conversion provision, it seems unlikely that Congress
meant to declare fraudulent every conversion of nonexempt to exempt assets
that occurs within ten years of filing for bankruptcy. Indeed, the new Code
requires that the conversion of nonexempt property be made "with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor," which suggests that merely converting
248.
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assets from nonexempt to exempt is not enough.253 If this analysis is correct,
the provision may do little more than restate the extrinsic-fraud test most courts
currently use to police exemption maximization.254
c. Narrowing the Chapter13 Super-Discharge
The new legislation also cuts back significantly on the scope of the
Chapter 13 discharge. Most torts that are nondischargeable under Chapter 7,
including drunk driving and willful or malicious personal injuries, will now be
nondischargeable under Chapter 13 as well.255 Criminal restitution awards are
also made nondischargeable.25 6
These provisions obviously help tort victims, who previously faced a
significant risk that even intentional tortfeasors could obtain a discharge under
Chapter 13 with only modest payments. But BAPCPA does nothing about the
greater barriers to intentional-tort collection posed by state exemption lawswhich continue to apply with full force in bankruptcy. Indeed, as we have
already seen, BAPCPA actually worsens the exemption picture by creating a
sweeping new federal bankruptcy exemption for all tax-qualified retirement
funds.
d. Avoidance of FraudulentTransfers to Self-Settled Trusts
The final important change in the Code is new § 548(e), which allows a
trustee in bankruptcy to avoid the debtor's transfer of an interest in property
made within ten years of the filing if the debtor made the transfer to a selfsettled trust or similar device for the debtor's benefit and with actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor. Because it requires actual intent to
defraud, this provision actually seems less stringent than existing state
fraudulent conveyance law. It seems unlikely, therefore, that it will stop

253. Id.
254. See Charles J. Tabb, Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy 9
(Univ. of I11.Law Sch., Working Paper No. 48, 2005), availableat www.law.bepress.com/
uiuclwps/papers/art48 (stating that BAPCPA § 522(o) "does not elaborate as to what constitutes
'intent to hinder, delay or defraud,' so presumably the old case law will remain relevant").
255. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2006) (barring discharge of debts from criminal fines or
from civil damages for death or injury).
256. Id. § 1328(a)(3). For discussion of the importance of criminal restitution as a partial
substitute for intentional tort liability, see infra Part V.B.5.
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potential tortfeasors from using self-settled trusts in conjunction with
bankruptcy.257
Overall, BAPCPA amounts to a grudging and partial retreat from the 1978
Code's harsh treatment of tort victims. Had Congress seen fit to apply
BAPCPA's Chapter 7 means test to cases involving primarily tort debts, rather
than solely to cases involving primarily consumer debts, BAPCPA would have
been a milestone in lowering the barriers to collecting tortjudgments. Instead,
BAPCPA represents only a modest step in that direction. 258 As I will argue in
Part V, far more remains to be done.

F. Who Isn't Judgment-Proof?
The list of legal barriers to enforcing tort claims and collecting tort
judgments is a long one:
a.

exemptions from collection, especially for earnings, homesteads
and retirement funds;

b.

procedural limits on postjudgment remedies, which make it
impracticable to collect personal property (including liquid assets
such as cash);

c.

the rule against prejudgment attachment in tort cases;

d.

bankruptcy stay and discharge;

e.

limits on fraudulent conveyance law;

257. Congress rejected a proposal by Senator Charles Schumer, Democrat of New York, to
limit the exemption of asset protection trusts. Stephen Labaton, Bankruptcy Bill Set.for
Passage; Victory for Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at Al. Schumer's amendment would
have allowed the trustee to avoid any transfer to a trust within ten years in excess of $125,000 if
the debtor was the beneficiary of the transfer. 151 CONG. REc. S2046 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005)
(proposed amendment of Sen. Schumer).
258. In addition to the substantive changes discussed in text, it should be noted that
BAPCPA made a series of procedural changes (ranging from requiring prebankruptcy credit
counseling, 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (Supp. 2006), to requiring additional paperwork such as tax
returns, 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(A)(I) (Supp. 2006)) that will substantially increase the costs of
every bankruptcy filing. See Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Bankruptcy after the Fall: United
States Law under S. 256, at 27-28 (Univ. of Ill. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 47, 2005),
available at www.law.bepress.com/uiuclwps/papers/art47 (describing the various "entry
barriers" to bankruptcy created by BAPCPA). Any increase in the costs of filing for bankruptcy
should translate into an increase in the settlement value of tort claims against tortfeasors for
whom bankruptcy is an option.
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f.

the rule enforcing spendthrift trust provisions; and

g.

the absence of legal prohibitions on the establishment of offshore
asset protection trusts by American citizens.

The cumulative impact of these legal rules is very great. 259 Even in our affluent
society, these legal rules enable most individuals, at every income level, to
escape-or at least deeply discount-the threat of tort liability.
For low-income and working-class Americans, the combination of
restrictions on garnishments, exemptions from collection, and low-cost Chapter
7 bankruptcy all but eliminates negligence claims. When it comes to
intentional torts, the third leg of this stool--Chapter 7 discharge-is missing,
but restrictions on garnishment and exemptions from collection still apply.
Middle-class people are also heavily judgment-proof. After taking into
account both exemptions and the ability to file for bankruptcy, middle-class,
unintentional tortfeasors often are left with minimal collectible assets.
Nevertheless, many middle-class households have significant nonexempt assets,
and the residual threat of tort liability may make it worthwhile for them to
purchase moderate amounts of liability insurance. In addition, because
intentional torts have long been difficult to discharge in bankruptcy (and under
BAPCPA will be per se nondischargeable), fear of personal liability for
intentional torts may still have a considerable deterrent impact on middle-class
individuals.
The wealthy, for whom exemptions and bankruptcy are least likely to
result in minimal collectible assets, have the option of using trusts and other
devices to shelter virtually all of their income and assets from tort liabilityincluding liability for intentional torts. For some risks, liability insurance may
be a low-cost alternative to the expenses of maintaining shelters. But the
explosive growth of asset protection planning suggests that wealthy individuals
are increasingly convinced that liability insurance does not provide sufficiently
complete protection 26026or is more expensive than sheltering wealth, or both.26'
259. Interestingly, the great majority of these legal rules are of statutory rather than
common law origin. This is consistent with the pattern we saw in bankruptcy law, in which
Congress seems less protective of creditors, and in particular of tort victims, than the bankruptcy
courts are. Pro-debtor populism seems far more powerful than pro-tort victim populism.
260. Wealthy individuals who are eager to avoid the nonpecuniary costs of being sued (lost
time, invasion of privacy, etc.) may also be reluctant to purchase large amounts of liability
insurance. As Kent Syverud puts it, "liability insurance promotes liability" by increasing the
risk that the insured will be sued. Syverud, supra note 22, at 1633.
261. See Gretchen Morgenson, Loophole Draws Firein BankruptcyDebate; U.S. Revision
Would Let Rich ProtectAssets, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Mar. 4, 2005, at 20 (suggesting that asset
protection trusts have become increasingly popular in recent years among physicians and
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IV. Liability Insuranceand the Judgment-ProofProblem
A. In Our Judgment-ProofSociety, Why Buy Liability Insurance?
The evidence presented in Part II suggests that most Americans do not
have much to fear from tort liability, and that those who do can engage in
advance planning (or purchase modest amounts of liability insurance) to
minimize their exposure. Despite Professor LoPucki's fears of corporate
judgment-proofing, corporations pay roughly $100 billion per year for liability
insurance to protect their corporate assets.2 62 But why do individual Americans
spend tens of billions per year on personal-lines liability insurance? Why not
just go bare and rely on asset protection planning and barriers to collection? As
we will see, the answer to this question turns out to be a bit complicated.
To be sure, one part of the answer is straightforward: Some types of
coverage, such as automobile liability insurance, are mandated by law in most
states. Yet legal mandates cannot explain why most individuals purchase as
much liability insurance as they do. The statutory minimums for auto liability
insurance are startlingly low: As of 2004, forty-six states required coverage of
$25,000 per person/$50,000 per occurrence or less, and forty-eight states had
not increased their minimums since 1996.263 Moreover, there was a robust
market for auto liability insurance long before mandatory liability insurance
laws took hold in the 1970s.26
corporate executives worried about new legal liabilities).
262. See supra note 30 (noting that even excluding medical malpractice liability, corporate
liability insurance policies paid out $90 billion in 2003; one would expect that the total
premiums for those policies at least equaled that amount).
263. As of 1996, four states required 10/20, one state 12.5/25, eight states 15/30, eleven
states 20/40, twenty-four states 25/50, one state 30/60, and one state 50/100. Jeffrey O'Connell
et al., The Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer Choicefor Auto Insurance in All Fifty
States, 55 MD. L. REV. 160, 214-20 (1996). As of 2005, the numbers were four states 10/20,
one state 12.5/25, seven states 15/30, ten states 20/40, twenty-four states 25/50, two states
30/60, and two states 50/100. Insure.com, Minimum Levels of Required Auto Insurance,
http://info.insure.com/auto/minimum.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In forty-six of the states, these minimums were mandated
by law. In the other four states (New Hampshire, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin) the
"minimums" were optional. Id.
264. See Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance,
andthe Challenge to Social Orderin the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CoNN. INS. L.J. 521,
527 (1997-1998) (stating that more than $250 million in auto liability insurance premiums was
written as early as 1929); Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance
andAccident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities,47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 362 tbl. 1 (2004) (listing
only three states with compulsory auto liability insurance laws as of 1969 and twenty-one states
that adopted such laws during the 1970s). As of 2004, forty-six states mandated the purchase of
auto liability insurance. Id.
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The remaining puzzle, then, is why so many Americans voluntarily
purchase liability insurance (or higher policy limits than are required by law).
One explanation is simply that many people buy liability insurance out of a
sense of responsibility to compensate those they accidentally and wrongfully
injure. Casual empiricism suggests that, while this moral sentiment is an
important motivation for some people, it carries little or no weight with others.
Another, more universally applicable explanation can be found in the fact
that the legal barriers to collecting a tort judgment make most Americans
largely-but not entirely-judgment-proof. Absent liability insurance, a
middle-class individual with $50,000 in annual income and $25,000 in
nonexempt assets would still face significant exposure to tort liability: roughly
$1000/month in garnishment, or bankruptcy and the loss of the nonexempt
assets.265 By purchasing, say, $100,000 in automobile liability insurance and
$100,000 in personal liability insurance (as part of homeowners' coverage), the
insured individual can greatly reduce exposure to this risk. Only in the unlikely
event that the insured tortiously caused personal injuries in excess of these
policy limits would the insured's personal assets be exposed.
If auto and homeowners' liability insurance were as expensive as medical
malpractice insurance, few Americans would follow this strategy. In fact,
however, these types of liability insurance are relatively inexpensive.
Moreover, the marginal cost of liability insurance falls as higher levels of
coverage are purchased, because the probability of a large loss is smaller.266 In
the auto insurance market, for example, it is inexpensive to purchase several
times more than the mandatory minimum, and insurers market the additional
coverage fairly aggressively to middle-class insureds. Insurance agents
typically recommend that homeowner-insureds purchase substantially more
than the minimum auto liability coverage-and many do.267
We can conclude, therefore, that the discounted but not de minimis risk of
personal tort liability furnishes one reason for middle-class and affluent
265. This assumes that the household's nonexempt assets cannot be converted into exempt
assets, as would be true if the household has already used up its exemptions.
266. The legal-defense component of liability insurance (which may account for more than
one-third of its cost) is also front-loaded: Although it costs more on average to defend a
$500,000 claim than a $50,000 claim, it ordinarily does not cost ten times as much. See Jett
Hanna, Moonlighting Law Professors: Identifying and Minimizing the ProfessionalLiability
Risk, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 421,462 (2001) (stating that legal defense costs represent about 35% of
legal malpractice liability costs).
267. As of 1991, 34% of all drivers bought $100,000 or more in liability insurance. See
Schwartz, Advantages andProblems,supra note 19, at 614 n. 11 (citing STEPHEN J. CARROLL E7
AL., NO-FAULT APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING PEOPLE INJURED IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS

100-05 (1991)).
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individuals to purchase liability insurance. A second reason is supplied by the
insurer's duty to defend the insured on all claims for which there is even
arguably coverage. 268thIn effect, the duty to defend creates prepaid legal defense
insurance for the insured. 269 With liability insurance, middle-class individuals
need fear neither the risk of having to incur out-of-pocket legal defense fees nor
the risk of personal liability.
Nevertheless, it may be rational for some homeowners to purchase only
the mandatory minimum auto insurance and to decline personal liability
coverage. Rational-but difficult to do. In the eyes of many insurance agents,
an auto insurance customer who owns a home but insists on buying only the
mandatory minimum exhibits an irresponsible attitude that may make the agent
unwilling to write the policy. Nonetheless, a determined homeowner can
doubtless find a carrier willing to write the mandatory minimum auto coverage.
Doing without personal liability insurance, by contrast, is exceedingly
difficult for any homeowner-insured. Since 1955, homeowners' insurers have
sold personal liability insurance as part of a bundle that also includes property
and casualty-and the two components cannot be purchased separately. 270 And
of course, mortgage lenders require mortgagors to maintain homeowners'
insurance. Persons who own their homes free and clear can elect to go bare,
but few homeowners are prepared to shoulder the property and casualty risks
that strategy would entail. 271 Personal liability insurance of at least $100,000$200,000 is therefore de facto mandatory in the United States. As with auto
insurance, additional layers of personal liability protection are inexpensive, and
many affluent individuals purchase "umbrella" policies of $1,000,000 or more.
268. See ROBERT H. JERRY, H, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 857 (3d ed. 2002)
(explaining that duty to defend arises if there is any possibility of recovery). This rule enables a
plaintiff's lawyer to bring the liability insurer into many intentional tort cases by
"underpleading," that is, framing the complaint in terms of negligence. In turn, the defense
attorney, although paid by the insurer, must defend the client--he insured-and that frequently
means cooperating with the plaintiff's attorney in shaping the case as involving negligence. See
Baker, Blood Money, supra note 2, at 300 (recounting attorney interviews that cite
underpleading as a technique for avoiding policies' intentional tort exceptions). Of course,
underpleading may be costly to plaintiffs as well. Consider a case in which the insured has
minimum auto liability insurance, the plaintiff underpleads, and the plaintiff wins ajudgment in
excess of the policy limits. The excess judgment is dischargeable in bankruptcy, whereas if the
plaintiff had litigated (and won) the case as an intentional tort, the judgment would be
nondischargeable.
269. See JERRY, supra note 268, at 856 (describing liability insurance as "litigation
insurance").
270.

S.S. HUEBNER ET AL., PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 433-34 (3d ed. 1982).

271. The percentage of people who own their homes without any mortgage debt declined
from 38.9% to 34.6% between 1997 and 2003, according to Census figures. David Streitfeld,
Equity Is Altering Spending Habits and View of Debt, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at Al.
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In sum, the residual threat of tort iability,27 2 plus the institutional practices
of lenders and liability insurers, encourage most middle-class and affluent
individuals to purchase more than token amounts of liability insurance. But
how much is "enough"-and how does "enough to protect myself' compare to
"enough to compensate those I might wrong"? I have not yet unearthed good
data on how much liability insurance the average or median consumer
purchases. Fortunately, a remarkable, path-breaking study of personal injury
lawyers by Professor Tom Baker sheds considerable light on these questions.
As we will now see, Baker's study suggests that individuals should buy enough
liability insurance to satisfy the professional expectations of plaintiffs' lawyers
as to what is "adequate," and that those expectations are largely a function of
the individual's wealth and the perceived riskiness of his or her activities.
B. Baker's "BloodMoney" Study
Baker set out to study the dynamics of personal injury litigation against
underinsured tortfeasors by interviewing personal injury and insurance defense
lawyers in Connecticut. Because so many tortfeasors lack adequate insurance,
Baker began his interviews with Connecticut tort lawyers expecting that "a
significant part of the personal injury universe would be financed by 'real
money' from 'real people'; that is, out-of-pocket payments by uninsured or
underinsured individual defendants., 273 But most of the lawyers told Baker that
they pursue "blood money"-money paid out of defendants' own pocketsinfrequently, reluctantly, and only from intentional tortfeasors or grossly
to identify some
underinsured defendants.27 4 (Baker was able, however,
275
rule.")
"union
this
follow
to
refused
dissenters who
According to Baker, whereas "[b]argaining for insurance money takes
place very much in the shadow of law... bargaining for blood money turns
more on common-sense morality and practicality., 276 Plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
272. Purchasing liability insurance may also reduce the risk of criminal prosecution, for
several reasons. The victim may be less insistent on punishment if the victim is compensated.
The victim may want to underplead in the civil case, a strategy that would be undermined by
establishing criminal liability if the relevant mens rea involves more than negligence. And the
victim will have less incentive to seek criminal restitution if adequate compensation is available
on the civil side. See infra Part IV.B.5 (detailing the increasing availability of criminal
restitution awards).
273. Baker, Blood Money, supra note 2, at 276.
274. See id. at 281-82 (documenting "unwritten code" against seeking out-of-pocket
damages in ordinary negligence cases).
275. Id. at 286-89.

276.

Id. at 276.
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lawyers are morally uncomfortable taking people's houses and other personal
assets. Nevertheless, Baker finds that:
[P]laintiffs' legal right to exact blood money retains an important role in the
tort settlement process. In combination with a strong norm against paying
blood money in a negligence case, the plaintiffs' legal claim to blood
money motivates all the repeat players in the litigation
process to arrive at a
2 77
settlement within the liability insurance limits.

Baker's analysis is nuanced and perceptive, and he presents convincing
evidence that moral sentiments (particularly those of plaintiffs) support the
norm against seeking blood money. 278 In my view, however, Baker
overestimates the role of morality-and underestimates the extent to which
bargaining over blood money (like bargaining over insurance money) takes
place "in the shadow of law. , 279 In large part, plaintiffs' lawyers are reluctant
280
to pursue blood money because of the serious legal barriers to collecting it.
Ultimately, whatever their moral beliefs may be, the self-interest of plaintiffs'
attorneys appears sufficient to explain the professional norm to which most of
them subscribe.
Consider these statements by some of Baker's interviewees. One attorney
said he would advise a client who is intent on pursuing a defendant's personal
assets that "this is not about vengeance. . . -in order to take someone's house,
you know, the legal hurdles you'd have to jump over are very significant. '281 A
second lawyer, who felt that "dipping into someone's everyday bread"

277. Id. at 277.
278. See, e.g., id. at 284 (quoting respondent's assertion that "most often a plaintiff doesn't
want to take the money out of the defendant," and will settle for the available insurance money);
see also id. at 285 ("I've rarely seen anybody that just stands on principle and says, you know, 'I
think I should get so much money. I don't care how much insurance you have."').
279. Baker acknowledges that his "respondents also stressed the practical problems in
collecting money from real people." Id. at 289. But he seems to place greater weight on moral
considerations. Similarly, whereas Baker stresses that the moral aversion to blood money
creates pressure on insurers to settle within the policy limits, I would emphasize that insurers
know they face greater potential liability (for breach of their duty to settle) if they refuse to settle
and an excess judgment results. By definition, that risk is omnipresent in the underinsurance
cases on which Baker focuses.
280. Baker also underestimates the prevalence of the judgment-proof problem. He infers
from the pervasiveness of consumer credit and from the existence of collection agencies for
consumer credit that most tort defendants are not judgment-proof. Id. at 276, 294. But the
question is not whether defendants could be "forced to pay something." Id. at 294 (emphasis
added). It is whether they could be forced to pay enough to justify the considerable costs of
getting a judgment and then collecting a portion of it, in the teeth of exemptions from collection
and the threat of bankruptcy.
281. Id. at 282.
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contravened "the moral order, 282 also pointed out that "[i]t is easier to collect
from an insurance company than it is to go against the individual and try to
garnish wages, foreclose on a home, as well as other things that most people
aren't interested in doing, whereas the insurance companies, they're like a
bank."28 3 A third adroitly explained how, if his client pursued a large judgment
against an elementary school teacher with only $100,000 in coverage, the
defendant would file for bankruptcy-in which event, "he's going to keep his
house, he's going to keep his car, and he's going to keep, under the statute,
if he's got
$15,000. You can't tap into his IRA, if he has one, his 401K
284
one ....

So what advantage is there for the client to do that?"

It appears, then, that most plaintiffs' lawyers avoid blood money cases
because they are far more expensive and difficult to litigate. 285 This creates a
"niche" that can profitably be exploited by the minority of lawyers who are
willing and able to pursue blood money recoveries in ordinary negligence
cases. 286 But because most plaintiffs are uninterested in blood money, and
because collecting blood money is often uneconomical, that niche is a small
one.
If correct, this analysis suggests that unintentional tortfeasors have little
reason to fear personal tort liability-provided they have adequate liability
insurance. How much is "adequate"? According to Baker, "[t]he minimum is
whatever it takes to claim, credibly, that you have satisfied your moral
obligation to insure. , 287 The first determinant of this "moral obligation" turns
out to be the defendant's assets: "Wealthy people have an obligation to
purchase insurance in larger amounts."' 288 The second determinant appears to
282. Id. at 285.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 289 (footnote omitted). One lawyer also stressed that whereas insurance-money
cases tend to settle, blood-money claims are much more likely to go to trial and hence involve
far greater delay in obtaining compensation for the tort victim. Id. at 290.
285. The "union rule" against pursuing blood money also advances the reputational
interests of the plaintiffs' bar in not being perceived as ruthless or greedy. Indeed, one defense
lawyer described the attitude of the few lawyers who pursue blood money as "the hell with the
bar association, the hell with our image, the hell with ethics, the hell with anything." Id. at 287
(emphasis added).
286. See id. at 286-87 (noting that some lawyers are known for being willing to go after
blood money).
287. Id. at 296-97. Interestingly, the plaintiffs' lawyers who refuse to follow the
customary norm of avoiding blood money in ordinary negligence cases appear to use a different
measure of adequacy-enough insurance to cover the damage done. See id. at 287 (quoting a
lawyer who argued that underinsured defendants have "done two things wrong. They caused the
injury, number one. And, number two, they didn't have themselves adequately insured.").
288. Id. at 297.
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be the magnitude of the harm done to the plaintiff: The greater the damages,
the higher the threshold for adequate insurance.289 Morality aside, these are
precisely the factors that will determine whether pursuing a blood-money
recovery is rational for the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney. The plaintiffs
attorney, in particular (and ignoring ethical constraints), is better off settling
within the policy limits unless the costs of trial and collection are lower than the
lesser of (1) the plaintiff's attorney's percentage of the excess judgment or
(2) the plaintiffs attorney's percentage of the defendant's collectible assets.29 °
The other exception to the professional norm against pursuing blood
money involves highly culpable tortfeasors--drunk drivers and batterers.2 9'
Almost all of the cases in this category are nondischargeable tort claimswhich makes collecting blood money easier because it removes the threat of
bankruptcy. 292 At the same time, these are also the situations in which plaintiffs
are most likely to want blood money. As one lawyer put it, for these plaintiffs
"the coverage just doesn't cut it because it is not coming out of the person's
pocket., 293 Even in such cases, however, plaintiffs' lawyers may encourage
their clients to settle within the policy limits because, as a defense lawyer
294
explained, "the last thing they want to see is an uncollectable judgment."
The evidence Baker presents, then, suggests that individuals with
significant nonexempt assets will benefit from purchasing amounts of liability
coverage that are roughly proportionate to their nonexempt assets. 295 A
289. See id. at 297-98 (discussing physicians who were grossly underinsured compared to
the foreseeable risks associated with their specialty).
290. Under some contingent fee agreements, the interests of plaintiffs and their attorneys
will diverge because the attorney bears most of the costs of going to trial (and of postjudgment
collection).
291. The tortfeasors in many of these cases are highly judgment-proof, and hence few of
these cases are litigated. Indeed, while a recent study of California civil trials found that
roughly 5% of all cases involved allegations of "unlawful force," the defendants in these cases
were far more likely to be governments or business than individuals. Samuel R. Gross & Kent
D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Gearedto Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1, 13,19 (1996).
292. Many of these cases also involve intentional harms that are technically excluded from
coverage under most liability insurance policies. Nevertheless, the insurer may well offer to
settle, to avoid the costs of providing a defense and the possibility that the plaintiff will
"underplead" (that is, litigate the case as a negligence claim). See Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories
We Tell: IntentionalHarm and the Questfor InsuranceFunding, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1721, 1722
(1997) (defining underlitigating).
293. Baker, Blood Money, supra note 2, at 300.
294. Id.
295. Cf.Syverud, supra note 22, at 1638 (arguing that risk-averse potential defendants
"should buy at least the average amount of liability insurance" purchased by similarly situated
persons).
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tortfeasor with a good income and some nonexempt assets faces a real-though
discounted-threat of personal liability for, say, a $100,000 auto accident
covered only by a $20,000 policy. The plaintiffs attorney may advise the
plaintiff to settle for the policy limit. But there is also a chance that the
plaintiff's attorney will treat this as a case of grossly inadequate insurance, and
hence outside the "union rule." By purchasing a moderate rather than minimal
policy limit, the individual can greatly reduce the risk of blood-money liability.
Given that individuals are likely to be quite risk averse when it comes to the
risk of a large personal tort liability, then, it is rational for many people to
purchase proportionate amounts of liability insurance.
C. Marketing and Information-CostFactors
Information-cost problems also may be a factor in creating demand for
liability insurance. Many people do not understand the extent to which their
assets are already protected by exemptions, the bankruptcy option, and the other
legal barriers to collection. Liability insurers ignore or downplay these other
296
methods of asset protection in order to increase the demand for their product.
They market liability insurance as essentially another type of casualty
insurance: "Even if you were not at fault," the standard sales pitch goes, "you
might still be sued if an accident happens-and your home and income could
be at risk. A six-figure (or seven-figure) personal liability policy will ensure
that your assets are safe. , 297 This type of marketing is reinforced by ongoing
and highly publicized
charges-often made by insurers-that the tort system is
'298
"out of control.

Moreover, individuals are in a poor position to quantify the risks of tort
liability or discount them properly in light of the legal barriers to tort recovery.
Governments do not advertise those barriers to the general public. The
information is readily available, but only for those who take the time to look for
it. Nor do plaintiffs' lawyers publicize the fact that they will not pursue blood
296. See id. at 1644 ("[M]any insurers are anxious to encourage current customers to
increase their liability policy limits, thus increasing the premium income from a line of
insurance and a set of insureds with which the underwriters are already most familiar.").
297. See, e.g., Chase Financial Services, Personal Umbrella Liability Insurance,
http://www.chaseagency.com/umbrellaFAQ.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2005) (promoting
protection of assets as a benefit of liability insurance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
298. See generallyStephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It Has Is Between
People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture,and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAuL L. REv. 453

(2000).
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money except from intentional tortfeasors or grossly underinsured defendants.
These informational considerations make middle-class individuals an "easy
sell" for liability insurance, provided its cost is not exorbitant.299
D. Disaggregatingthe Uninsured-or-UnderinsuredProblem
Now that we have examined the reasons why individuals purchase as
much liability insurance as they currently do, we are in a position to draw some
additional conclusions about the nature and magnitude of the judgment-proof
problem. Intentional torts aside, the judgment-proof problem would be of no
practical importance if every potential tortfeasor carried unlimited amounts of
personal liability insurance. Thus, we can also think of the judgment-proof
problem as "the uninsured-or-underinsured problem." Viewed from that
perspective, the key questions are which torts are likely to be underinsured
against and who is likely to commit torts while underinsured. Obviously there
are uninsured and underinsured tortfeasors at every level of age, income, and
wealth. Clearly, however, some demographic groups are more likely than
others to commit unintentional torts and to be underinsured for the torts they do
commit.
Consider, for example, the two-thirds of households that are homeowners.
The fact that the liability insurance component of homeowners' insurance is
inexpensive is strong evidence that--except when they are drivinghomeowners simply do not commit very many serious unintentional torts.
Conversely, as we have already seen, homeowners are de facto required to buy
liability insurance on the order of $100,000. The implication is that
homeowners will normally have liability insurance sufficient to cover most
nondriving-related unintentional torts they might commit. Thus, although there
is certainly an underinsured-tortfeasor problem with regard to serious accidents
of the kinds covered by homeowners' liability insurance, that problem is
comparatively modest in scope.
Contrast the situation of renters, who are, on average, significantly
younger than homeowners and have far lower net worth. 300 Like intentional
299. The costs and benefits of liability insurance may be different for wealthy individuals,
to whom the nonpecuniary costs of litigation may matter more than legal defense costs. Some
rich individuals may prefer to go bare precisely on the grounds that the combination of zero
insurance and customized asset-protection planning is the best way to deter plaintiffs' lawyers
from suing them at all.
300. According to a 2004 study of census data by the Pew Hispanic Center, the median net
worth of renters is only 1% of the median net worth of homeowners. Press Release, Pew
Hispanic Center, Wealth Gap Widens Between Whites and Hispanics (Oct. 18, 2004),
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wrongdoing, negligence is presumably negatively correlated with age and
wealth in most settings. One would therefore expect renters' liability insurance
to be more expensive. At the same time, renters face a far smaller residual
threat of tort liability because they are less likely to have significant collectible
assets. Nor is there any gatekeeper to pressure renters to purchase personal
liability insurance. Unsurprisingly, therefore, most renters do not purchase
personal liability insurance (other than auto insurance). It thus seems clear that
the underinsured-tortfeasor problem is far more serious among renters: They
probably commit more unintentional torts per capita, and they unquestionably
have far less insurance to cover them.
When it comes to automobile liability insurance, a similar pattern appears.
There is clearly some correlation between levels of income and wealth and
levels of liability insurance purchased. Poor and working-class people are more
likely either to be uninsured or to have purchased the statutory minimum. As
income increases, voluntary purchases of liability insurance in excess of the
minimum become increasingly frequent (and increasingly large).30' At the
same time, negligence rates probably diminish.
In sum, persons with few assets and modest incomes are probably
responsible for a disproportionately high share of the uninsured-orunderinsured torts that occur with such regularity in our society. In turn, that
suggests that the most important part of the judgment-proof problem is incomesheltering, not asset-sheltering. People who have significant assets are less
likely to commit torts in the first place. When they do, as I will argue in Part V,
their personal assets should be at risk absent adequate liability insurance. But
from the standpoint of deterrence, income-sheltering matters more, because it
alone affects the incentives of persons who have income but few collectible
assets and little or no liability insurance.
V. Lowering the Barriersto Enforcing Personal Tort Liability: Arguments
and Objections
We have now seen that the judgment-proof problem pervades our tort
system, and that this situation is largely attributable to legal rules that hamper
the collection of judgments. To partisans of the tort system, it may seem selfevident that these barriers to enforcing tort liability should be lowered or
http://pewhispanic.org/newsroom/releases.
301. See Rachel Emma Silverman, InsurersOffer New Policiesfor the Wealthy, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 27, 2005, at DI ("[A]s individuals' net worth increases, so does their demand for excess
liability coverage.").
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eliminated. On reflection, however, this turns out to be a closer question than
might first appear. The existing barriers unquestionably subvert the deterrence,
corrective justice, and compensation functions of the tort system. But the
efficacy and efficiency of the tort system is open to doubt, and pro-debtor
policies supposedly advance social goals outside the purview of the tort system.
It is conceivable, therefore, that the barriers to enforcing tort liability are
socially beneficial despite their detrimental impact on the tort system.
Nevertheless, I will argue in this Part that a convincing case can be made
for reforms designed to increase tortfeasors' exposure to personal tort liability.
I will then lay out in more detail the principal ways in which barrier-lowering
might proceed and briefly evaluate their pros and cons. Then, in Part VI, I will
consider an alternative way to reduce the judgment-proof problem: mandating
the purchase of adequate liability insurance in as many contexts as possible.
A. Arguments for Barrier-Lowering
1. The Argument from Deterrence
This subsection will evaluate the argument that lowering the barriers to
enforcing tort liability would greatly improve the tort system's ability to deter
tortious conduct. Before taking up that question, however, it is worth noting
that the obstacles to judgment collection may be unduly high for both tort and
contract claimants. The American discharge in bankruptcy is unique in the
world, 30 2 and American exemption laws shelter a substantial portion of
household net worth even outside bankruptcy. 30 3 These supposedly pro-debtor
policies harm most debtors-those who do not default or file for bankruptcyby driving up the cost of borrowing. 30 4 On the other hand, America's liberal
bankruptcy and exemption laws have long been defended as encouraging risktaking by individuals and firms and ensuring that the human capital of those
who run into financial difficulties will be redeployed after a "fresh start.' °
302. SKEEL, supra note 222, at 238.
303. American exemption laws also appear more generous than those of other
industrialized democracies. See, e.g., Paul B. Lewis, Can't Pay Your Debts, Mate? A
Comparisonof the AustralianandAmerican PersonalBankruptcy Systems, 18 BANKR. DEv. J.

297,324-25 (2002) (describing the very limited exemptions available under Australian law).
304. Of course, the same policies benefit debtors by supplying a form of insurance against
the consequences of default. But that insurance is, to put it mildly, a better bargain for some
debtors than for others.
305.
MANAGER

See DAVID A. Moss, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT
138-50 (2002) (articulating the case for bankruptcy).
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Perhaps these benefits outweigh the higher costs of borrowing caused by
generous discharge and exemption provisions.
But even if the legal barriers to enforcing contract claims are justifiable,
the extension of these barriers to tort claims is highly problematic. Unlike
contract claimants, tort victims are involuntary creditors. Contract creditors can
choose the parties with whom they deal, avoid dealing with persons they
perceive to be bad credit risks, and adjust other terms of their contracts (such as
interest rates) in response to pro-debtor legal rules. The parallel forms of
protection for potential tort victims are far less robust. In many contexts, such
as auto accidents, tort victims and tortfeasors are strangers, so that bargaining is
impossible; and no one has control over who else is on the road at any given
time and place. 306 Even in contractual settings, such as medical malpractice,
potential tort victims face severe informational problems in choosing among
possible contracting parties based on their reputations for safety. And potential
tort victims are almost never in a position to shift the costs of protortfeasor legal
rules back onto tortfeasors. Thus, the powerful private-law mechanisms that
limit the undesirable effects of pro-debtor policies in the contract setting are
weak or nonexistent in the tort setting. As a result, there is reason to fear that
pro-debtor policies, when applied to tort claims, will produce more personal
injuries and less compensation than is optimal.3 °7
Although we cannot measure the reduction on deterrence attributable to
the barriers to enforcing tort liability, we can get a sense of its magnitude by
imagining what would happen were those barriers eliminated. Consider first
the situation of potential intentional tortfeasors. Absent barriers to collection,
the probability that these individuals would suffer the loss of personal assets
were they to commit an intentional tort, as well as the magnitude of their
expected losses, would greatly increase (on average). Moreover, these
individuals would not be able to avoid the increased threat of liability by
purchasing insurance because liability insurers refuse to cover intentional torts

306. Potential tort victims can take precautions to protect themselves against accidents.
But by the same token, contracting parties can take precautions to protect themselves from the
consequences of breach. And in any event, tort victims who fail to take such precautions are
already penalized by the doctrine of comparative fault, which reduces or eliminates a negligent
plaintiff's recovery.
307. Unlike tort victims, who can purchase first-party accident, health, disability, and life
insurance, creditors cannot purchase insurance against the business risk of default. But the
difference in insurability is attributable to the fact that tort victims' lack of control makes their
losses accidental, whereas creditors' far greater control over their lending practices makes
insurance unworkable. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 72-75 (describing the limits of liability
insurance).
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treat such insurance
for reasons of moral hazard.3 °8 (Indeed, some states3would
°9
as against public policy even if insurers offered it.)
It seems axiomatic that this greater risk of uninsurable personal liability
would deter some potential tortfeasors from committing intentional torts. What
is harder to predict is the magnitude of this deterrent effect. Because
intentional tortfeasors must affirmatively choose to harm their victims, we
might expect many of them to be deterred by the prospect of losing their core
assets. On the other hand, because many intentional torts also constitute
crimes, one might expect the marginal deterrence attributable to this additional
threat of tort liability to be relatively small. A person who is willing to risk
prison time for, say, aggravated battery might not be deterred by the risk of
prison time plus the loss of some personal assets. To further complicate
matters, the criminal justice system has in recent years made increasing use of
criminal restitution awards that require convicted criminals to compensate their
victims' pecuniary losses.3 10 Unlike tort judgments, these criminal restitution
awards trump exemptions from collection in many jurisdictions. 311 It seems
even less likely that a potential intentional tortfeasor who is not deterred by the
threat of prison plus the threat of criminal restitution would be deterred by an
increased threat of tort liability for nonpecuniary harm or punitive damages.
But this analysis is incomplete. Some intentional torts do not constitute
crimes, and many intentional torts that do constitute crimes are never
prosecuted due to limited government resources, problems of proof, or other
grounds for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Lowering the barriers to
enforcing tort judgments would significantly increase the probability that
crime-tortfeasors will face at least one substantial sanction. There is good
reason to think that this increase in the probability of suffering a sanction will
generate increased deterrence. 312 No doubt many individuals, deficient in selfcontrol or foresight, would still commit intentional torts.3 13 But that simply
308. JERRY, supranote 268, at 479. For reasons already discussed, an insured with liability
coverage for unintentional torts may, as a practical matter, be protected against liability for some
intentional torts. See supra note 268 (describing underpleading).
309. JERRY, supra note 268, at 479 ("[P]ublic policy forbids contracts indemnifying a
person against loss resulting from his own willful wrongdoing.").
310. See infra Part V.B.5 (discussing criminal restitution as a possible alternative to
lowering barriers to tort recovery).
311. See infra Part V.B.5.
312. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 220 (6th ed. 2003) ("A
growing empirical literature on crime has shown that individuals respond to changes in
opportunity costs, in the probability of apprehension, in the severity of punishment, and in other
relevant variables.").
313. Actors who are judgment-proof in fact, of course, would not be deterred by the threat

THE JUDGMENT-PROOFSOCIETY
illustrates the familiar proposition that deterrence gains at the margins can
coexist with subpopulations that remain undeterred.
Let us now evaluate the deterrence gains with regard to potential
unintentional tortfeasors. Because uninsured and underinsured individuals
would face a much greater threat of tort liability, we would expect them to
commit fewer unintentional torts.314 Again, however, the key question is the
magnitude of this effect. For simplicity, I will ignore the smaller (but still
important) overlap between the criminal justice and unintentional-tort systems
in order to focus on the important objection that tort liability is poorly suited to
deterring negligence by individuals. 315 The argument is that, unlike repeat
players such as product manufacturers and health-care providers,3 16 most
individuals are, for several reasons, not much influenced by the threat of tort
liability. 317 In the biggest category of serious personal injury cases-auto
accidents-individuals already face the powerful threat of death or bodily
injury should they cause a collision. Many negligent accidents are caused by
inadvertent behavior that individuals cannot readily modify and about which
they do not engage in cost-benefit planning. Most unintentional torts are lowprobability events that may simply not be on most individuals' radar screens.
Each of these factors reduces the deterrent impact of unintentional tort liability
on individuals. Taken together, they suggest that the deterrence benefits of tort
litigation against individuals are decisively lower than the benefits of tort
litigation against organizations and other repeat players.
Although each of these points has some validity, they do not add up to a
convincing refutation of the deterrence benefits of individual tort liability.
Negligent drivers frequently emerge unscathed from accidents that seriously
injure others. Adding a realistic threat of tort liability, therefore, will
significantly increase the probability and severity of the expected penalty for
of tort liability even if there were no barriers to collection.
314. Moreover, lowering the barriers to collection is likely to weaken the professional
norm against collecting blood money from unintentional tortfeasors. To the extent that this
norm is attributable to the difficulty of collecting blood money, making collection easier should
lead more lawyers to pursue the personal assets of uninsured or underinsured defendants. In
turn, that will reinforce the new incentives for individuals to buy adequate liability insurance.
Alternatively, to the extent that the professional norm is attributable to attorneys' moral
sentiments, those sentiments are likely to reflect broader societal attitudes. Were legislatures to
decide that enforcing tort liability is more important than shielding tortfeasors' personal assets,
the moral sentiments of many personal injury lawyers would presumably follow suit.
315. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does
Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Reality].
316. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 97 (6th ed. 2003) (arguing
that institutional actors are more likely to be affected by liability-creating rules).
317. Id. at 382-83.
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negligent driving, notwithstanding that the existing penalty structure includes a
risk-of-bodily-injury component. As for inadvertent behavior, much of the time
inadvertence to one thing (say, the location, speed, presence, or likely behavior
of another driver) is the result of advertence to other things (say, a cell phone
conversation). An increase in the expected sanction for negligence raises the
cost of paying attention to one's own priorities in ways that unduly risk the
safety of others. That should reduce the incidence of negligent inadvertence:
For example, uninsured and underinsured drivers would make fewer cell phone
calls if the threat of personal tort liability were more credible.
The same example will illustrate the fallacy inherent in the argument that
marginal deterrence will be negligible because individuals frequently ignore
low-probability events.31 8 I agree that many people do not think about tort
liability (or even about risks to themselves) before electing to engage in risky
behavior such as making a cell phone call while driving. But in order for an
increased threat of liability to produce improved deterrence it is not necessary
that everyone be paying attention to the risk in question. It suffices that a
substantial number of people do so. In deciding how safely to behave, many
people take their bearings from salient information about the consequences of
risky behavior. Stories linking driving while on one's cell phone to the loss of
personal assets and income would surely be both well-publicized and
memorable. They are the kind of news that would predictably lead many
individuals to cut down on their calls while driving or to adopt the habit of
avoiding them except in emergencies.
The discussion so far has focused on the how much deterrent impact an
increase in the threat of personal tort liability can be expected to have. It is
now time to consider the complication introduced by the availability of liability
insurance for unintentional torts.
There is good reason to think that barrier-lowering would trigger a large
increase in voluntary purchases of liability insurance. 319 As we saw in Part Il,
millions of individuals voluntarily purchase substantial amounts of liability
insurance, even though many of their assets are exempt from collection and
their possible unintentional torts are dischargeable in bankruptcy. This
behavior suggests that most individuals are quite risk-averse with regard to
personal tort liability. If personal assets were fully exposed to collection, and if
318. In addition, many torts involve risks that happen frequently enough that most
individuals do not ignore them (e.g., the risk of a collision if one runs a red light).
319. We do not know the elasticity of demand for liability insurance as a function of
increases in the "price" of tort liability. If the data were available, however, one might be able
to approximate it by comparing how much liability insurance individuals purchase in lowexemption and high-exemption states.

THE JUDGMENT-PROOFSOCIETY
ordinary negligence were nondischargeable, many people who already
purchase liability insurance voluntarily would presumably be motivated to
increase their coverage limits significantly. More important, millions of
individuals who currently lack personal liability insurance (or who buy only the
mandatory minimum auto liability coverage) would have much greater
incentives to purchase "voluntary" liability insurance. A few hardy souls might
elect to go bare and risk losing their paychecks and retirement savings. But
most people would want to purchase enough liability insurance to protect these
assets.
Assuming this analysis is correct, the question is what impact these
purchases of liability insurance would have on the increased deterrence that
would (absent liability insurance) flow from the increased threat of personal tort
liability. As Shavell has shown, if insurers can perfectly monitor insureds'
levels of care, insurance will not interfere with optimal deterrence because
insureds who take less care will pay higher premiums. 32 If, at the other
extreme, insurers cannot monitor insureds' levels of care at all, insureds will
have reduced incentives to take due care. 321 Thus, "whether injurers' incentives
to take care will be altered for the better by their purchase of liability coverage
depends on the ability of insurers to determine levels of care and to link the
premium (or other policy terms) to it."3 22 Although the issue deserves fuller
investigation, it seems fairly clear that in most liability insurance markets,
insurers can monitor insureds' levels of care to some extent and adjust
premiums accordingly. 32 3 By inducing individuals to buy more liability
insurance, we will therefore (on average) increase the threat of premium
increases should insureds negligently cause covered losses.
Monitoring by insurers, however, is both imperfect and costly.
Consequently, we cannot rule out the possibility that in some contexts
voluntary liability insurance, on balance, reduces incentives to take care. 3 24 But
it reduces them only compared to a regime in which liability insurance is
forbidden. Because American law uniformly permits liability insurance for

320. SHAVELL,ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 195.
321. Id. at 195-96.
322. Id. at 241.
323. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance,75
CORNELL L. REv. 313,320 (1990) [hereinafter Schwartz, Ethics andEconomics] (describing the
prevalence of "responsive" insurance arrangements).
324. As Shavell has also shown, however, liability insurance is likely to be socially
beneficial even in such contexts. See SHAvELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 213
(suggesting that "the dilution of incentives will be moderate" and will ordinarily be outweighed
by "increases [in] the welfare of risk-averse injurers").
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unintentional torts, that comparison is irrelevant. The baseline for comparison,
rather, consists of individuals who are motivated to buy little or no liability
insurance (because they face little or no threat of tort liability). Existing tort
law obviously has weak deterrent force as applied to these persons. Eliminating
the barriers to enforcing tort liability will increase deterrence by making the
threat of tort liability more credible. Even if, in some contexts, voluntary
purchases of liability insurance dilute this increase in deterrence, they are
unlikely to eliminate it-and they certainly will not reverse it.
2. The Argumentfrom Corrective Justice
To many torts scholars, deterring tortious behavior is a distinctly
secondary purpose of tort law (if indeed it deserves to be called a purpose at
all). 325 On this view, the main point of tort law is corrective justice-righting
wrongs, not preventing them. 326 As understood by many of its adherents,
corrective justice is important for practical as well as moral reasons: It is good
to do justice by requiring wrongdoers to make amends to their victims for the
harm they have done. A tort system that reliably and consistently achieves
corrective justice is a better tort system than one that unreliably and
inconsistently does so. From this perspective, the barriers to collecting tort
judgments are plainly undesirable because they insulate millions of Americans
from accountability in corrective justice.
It does not follow, of course, that increasing the tort system's ability to
deliver corrective justice is a goal we must pursue regardless of other
considerations and consequences. But a large increase in the quantity of
corrective justice supplied by the tort system should count as a major benefit of
lowering the barriers to collecting tort judgments. Similarly, the related
increase in the demand for liability insurance should mean that more tort
victims receive more of the compensation owed to them by wrongdoers. 327
325. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrenceand
CorrectiveJustice, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1801, 1806-08 (1997) (reviewing the work of corrective
justice advocates).
326. As Gary Schwartz has noted, however, one can believe that corrective justice is
valuable but that preventing injustices (including tortious injuries) is also desirable. See id. at
1831-32 (arguing that by deterring negligence, tort liability furthers not only utility but also
justice).
327. Schwartz, Ethics and Economics, supranote 323, at 328-29. Schwartz points out that
on some understandings of corrective justice it is crucial that the wrongdoer be personally
responsible for compensating the victim. See id. at 332-36 (observing that although some
versions of corrective justice, including George Fletcher's, would accept responsively priced
liability insurance as a mechanism for satisfying tort judgments, other "strong" versions would
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The deterrence and corrective-justice benefits of barrier-lowering are not
mutually exclusive: One can consistently maintain both that wrongs should be
minimized and that as many wrongs as possible should be righted. In addition,
barrier-lowering may generate indirect benefits of both types. In recent years,
scholars have paid increasing attention to the expressive function of law-its
ability authoritatively to declare society's values and expectations in ways that
can reinforce and shape the attitudes and mores of individuals. 328 As Richard
McAdams puts it, "It]he thesis is that the law influences behavior independent
of the sanctions it threatens
to impose, that law works by what it says in
3 29
addition to what it does.
In these terms, the expressive meaning of current law is at cross-purposes
with itself: Tort law announces that tortfeasors should pay for their wrongs (or
purchase liability insurance to make payments on their behalf), but exemption
and bankruptcy law subvert that message at every turn. Of course, many people
are unaware that tort liability is as easy to evade as this Article has shown it to
be. But the large numbers of uninsured and underinsured tortfeasors suggest
that a substantial fraction of the populace does not perceive tort liability as
anything to worry about. And the emergence of an organized asset-protection
industry is likely to mean, over time, that an increasingly large group of more
affluent individuals perceives tort law as a risk to be avoided, rather than a
series of norms mandating due care for the safety of others.
Conversely, were society to eliminate the barriers to enforcing tort
judgments-and to publicize that fact-it would send a powerful message
reinforcing the deterrent and corrective-justice goals of tort law. Individuals
would in effect be told that torts are treated as serious wrongs for which
personal responsibility is the norm, not the exception. Bound up with that
message would be another: that each person is expected to purchase adequate

reject any means by which a tortfeasor might diminish personal financial liability). On these
views, liability insurance undermines corrective justice insofar as wrongdoers do not face higher
premiums than other insureds. Id. at 332.
328. See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, A Belief-Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L.
REv.35, 62-65 (2002) (examining law's ability to affect behavior by altering the certainty of a
belief or the evaluation of consequences); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?
An EconomicAnalysis of InternalizedNorms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1590 (2000) (arguing that
law affects the internalization of behavioral rules by influencing beliefs about how others will
behave); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Functionof Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 202223 (1996) (arguing that some support for law comes from its expressive content, not its
efficacy).
329. Richard H. McAdams, A FocalPoint Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649,
1650-51 (2000).
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liability insurance-and that failure to do so exposes one's personal assets and
income to the full force of tort liability.
B. Objections to Barrier-Lowering
1. The Welfare Justificationfor Barriersto Enforcing Tort Liability
Having established the prima facie case for barrier-lowering, we turn now
to a series of possible justifications for the status quo. First up is the contention
that blood-money tort litigation should be discouraged because it is unduly
harmful to the welfare of tortfeasors and their innocent spouses and dependents.
As applied to intentional tortfeasors, this argument is unpersuasive. Why, for
example, should an intentional tortfeasor be allowed to keep 75% of his or her
disposable earnings, regardless of how high they may be? The tortfeasor has
intentionally wronged the victim, and in so doing typically (and often
deliberately) impaired the victim's physical and emotional health. Under these
circumstances, the tortfeasor's existing lifestyle should not be privilegedparticularly when that lifestyle is an affluent one. 330 Nor is there any reason to
think that dollars are, in general, more valuable to tortfeasors than to their
victims. 33' Often, the opposite is true.
As for intentional tortfeasors' innocent spouses and other family members,
the simple rejoinder is that the victim is also innocent. 332 Beyond that, victims
are just as likely to have spouses and dependents as tortfeasors are: hence any
amplification of welfare losses on one side is, on average, matched on the other.
So long, therefore, as tortfeasors are allowed income and assets sufficient to
provide their families with a decent level of basic needs such as food, clothing,
shelter, transportation, and medical care,
it seems appropriate to set aside the
3 33
balance for the intentional tort victim.
330. Exemptions to tort collection (and to debt collection generally) almost always apply
regardless of the tort judgment debtor's income (or wealth). Insofar as exemptions are said to
be justified by the need to avoid undue hardship to debtors, this failure to consider the debtor's
ability to pay seems indefensible.
331. I am assuming that we can make useful (even if not rigorous) comparisons of
interpersonal welfare or utility. Intuitively, enforcing a tort judgment by reducing the tortfeasor
to destitution or starvation would be welfare-reducing at the margins. That is why I have
suggested throughout that the elimination of barriers to torts collection should be qualified by
some form of hardship exception.
332. This statement requires a modest qualification: Plaintiff's negligence is not a defense
to most intentional torts, and consequently it is possible that the victim was somewhat at fault,
yet is still entitled to recover.
333. The same logic applies to alimony and child support. The fact that the tortfeasor's
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The case of the negligent tortfeasor seems closer. We are all negligent on
occasion, and most of us would shudder at the thought that an inadvertent lapse
could subject us to large blood-money losses--or that a jury might erroneously
find us negligent, with equally ruinous results. But there is a simple way to
avoid these risks: purchase adequate liability insurance.334 It is predictable, of
course, that some tortfeasors will fail to follow this simple strategy (or will be
uninsurable). It is equally predictable, however, that some tort victims will fail
to obtain adequate first-party insurance (or be uninsurable).335 Once again,
there are large welfare losses on both sides, rather than a pattern of one-sided
welfare losses favoring tortfeasors. Consequently, the deterrence and corrective
justice benefits of enforcing tort liability should carry the day.
The following thought experiment lends additional support to the
proposition that the existing barriers to collection are too high as applied to tort
claims. Imagine that tortfeasors could not obtain a discharge in bankruptcy or
invoke exemptions from collection. Instead, upon entry of judgment, the trial
judge would hold a hearing to determine how much of the judgment, and from
what assets, the underinsured tortfeasor should be directed to pay. In so ruling,
the court would take into account the goals of deterrence and corrective justice,
along with the impact of the award on the well-being of each of the parties and
their dependents. The court, in other words, would decide how much of each
tortfeasor's income and assets should be exempt, after considering all the
relevant legal policies and welfare implications.
Under this regime, it seems intuitively obvious that judges would require
defendants to pay significantly more, on average, than they do under existing
law. Surely, for example, judges would require many underinsured tortfeasors
to turn over portions of their retirement funds, forfeit more than 25% of their
disposable income, or lose all or most of their home equity. Of course, in some
instances judges would award less than current law allows. (For example, a
court might hesitate to garnish 25% of the earnings of a low-income worker
supporting a large family). But on balance this system should substantially
increase payments to tort victims. Imagine that tortfeasors and tort victims
were permitted to choose between this hypothetical system and the real one. In
dependents are not living with the tortfeasor does not give them a greater claim to support vis-Avis a tort victim than if they were part of the tortfeasor' s intact family.
334. See Schwartz, Ethics and Economics, supra note 323, at 325 (discussing the use of
liability insurance to avoid the risk of mistaken findings of negligence).
335. Increasing personal exposure to tort liability will have a bigger (socially beneficial)
effect on potential tortfeasors' purchases of liability insurance than the (socially detrimental)
effect of reducing potential victims' purchases of first-party insurance. The latter effect should
be small because first-party coverage provides protection against a broad range of risks, of
which tortiously caused injuries are only a small part.
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most jurisdictions, it seems clear that tortfeasors would generally prefer existing
law, while tort victims would prefer the new regime.336 In the real world, of
course, this hypothetical system would be plagued by high administrative
CoStS. 3 37 But if indeed judges in an individualized system would exempt a
substantially smaller percentage of tortfeasors' assets and income than current
law protects, we may infer that social welfare would be increased by cutting
back on exemptions.
2. The Incentive Justificationfor Barriersto Tort Liability
The next justification for the existing barriers to tort liability asserts that
the protection of debtors' assets and income via exemptions and discharge in
bankruptcy pays important social dividends as applied to tort liabilities, not just
contract claims. The argument is that individuals will be more willing to
engage in risky (but on average beneficial) activities if given a "safety net"; that
overwhelmed debtors will, in the end, be more productive if given a fresh start;
338
and that these effects are as large in the tort setting as the contractual one.
In some contexts, such as the potential tort liability of professionals and
small businesspersons, concerns about discouraging beneficial activities could
be important. For the most part, however, these individuals should be able to
obtain an alternative "safety net" by purchasing more liability insurance. There
may also be some situations in which fear of blood-money tort liability could
overdeter individuals. For example, consider bodily injury inflicted by an actor
in self-defense. Some individuals might do too little to defend themselves, for
fear of personal tort liability if a jury concludes they behaved unreasonably or
used excessive force. 339 But such situations seem atypical: Most intentional
torts do not stem from mere unreasonableness.
As for the "fresh start" policy, I agree that enhancing the enforceability of
tort judgments should not be taken to extremes. For example, if tort victims
336. The considerable variation across states also complicates matters: Tortfeasors in
Texas and Florida would pay far more under this hypothetical regime, whereas their
counterparts in creditor-friendly states such as Illinois and Maryland might pay only a little
more.
337. This system is also not entirely hypothetical. In many respects, it resembles current
practice in criminal restitution cases, in which courts fashion restitution orders as part of
criminal sentencing. See infra Part V.B.5 (discussing criminal restitution as a possible
alternative to lower tort recovery barriers).
338. SKEEL, supra note 222, at 100.
339. Most courts hold that injuries wrongfully inflicted in self-defense are excluded by the
standard exclusion for intentional injuries. JERRY, supra note 268, at 490-91.
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were entitled to collect 75% of tortfeasors' earnings, some tortfeasors might
drop out of the workforce, join the underground economy, or flee the United
States. Of course, even under this regime, many tort victims would find it in
their interest to strike less draconian bargains with tortfeasors in settlement of
their claims. To the extent that the problem persisted, however, it would be
prudent to reduce it through hardship exemptions. In any event, the problem
should be self-limiting: Whereas debtors cannot purchase insurance against the
risk that they will be unable to pay their debts, most potential tortfeasors can
purchase liability insurance.
3. The Counterargumentfrom PoliticalPopularity
In response, it might be argued that the political popularity of legal
barriers to collection is strong evidence that additional personal tort liability
would be socially undesirable. On this view, the high barriers to collecting tort
judgments reflect the fact that most people would rather be sure of keeping
their core personal assets (should they become tortfeasors) than have the right
to seize a tortfeasor's core personal assets (should they become victims). If
these preferences are rational, then barrier-lowering would be welfare-reducing.
This argument, however, presupposes that existing law accurately reflects
the preferences of the public. The fact that the general public unquestionably
underestimates the extent to which assets are sheltered from tort liability by
existing law suggests that this argument is mistaken. So does the public choice
analysis I will present in Part VII of this Article, which argues that the political
process undervalues the interests of potential tort victims as compared with the
interests of potential tortfeasors, debtors, contract creditors, attorneys, and
liability insurers.
In addition, this objection overstates the danger an exemption-free tort law
would pose to most people and understates the benefits it would confer on
them. To avoid losing one's personal assets, one need only purchase adequate
liability insurance (to minimize the threat of negligence liability) and refrain
from committing any uninsurable intentional torts. To be sure, even a wellinsured individual would still have a small chance of being held liable for a
catastrophic accident that caused damages in excess of the policy limits; and,
absent barriers to collection, plaintiffs would be more likely to pursue "blood
340. Psychological biases may also play a role here. For example, individuals may feel
they have more control over whether they become victims than over whether they accidentally
injure someone. Or they may exaggerate the risk of tort liability because tort reform is a salient
political issue. Thanks to Tom Baker and Neal Feigenson for help with these points.
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money" in such cases. But even in this low-probability, worst-case scenario,
plaintiffs would have strong incentives to settle within the (by hypothesis) large
policy limits, (or, failing that, to settle for the policy limits plus a nonruinous
contribution from the defendant's personal assets). Moreover, as I discuss in
Part VI, this risk could be eliminated by legislation limiting the personal
liability of highly insured individuals. Alternatively, insurance markets might
well respond by offering unlimited liability policies for the affluent individuals
who are most likely to be concerned about this residual risk.3 4'
As for the benefits, an exemption-free tort law would materially reduce
what is currently a very significant risk of suffering uncompensated bodily
injury or death at the hands of a judgment-proof tortfeasor. True, one can
soften that threat by purchasing first-party health, disability, and life insurance.
But these are imperfect substitutes for liability insurance, because none of them
includes compensation for nonpecuniary harm (i.e., pain and suffering and
emotional distress). Beyond that, even those of us with good first-party
insurance have a very real stake in the deterrence benefits of barrier-lowering:
As potential victims, we would all prefer to escape bodily injury (let alone
death) rather than to be injured and receive full tort damages. Consequently,
behind the veil of ignorance, not knowing whether we will be victims or
injurers, the preferred solution should be to choose a no-exemptions regime and
purchase adequate liability insurance.
4. If Tort Liability Is Bad, Why Create More of It?
In defense of the status quo, it might also be argued that tort litigation--or,
at least, more tort litigation-is on balance undesirable. The deterrence,
corrective-justice, and loss-spreading benefits of tort liability are delivered via a
civil litigation system plagued by high administrative, information, and error
costs. Any proposal to reduce the barriers to enforcing tort liability can be seen
as yet another expansion of a tort system that some critics would abolish
altogether, and that others urge should be pruned back.34 2
Although I cannot undertake a global defense of the tort system, I agree
with those who contend that its benefits are worth its CoStS. 343 But I agree with
341. Unlimited automobile liability policies are apparently common in some European
countries.
342.

See, e.g., STEPHEN SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 127-66

(1989) (urging replacement of the tort system with safety regulation and first-party insurance);
PETER HUBER, LiABiLrrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-18 (1988)
(arguing that the expansion of tort liability in recent decades is socially harmful).
343.

See, e.g., ThOMAS H. KOENIG & MIcHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 1-3
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the critics that some parts of the tort system are dysfunctional, and that the
system's high costs provide strong reason for caution in expanding it. As I
have already argued, however, barrier-lowering would result in substantially
greater deterrence of tortious conduct, rectification of more wrongs, and
substantially greater purchases of liability insurance (and therefore fewer
undercompensated tort victims). The question is whether these benefits would
come at too great a cost. For the reasons that follow, I am inclined to think not.
First, the controversial areas of tort law generally involve businesses and
professionals, rather than the private individuals whose exposure to tort liability
I am arguing should be increased. Criticism of the tort system has typically
been directed at contexts in which juries are allegedly unreliable or in which
theories of liability are pressed beyond sensible limits. These contexts-from
products liability to mass torts to medical malpractice-do not involve the
commission of wrongs by individuals in their everyday personal lives. On the
contrary, automobile accident litigation, slip and fall cases, and other
individual-versus-individual tort claims are generally thought to showcase the
tort system at its best. These are settings in which the experience and common
sense of jurors are likely to be most reliable and in which the doctrine bearing
on liability has generally been most stable and predictable.
It is true that proponents of no-fault automobile insurance have long
argued that even this branch of the tort system delivers too little in benefits to
justify its Costs. 344 But the available evidence suggests that no-fault proponents
have underestimated tort law's deterrent impact.34 5 Moreover, unlike many
expansions of tort liability, which have subjected firms to liability for risks that
others are better situated to avoid, barrier-lowering does not alter the doctrinal
grounds for determining whether an individual is a tortfeasor. It simply ensures
that the assets of individual tortfeasors will be collectible by their victims.
A different argument-one reminiscent of some concerns about medical
malpractice litigation-holds that litigation in which personal assets are at stake
should be restricted because it is especially costly, in both pecuniary and
emotional terms, for the parties and their lawyers. 346 The premise seems
(2001) (describing tort law as a "protector of core American values").
344. See JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 157-61 (1979) (describing the
disadvantages of no-fault insurance).
345. See Schwartz, Reality, supra note 315, at 394-95 (collecting several studies that
found increases in automobile accidents after the imposition of no-fault insurance regimes).
346. See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical MalpracticeRisks
Between Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173, 176-77

(asserting that malpractice liability "imposes some costs that are uninsurable, such as harm to
reputation, disruption of the physician's practice, and emotional stress caused by litigation").
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unexceptionable: Individual defendants are more likely to be angry, fearful,
and intransigent when their personal assets are at stake. In the context of
unintentional torts, the availability of liability insurance is likely to reduce the
frequency of this problem. Making blood-money litigation easier would
increase both the amount of litigation and the amount of liability insurance
purchased by individuals. But because much of the new negligence litigation
would involve defendants who were "adequately" (even if not always "fully")
insured, the increase in blood-money negligence litigation would probably be
modest.
A different analysis applies to intentional torts, as to which potential
tortfeasors generally cannot insure against personal liability. Removing the
barriers to collection might produce an explosion in no-holds-barred litigation
against intentional tortfeasors. But if that occurs, we would expect the greatly
increased threat of blood-money litigation to deter large numbers of potential
tortfeasors from committing intentional torts. It seems likely-though certainly
not demonstrable-that these gains in deterrence would outweigh the increase
in traumatic blood-money litigation.
5. The Criminal RestitutionAlternative
It might also be argued that there is a better way to solve the judgmentproof problem: criminal restitution. Increasingly, criminal restitution awards
are functioning as a substitute for tort liability in cases of serious wrongdoing.
In recent years, legislatures have greatly expanded the availability-and even
the nature-of criminal restitution.347 Traditionally, restitution was limited to
cases in which the criminal profited from the crime. But the newer restitution
statutes typically authorize criminal courts to order defendants to compensate
their victims for the pecuniary harm they suffered, whether or not the criminal
348
notdamages.
encompassing
whiletort
of this kind,
Awardsobviously
any gain to
has
34 9
resemble
fordisgorge.
pain and suffering,
compensation
347.

See VICTIMS COMM.,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AM.

BAR

ASS'N, RESTITUTION FOR

CRIME VICTIMS: A NATIONAL STRATEGY 4 (2004) [hereinafter RESTrrTUON FOR CRIME VICTIMS]

(describing the increased availability of restitution since the 1970s).
348. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE
FIELD: VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERviCES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 355 (1998) [hereinafter NEW
DIRECTIONS], microformedon SUPTDOCS/GPO No. P0001-0072J 34.2:D62-335 (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office) (describing use of restitution to compensate victims of violent crime for
"current and future expenses related to their physical and mental health recovery").
349. See United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that
"[f]unctionally, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a tort statute," because "definite
persons are to be compensated for definite losses just as if the persons were successful tort
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In general, the barriers to collection of criminal restitution awards are also
much lower than those that impede collection of tort judgments. Both state and
federal criminal restitution awards are nondischargeable in bankruptcy 350 and
outside the scope of the automatic stay. 35 1 Federal restitution awards also
trump most exemptions-state and federal-pursuant to the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA).35 2 Remarkably, the MVRA requires federal
courts to order restitution in the full amount of each victim's loss "without
consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant. 3 53 The court
must draw up a schedule of restitution payments in light of the defendant's
354
assets, projected earnings and income, and financial obligations.
The Second Circuit's recent decision in UnitedStates v. Jaffe355 illustrates
the extraordinary trumping power of federal restitution orders under the
MVRA.The Second Circuit first held that because a restitution order merely
requires that the defendant pay money, rather than restraining the use of
specific funds, it is not subject to the CCPA's restrictions on garnishment
orders.356 The court next rejected the defendant's claim that the restitution
order was inconsistent with Florida's homestead exemption because he would
be forced to sell his house to comply with it. The MVRA provides that a
restitution award may be enforced against all of the defendant's property except
property that is exempt from tax levy under specified sections of the Internal
Revenue Code-and the enumerated sections do not exempt residences.357 In
light of this statutory mandate, the Second Circuit held that "even if compliance
with a restitution order will ultimately force a defendant to sell specific assets,

plaintiffs").
350. In re Thompson, 418 F.3d 362, 363 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding state criminal restitution
award nondischargeable in Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
351. See, e.g., Georgia ex reL Admin. of the Fair Bus. Practices Act v. Family Vending,
Inc. (In re Family Vending, Inc.), 171 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that a
state restitution proceeding was excepted from the automatic stay); Bilzerian v. SEC, 146 B.R.
871, 873 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that the SEC's restitution action against the debtor

was excepted from the stay).
352. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A)j) (2000) (authorizing enforcement of restitution
awards in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1), which applies to "all property" of the
defendant, subject to the enumerated exceptions).
353. Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A).
354. Id. § 3664(f)(2).
355. United States v. Jaffe, 417 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2005).
356. Id. at 265.
357. Id. at 265-66.
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such a potential or even inevitable consequence does not lessen
the district
'' 58
court's authority-indeed, obligation-to order full restitution.
The enforceability of state criminal restitution awards varies considerably
from state to state, but in many jurisdictions is relatively favorable to crime
victims. 359 In some states, criminal restitution orders are subject to the same
exemptions from collection that apply to civil judgments. 360 But several states
have exemption statutes that expressly provide that they do not apply to
criminal restitution awards. 361 Courts in other states have held that their
exemption laws do not apply to criminal restitution awards, or that defendants
may be required to waive the exemption as a condition of receiving
probation. 362 Perhaps most remarkably, some state courts have held that
ERISA's anti-alienation provision does not bar enforcement
of a criminal
36 3
restitution award against pension benefits held in trust.
It seems apparent that these developments in criminal law advance the
deterrence and corrective justice goals it shares with the tort system. As Judge
Posner has pointed out, criminal restitution "enables the tort victim to recover
his damages in a summary proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution," and
thereby achieves "a welcome streamlining of the cumbersome processes of our
law. "364 The fact that the barriers to recovering criminal restitution awards tend
358. Id. at 266. As the Second Circuit also pointed out, if the MVRA did conflict with
Florida exemption law, the latter would be preempted. Id. at 266 n.6; see also United States v.
817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1311-12 n.14 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that federal
forfeiture law preempts the Florida homestead exemption).
359. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 348, at 361 (noting that forty-one states "provide
civil remedies for victims whose offenders' sentences include restitution orders," and describing
some of the variations among these laws).
360. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.PROC. § 11-608(2) (West 2001) (providing that a
judgment of restitution constitutes a money judgment in favor of the individual and may be
enforced by the individual in the same manner as a money judgment in a civil action); Gray v.
Allstate Ins., 769 A.2d 891, 894 (Md. 2001) (applying Maryland statute). Not surprisingly,
Florida is among these jurisdictions. In Downing v. State, the court held that Florida's
constitutional homestead exemption, which "does not distinguish between the civil court and the
criminal court," barred enforcement of a criminal restitution order against the defendant's
homestead. Downing v. State, 593 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
361. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 235, § 34A (2000) (providing that exemption for
retirement funds does not apply "in the event of the conviction of such person of a crime, [to] an
order of a court requiring such person to satisfy a monetary penalty or make restitution to the
victim of such crime").
362. See State v. Smith, 628 P.2d 65, 67-68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (holding homestead
exemption waiver condition was not an illegal condition of probation); State v. Dziuba, 435
N.W.2d 258, 261 (Wis. 1989) (holding that defendant who accepted restitution sentence was
estopped from later exempting homestead as a source of restitution funds).
363. State v. Pulasty, 612 A.2d 952, 958 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
364. United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999).
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to be much lower than those obstructing collection of tort judgments suggests
365
that this strategy may also be an easier sell politically.
Nevertheless, criminal restitution offers only a partial solution to the
judgment-proof problem in tort law. Only a subset of torts constitutes crimes.
How big that subset is varies depending on which category of torts we are
considering. For example, a high percentage of tortious assaults and batteries
are also criminal. By contrast, negligence in private life, of the type covered by
homeowner's liability insurance, is unlikely to constitute a crime. (Think of
failing to shovel one's sidewalk or colliding with a pedestrian while bicycling.)
Negligent operation of a motor vehicle is an intermediate case: Ordinary
negligence is not criminal per se, but there are many forms of aggravated
negligence that are subject to serious criminal penalties, including criminal
restitution. 366 Of course, in theory all tortious conduct could be criminalized.
But that strategy has grave disadvantages, ranging from enormous expansion of
government power to the unnecessary subjection of risk-averse individuals to
the risk of criminal stigma.
Indeed, even if all torts were crimes, criminal restitution would still have
its drawbacks. Restitution actions are not available to the victim of a crime-tort
unless the prosecutor elects to bring criminal charges and obtains a conviction.
In some states, victims cannot obtain restitution if the criminal charge arising
from their victimization was dropped as part of a plea bargain.367 The
combination of limited prosecutorial resources and the higher criminal burden
of proof means that many torts go unredressed by criminal restitution. Even if
restitution is available, prosecutors may have little incentive to seek an adequate
award-and crime victims may lack standing to challenge an inadequate one. 368
Even when the tort victim does receive a restitution award, that award will be
limited to pecuniary damages. 3 69 And--despite the fact that restitution awards
365. As discussed infra Part VH.F, however, there may be coalition-building opportunities
between advocates for greater collectibility of tort judgments and the well-established crime
victims' rights groups that have lobbied for greater availability of criminal restitution.
366.

See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-5-205(3)(a) (2005) (providing that a person

convicted of negligent vehicular assault "shall be fined an amount not to exceed $10,000 or
shall be incarcerated for a term not to exceed five years or both, and shall be ordered to pay
restitution").
367. See, e.g., People v. Armijo, 989 P.2d 224,226-27 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that
when the charged crime "require[s] the designation of a particular victim, restitution could not
be ordered to be paid to another").
368. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Robbing the Rich to Feed the Poor?,3 BuFF. CRIm. L. REv.
261, 277 (1999).
369. 1 am not aware of any state that allows criminal restitution awards to include pain and
suffering or emotional distress. At least in theory, however, this limitation could be removed by
state legislatures.

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603 (2006)

690

usually trump exemptions-the collection rate for restitution awards is
dismayingly low: A 2001 GAO study estimates that only seven percent of state
and federal restitution awards is actually collected. 370 These problems suggest
that, instead of expanding the substantive criminal law in order to make
ancillary criminal restitution a more common substitute for tort liability, we
should attack the judgment-proof problem directly by giving tort claims the
same preferred status that criminal restitution claims typically receive.
6. The Objection that Barrier-LoweringWill Harm Preferred
NoncontractualCreditors
The final objection I will consider argues that tort claims are less
important than the two principal categories of noncontractual claims that trump
many exemptions under current law: criminal fines and tax obligations. Were
tort claims given the same preferred treatment, the argument goes, wrongdoers'
assets would sometimes be diverted from these more important purposes to
compensating tort victims.
Before evaluating this argument, it will be useful to take a brief look at the
treatment of criminal fines and taxes. Criminal fines have traditionally been
excluded from state and federal exemptions and from discharge in
bankruptcy.3 7' Some states also exclude criminal forfeitures from their
exemption laws.372 Unpaid tax obligations are, if anything, even less likely to
370.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OmCE, CRIMINAL DEBT: OvERSIGlrr AND ACTnONS NEEDED TO

DEFICIENCIES IN COLLECTION PROCESSES 40 (2001), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d01664.pdf.
371. Criminal fines are typically not treated as ordinary contractual debts to society. State
and federal laws frequently provide that exemptions from collection shall not apply to fines or
taxes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4913(a) (2004) ("Eighty-five percent of the amount
of the wages for labor or service of any person residing within the State shall be exempt from
mesne attachment process and execution attachment process under the laws of this State; but
such limitation shall be inapplicable to process issued for the collection of a fine or costs or
taxes due and owing the State."). Internal Revenue Code § 523 classifies most federal tax
obligations as nondischargeable. See HERBERT, supra note 47, at 215 (describing several
classes of nondischargeable tax obligations).
372. See, e.g., Emmet County Prosecuting Attorney v. Two Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars (In re 5118 Indian Garden Rd.), 654 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that forfeiture does not entail the satisfaction of a "debt or money judgment" to which
Michigan's constitutional homestead exemption would apply); Tellevik v. 6717 100th St. S.W.,
921 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that forfeiture falls outside the state
constitutional homestead exemption, which protects the homestead from "forced sale"). But see,
e.g., Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 58-61 (Fla. 1992) (holding that forfeiture is a
"forced sale" within the meaning of Florida's constitutional homestead exemption); In re Prop.
Seized from Bly, 456 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Iowa 1990) (holding that forfeiture is a "judicial sale"
ADDRESS
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be subject to exemption laws. For example, federal tax levies are subject only
to the very narrow exemptions set forth in § 6334 of the Internal Revenue
Code.373 The only exemption for ordinary earned income is an amount equal to
the taxpayer's personal exemptions and standard deduction (based on the
taxpayer's filing status), as well as any additional standard deductions due to
blindness or age. 374 The taxpayer's primary residence is subject to levy if a
federal judge or magistrate determines that the taxpayer's other collectible
assets are insufficient to pay the amount owed.375 Pension benefits are not
exempt, 376 nor are beneficial interests in spendthrift trusts. 377 Perhaps most
remarkably, property held in tenancy by the entirety may be levied upon, even
if only one spouse owes federal taxes.378
Now consider the objection that adding tort claims to the short list of
exemption-trumping claims will inevitably reduce the value of some of the
already-privileged criminal and tax obligations. Even if we assume that it
would be better to preserve some difference in treatment, we could simply give
criminal and tax obligations priority over tort claims with regard to tortfeasors'
otherwise-exempt assets. That would allow tort victims to recover from the
personal assets of tortfeasors who did not owe taxes or criminal fines, while
ensuring that tort claims did not reduce the funds available to satisfy the latter
obligations.
But the more fundamental point is that the existing disparity in treatment
is largely unjustifiable. Preferential treatment could be justified on the grounds
that the preferred obligations involve either a higher degree of culpability, a
needier claimant, or both. These arguments are unpersuasive in the case of
within the meaning of Iowa's statutory homestead exemption).
373. State tax liabilities are also highly collectible. Most states specifically provide that
homestead and other exemptions do not apply to tax liabilities. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 115.010(3) (2004). Indeed, even Florida's constitutional homestead provision applies "except
for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a). The CCPA's
restrictions on garnishment do not apply to "any debt due for any State or Federal tax." 15
U.S.C.A. § 1673(b)(1)(C) (1998).
374. I.R.C. § 6334(d) (2000).
375. Id. § 6334(e). Indeed, the IRS may force the sale of homestead property even if state
law gives the nondelinquent spouse the equivalent of an undivided life estate in the property.
United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 701-02 (1983).
376. There is an exemption for railroad workers' retirement benefits and for certain military
pensions. I.R.C. § 6334(a)(6).
377. Bank One Ohio Trust Co., N.A. v. United States, 80 F.3d 173, 176 (6th Cir. 1996);
see also Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 60 n.7 (1999) (reserving the question).
378. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 288 (2002) (concluding that a delinquent
spouse's "interest in the entireties property constituted 'property' or 'rights to property' for
purposes of the federal tax lien statute").
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taxes. Failure to pay taxes, like tort liability, can involve a wide range of
degrees of culpability. The contention that failure to pay taxes is particularly
serious because government depends on taxes (and society depends on
government) seems like a self-serving rationalization. If exemption laws
applied to taxes, more people would fail to pay their taxes-but these losses
would be spread across society, rather than concentrated on individuals, as in
tort law.
Compare next the treatment of criminal fines and tort judgments.
Criminal fines, which are routinely imposed to sanction wrongdoers and deter
wrongdoing, obviously resemble tort judgments in both respects. Proof of
crime involves a higher burden of proof, which arguably implies that criminal
convictions are more reliable than plaintiffs' tort judgments. But while that
may be true in the small percentage of criminal cases that go to trial, it seems
unlikely to be true in the far larger number of cases that are settled by plea
bargains.37 9 On average, crimes involve greater culpability than torts. But in
many cases, a criminal fine is imposed in addition to jail or prison timewhereas in the tort system, a money judgment is normally the only sanction.
Yet while the public can reach the criminal's exempt assets, the tort victim
cannot (unless the tort also constitutes a crime for which criminal restitution is
available).
Let us now turn the comparison around and ask what would happen if
criminal fines (and criminal restitution) were subject to exemptions from
collection and discharge in bankruptcy. In that event, far more criminals would
be judgment-proof. As to them, reliance on fines would be impractical, 380 and
the criminal justice system would be forced either to accept a reduction in
deterrence or to rely on imprisonment even more than it currently does. But at
least imprisonment is an available choice within the criminal justice system.
Imprisonment for tort debts, like imprisonment for contract debts, has been
virtually extinct for more than a century. 381 Given that it must rely almost
exclusively on monetary penalties, the judgment-proof problem is more urgent
for the tort system.

379.

See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargainingas Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,

1988 (1992) (arguing that the guilty plea process is inherently unreliable).
380. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1208 (1985) (entertaining the possibility of a criminal system based solely on fines, and
identifying the judgment-proof problem as an impediment thereto).
381.

See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA:

INSOLVENCY,

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRuPrcY, 1607-1900, at 256-57 (1974) (noting that

imprisonment for failure to pay debts had largely ceased in the eastern United States by the end
of Reconstruction).
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To sum up, the tax and criminal liabilities for which American law
removes the legal barriers to collection seem closely comparable to tort liability.
Yet in most states, even intentional tort claims are subject to the full panoply of
exemptions from collection. Indeed, with the exception of discharge in
bankruptcy, all of the barriers to torts enforcement described in Part 11 are
generally applicable to intentional torts.382 This dramatic disparity in treatment
between tort liabilities and tax and criminal liabilities should be eliminated.
Because each type of liability originates in wrongdoing to an involuntary
creditor, it should not be subject to exemptions from the collection of ordinary
debts.
I have examined a variety of arguments but found none that suffices to
overcome the large deterrence and corrective justice gains from making tort
judgments more collectible. The existing barriers to collection are far too high.
Yet it does not follow that the optimal solution is across-the-board elimination
of each of the barriers to collecting tort judgments. Even with hardship
exemptions, total, unqualified abolition of all barriers to collection would entail
a large increase in tort litigation costs and might invite abusive litigation to
extract settlements based on fear of personal liability. It is possible that some
barriers to tort collection should survive. Under these circumstances, it seems
appropriate to take a brief look at some of the more plausible targets for barrierand to see
lowering legislation, both to flesh out the specifics of such legislation
383
which reforms seem especially likely to be beneficial on net.
C. Barrier-SpecificReform Possibilities
1. Income-Sheltering Rules
As discussed in Part III, the most pernicious barriers from the standpoint
of deterrence are probably the rules that shelter earned income (because
potential tortfeasors are more likely to have collectible income than to have
significant collectible assets). The CCPA's limitation on garnishment of
earnings is the most universal and important income-sheltering rule. Discharge
382. Even discharge in bankruptcy was available for some intentional torts under Chapter
13 until the enactment of BAPCPA this year. Supra Part III.E.5.

383. The analysis here deals with each barrier in isolation. If some barriers are eliminated,
however, individuals may respond by taking greater advantage of others. To deal with this
dynamic, it may be necessary simultaneously to restrict many of the judgment-proofing
strategies available to individuals.
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in bankruptcy, particularly Chapter 7 discharge, is a close second, because it
enables tortfeasors with incomes but few assets to protect their future earnings
at low cost. Also important38are
the various rules that shelter entitlements, from
4
welfare to Social Security.
a. Garnishment
As it stands, the CCPA erects a bright-line rule protecting 75% of debtors'
earnings, while allowing states to protect a higher percentage if they choose. In
light of the high administrative costs of individualized hearings on how much
tortfeasors can feasibly pay, it probably makes sense to retain a rule-based
approach.3 85 But instead of a flat percentage, a sliding scale would be
preferable. Perhaps family size should also be taken into account. The
CCPA's 75 % line could be lowered to, say, 60% for low-income workers, 50%
for the middle class, and 40% for the affluent. For each income bracket, the
percentage recoverable could be further increased if the tort was an intentional
one.
Faced with higher levels of garnishment, some tortfeasors might work less,
find employment in the underground economy, or flee.386 The new statute
should not be written in stone: Experience might suggest adjustments to
garnishment rates that would maximize the recoveries for tort victims. Higher
allowable levels of garnishment would also increase the attractiveness of
bankruptcy. But this could be dealt with as part of the same federal legislation,
387
by eliminating or reducing the dischargeability of tort claims in bankruptcy.
b. Dischargein Bankruptcy
In the 1978 Code, Congress carried forward the 1898 Bankruptcy Act's
policy of denying Chapter 7 discharge to intentional tortfeasors. But Congress
384. Rules that protect retirement savings can also be seen as (deferred) income-sheltering
provisions. But the homeowning class and the retirement-savings class are largely one and the
same. Younger workers who do not yet own homes or have retirement savings seem more likely
to commit torts for which they are uninsured or underinsured than their older counterparts.
385. The high costs of individualized hearings might loom less large if, as seems likely,
most cases would settle after judgment was entered based on expectations about what the judge
would award after a hearing. Particularly in light of its similarity to individualized criminal
restitution orders, this alternative deserves further study.
386. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 12.
387. I am putting to one side the important (and thorny) question of federal versus state
responsibility for addressing the judgment-proof problem in tort law.
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also made plain that even intentional tortfeasors could receive a Chapter 13
discharge under some circumstances. 8 Apparently, Congress believed that
even an intentional tortfeasor should not necessarily be subject to a lifelong,
nondischargeable debt. This argument is unpersuasive, not least because it
would subject some innocent tort victims to lifelong, uncompensated personal
injuries. In any event, BAPCPA has now closed the loophole and made all
intentional torts nondischargeable in bankruptcy. But why stop there?
Unintentionaltort claims should also be made nondischargeable in bankruptcy,
except in cases of "undue hardship" (the standard used for student loans). 389 As
we have seen, the benefits of a "fresh start" policy for tortfeasors are diminished
by the ready availability of liability insurance and outweighed by discharge's
detrimental impact on the tort system.
At a minimum, unintentional tort claims should be made nondischargeable
in Chapter 7, so that negligent tortfeasors would have to file under Chapter 13
to obtain a discharge. 390 There is no reason to allow unintentional tortfeasors
who have a regular, disposable income-and who have failed to purchase
adequate liability insurance-to walk away from their obligation to compensate
the victim. Alternatively, BAPCPA's means-test restrictions on Chapter 7
could be extended to cases involving primarily tort debt.3 9 But that would still
allow some tortfeasors with significant disposable income to evade
responsibility for their torts via Chapter 7. The better view is that tort claims
should be dischargeable, if at all, under Chapter 13.
2. Asset-Sheltering Rules
Within the domain of asset-sheltering rules, the homestead and retirementsavings exemptions seem especially important, given the enormous number of
people who have significant home equity, retirement savings, or both.
Spendthrift trusts and OAPTs, while they make for sensational inequities, are
far less common; however, they may still be worth restricting (particularly on
expressive grounds).392
388. Supra Part HI.E.5.
389. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000) (governing discharge of student loans).
390. Cf Jason J. Kilborn, Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A Radical
Reassessment ofIndividualBankruptcy, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 855 (2003) (arguing that Chapter
7 bankruptcy should be abolished and all "individuals seeking debt relief should be required by
statute to participate in a wage assignment plan for a limited period").
391. See supra Part III.E.7.a (describing means test).
392. If one focuses solely on torts involving bodily injury, OAPTs seem less important than
if one includes fraud and other economic torts.

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603 (2006)

a. Homestead Exemptions
The simplest way to remove the barrier posed by homestead exemptions
would be a per se rule making them inapplicable to tort claims. Alternatively,
legislatures could employ a tiered system in which exemption amounts would
be lower for tort claims than for contract ones. Other than as an expedient
political compromise, a two-tiered system has little to recommend it.
In today's society, homestead exemptions from tort liability are not
necessary to ensure that tortfeasors are spared from destitution. In the
nineteenth century, when most families were farmers, loss of a homestead could
imperil the entire family's livelihood, even its survival.39 3 But homestead

exemptions today, insofar as they are not merely vehicles to shelter wealth from
creditors, simply ensure that individuals will be able to keep their homes.
Meaningful as living in one's own home may be, that privilege hardly counts
for more than repairing the personal injuries of a tort victim the homeowner has
wronged. Moreover, whereas in the nineteenth century home equity loans were
rare, they are now ubiquitous. Consequently, even in the absence of a
homestead exemption, tortfeasors may be able to tap their home equity to fund
settlements that will allow them to keep their homes. For those who want to
avoid this scenario, there is now an easy solution, also unavailable in the
nineteenth century: buy adequate liability insurance.
b. Retirement-Savings Exemptions
The sweeping exemptions for retirement savings are also far broader than
necessary to spare tortfeasors from undue hardship. The premise of our
existing retirement system is that retirees should ideally be able to maintain
their preretirement standard of living by supplementing Social Security with
their own tax-preferred retirement savings. But this ideal is not an entitlement,
let alone a question of subsistence. It might be too harsh, however, to treat all
retirement funds other than Social Security as collectible in toto to satisfy a tort
judgment. 394 The better course would be to treat retirement funds like ordinary
earnings, whether or not the recipient was still working, by permitting

393. See Paul Goodman, The Emergence of HomesteadExemption in the United States:
Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840-1880, 80 J. AM. IST. 470,471
(1993) (explaining original motivation for homestead exemption).
394. On the other hand, given that millions of retirees live solely on their Social Security
payments, one can argue that supplemental, private-sector retirement assets should not be
exempt from tort collection at all.
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garnishment of a percentage keyed to the worker's income (including Social
Security) and the size of the retirement account.395
c. Trusts and OAPTs
Given the substantial costs of using spendthrift trusts and OAPTs to
shelter assets, the rules that permit these strategies may do relatively little harm
in deterrence terms, simply because most people cannot afford to employ them.
On the other hand, there is clearly a self-selection effect in which persons at
greater risk of being sued are more likely to engage in aggressive assetprotection planning.
In any event, the recommendation as to spendthrift trusts is simple: adopt
the rule that spendthrift trust provisions are effective against contract creditors
but not tort victims. The voluntary/involuntary creditor line should be decisive
here: Contract creditors can take spendthrift trust provisions into account in
their dealings with beneficiaries. (A debtor whose main income derives from a
spendthrift trust is not a good candidate for an unsecured loan.) Tort victims
have no such protection.
Determining what to do about OAPTs is considerably harder. It is unclear
whether a state can forbid its citizens from establishing such trusts. But even if
the states cannot, Congress presumably has constitutional power under the
Foreign Commerce Clause to declare OAPTs unlawful and to require the
396
Such a
prompt dissolution of existing OAPTs established by Americans.
law, of course, would forbid citizens from setting up OAPTs to avoid possible
contractual liabilities as well. While that might be a good idea, for present
purposes a narrower remedy would suffice. For example, federal law could
forbid Americans to enter into OAPTs unless the trust provides that tort
claimants shall have effective remedies against the trust proceeds and unless the
397
foreign jurisdiction actually enforces those provisions.
395. Social Security benefits should also be subject to collection in at least some
circumstances. If 25% of a low-income worker's wages can be garnished to pay a tort
judgment, why should not 25% of a retiree's Social Security benefits be subject to garnishment
as well? Again, hardship exceptions could ensure that no one was unduly impoverished under
this approach.
396. There is precedent for congressional intervention in the OAPT market. In the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Congress curtailed the use of offshore trusts as a means of tax avoidance
by requiring the IRS to treat the assets of most foreign trusts settled by Americans as assets of
the settlor for income tax purposes. See Sterk, supra note 139, at 1048 (discussing 26 U.S.C.
§ 679 (1994)).
397. Cf. Randall J. Gingiss, Putting A Stop to "Asset Protection" Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L.
REv. 987, 992 (1999) (advocating "criminal penalties for transferring assets to a self-settled
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One objection to this proposal is that wealthy individuals would simply
move their assets abroad while continuing to hold them in their own names.
Tort victims would still face many obstacles to collecting under these
circumstances. This objection has some force, but it is surely easier to collect
from an American who owns assets abroad in his or her own name than from an
American who has established an OAPT. It might also be argued that the tort
system occasionally generates questionable, even outrageous results, and that
high earners, wealthy entrepreneurs, and corporate executives are entitled to
self-help against the risk of arbitrary deprivations at the hands of overheated
juries. Granting the premise, the better remedy would seem to be to fix
whatever features of the tort system lead to these aberrant outcomes.398
3. Priorityin Bankruptcy
When individual tortfeasors file for bankruptcy, tort claims are treated as
unsecured claims (unless the tort victim has obtained a nonavoidable judgment
lien). 399 As a result, tort victims typically receive little or nothing. In the
context of corporate bankruptcy-where the same rule applies-many scholars
have argued, on both fairness and efficiency grounds, that tort claims should be
given priority over unsecured (and perhaps even secured) creditors. 4 00 This
foreign trust which does not provide for enforcement by American courts to the same degree as
a domestic trust").
398. Alternatively, Congress could legalize OAPTs on the condition that the settlor
purchase large, statutorily specified amounts of liability insurance. Cf. Robert T. Danforth,
Rethinking the Law of Creditors' Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 365 (2002)
(suggesting that asset protection trusts be presumed to result from fraudulent transfers if the
settlor-beneficiary has inadequate liability insurance).
399. Supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
400. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case.for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 883 (1996) ("It is by now a familiar point in
the law review and finance literature that according full priority to secured claims permits a firm
to divert value from its tort creditors."); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and
Creditors,91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1643-50 (1991) ("Under a regime of limited shareholder
liability, it might be desirable that unsecured creditors should bear a greater portion of [tort] risk
and that secured creditors should bear at least some of it."); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured
Creditor'sBargain,80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1908-16 (1994) (examining arguments for giving tort
creditors priority over secured creditors); Note, Switching Priorities: Elevating the Status of
Tort Claims in Bankruptcy in Pursuit of Optimal Deterrence, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2541, 2541
(2003) (proposing the "elevation of the payment of tort claims in bankruptcy, which would give
creditors the incentive to adjust the price of credit to reflect a firm's level of care"); see also
Robert Rasmussen, Resolving TransnationalInsolvencies ThroughPrivate Ordering,98 MICH.
L. REV. 2252, 2269 (2000) ("Those who view fairness as the overriding normative goal of
bankruptcy... conclude that tort victims should receive better treatment than they currently
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prompts the question whether tort claims should receive a parallel priority in
individual bankruptcy cases.
Because corporations cannot use exemptions from collection, priority
would make an enormous difference in how tort claimants fare against bankrupt
corporations. In the context of individual bankruptcy, the situation is more
complicated. In Chapter 7, priority for tort claims over unsecured creditors
would make little difference, because so many tortfeasors have little or nothing
in the way of nonexempt, unsecured assets. Priority over secured creditors, by
contrast, would often enable tort claimants to recover from tortfeasors'
nonexempt secured assets-such as homes and cars. In the Chapter 13 setting,
in which debtors must make payments out of their disposable income to
unsecured creditors, even priority over unsecured creditors could make a big
difference.4 ° '
Having argued at length that tort claims should receive one kind of
preference over secured and unsecured contract claims-that is, exclusion from
exemptions and status as nondischargeable claims-I will not belabor what are
essentially the same arguments for giving them priority in bankruptcy. 4°2 In any
event, the more pressing reform seems to be making exempt assets available to
satisfy tort claims, rather than giving tort claims priority when it comes to
nonexempt assets. 4°3

do."). The fairness argument relies heavily on the fact that tort victims are nonconsensual
creditors who cannot protect themselves by varying the terms on which they deal with
tortfeasors. The efficiency argument is that unless tort claims are given priority over consensual
debt, actors will not internalize the full cost of their torts, thereby undermining deterrence. See
Note, supra, at 2542 (arguing that a rule "subordinating all non-tort creditors-whether secured
or unsecured, in liquidation or reorganization-minimizes the sum of social costs, namely the
total costs of precaution against accidents, of unavoided harm from accidents, of credit for
ongoing business enterprise, and of related market and judicial transactions").
401. Because far more cases will be swept into Chapter 13 under BAPCPA, the issue of
priority over unsecured creditors will become considerably more important in the near future.
402. Even if unintentional tort claims were nondischargeable, bankruptcy could remain a
technique for delaying payment to tort judgment creditors. Consider, for example, a tortfeasor
who files under Chapter 13. The tort judgment creditor would receive a court-approved share of
payments to creditors for five years. After that time, the tort judgment creditor could still
attempt to collect the unpaid balance of the judgment. But while this is better than having the
unpaid balance wiped out by a Chapter 13 discharge, it still means that the tort victim must
share payments with other unsecured creditors for five years. If the tort claimant also had
priority, the tort judgment could be paid off more quickly.
403. Moreover, as we will see in Part VI, it is extremely unlikely, as a predictive matter,
that the interests of tort claimants will ever be given priority over the interests of better
organized secured and unsecured creditors. There is a better chance that the interests of tort
claimants will someday be given greater weight vis-A-vis the interests of tortfeasors.
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VI. The MandatoryLiability Insurance Option
Part V argued that the judgment-proof problem should be tamed by
reducing, and in some cases eliminating, the barriers to collecting tort
judgments. Doing so would give individuals better incentives to avoid
negligently or intentionally injuring others, as well as better incentives to
purchase adequate liability insurance.
This analysis would be incomplete, however, without some consideration
of an alternative method of increasing the amount of liability insurance
individuals purchase:
mandatory liability insurance laws.4 °4 Mandatory
liability insurance is an important and understudied topic that deserves an
article of its own. My treatment of it here will be exploratory and highly
selective. As I will try to show, however, appreciating the importance of
exemptions and other barriers to collecting tort claims can help point the way to
more effective use of mandatory liability insurance.

A. Mandatory Liability Insurancefor UnintentionalTorts
The reason why insurance mandates might help solve the judgment-proof
problem is simple: If individuals must purchase insurance in order to engage in
a desired activity (e.g., driving, owning a home, renting an apartment), more of
them will purchase that insurance than would have voluntarily done so. In turn,
the threat of premium increases--or, worse yet, uninsurability-should give
individuals incentives to avoid injuring others. Moreover, mandatory liability
insurance, at least in theory, can induce even individuals who are de facto
judgment-proof to purchase liability insurance. These individuals would have
no incentive voluntarily to purchase liability insurance even if there were no
legal barriers to enforcing tort liability.
This line of reasoning might lead one to think that we should stop
worrying about barriers to collecting unintentional tort judgments and simply
mandate that every adult individual carry reasonable amounts of liability
insurance. 40 5 That would be a recipe for well-intentioned disaster. The high
404. See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 169, 242 (1987) (discussing
mandatory liability insurance as a possible response to the judgment-proof problem). Shavell
also identifies minimum asset requirements and criminal sanctions as techniques that might
alleviate the judgment-proof problem. Id. at 284-86. This Article will not consider those

alternatives.
405. Given that liability insurers are generally unwilling to offer coverage for intentional
torts, it plainly will not be easy to design a workable program of mandatory liability insurance
that covers intentional torts. Infra Part VI.B.
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barriers to enforcing tort liability mean that, for many individuals, buying
liability insurance yields them little or no benefit. But the less liability
insurance benefits the insured, the harder it is for insurers to obtain the
insured's cooperation or monitor the insured's behavior. Liability insurance
cannot work well under those circumstances. 4°6 Moreover, individuals who do
not benefit from buying liability insurance may refuse to purchase it.
Mandatory auto liability insurance is already beset by serious enforcement
problems. The best estimates are that roughly 15% of American drivers are
uninsured407 -- even though the current mandatory minimums (typically
$20,000/$40,000 or $25,000/$50,000) are extremely low (and wholly
inadequate to cover serious accidents).
Consider what would happen if American states raised their mandatory
auto minimums to Western European levels, which typically run in the millions
of dollars. 40 8 This would mean at least a forty-fold increase in coverage, which
would surely cost several times more than the existing price. We would expect
many more individuals, particularly lower-income drivers, to disobey such an
expensive mandate. That would create intense political pressure to subsidize
mandatory coverage for low-income drivers, which would undermine their
incentives to avoid accidents. And unless states were willing to forbid
uninsurable, high-risk drivers from driving (and to enforce that prohibition),
those drivers would presumably be placed in some type of assigned-risk poolwhich is to say, other drivers would be forced
to subsidize them, and they
4 9
would have little incentive to drive carefully. 0
I am not arguing that the enforcement problems with mandatory auto
insurance are inherently unmanageable (though that may turn out to be the
case).41 ° I want to suggest, however, that there is a better way to strengthen
406.
LoPucki,
407.
13% and

For fuller discussion of these issues in the context of corporate liability insurance, see
supra note 1, at 80-85.
According to the Insurance Research Council, the uninsured rate has varied between
16% in recent years. GREG KELLY, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., ISSUES
AND ANSWERS No. 123: CAN GOVERNMENT FORCE PEOPLE To BuY INSURANCE? 1 (2004),
available at http://www.cahi.org/cahi-contents/resources/issues.asp.
408. See J6rg Fedtke, Strict Liability for Car Drivers in Accidents Involving "Bicycle
Guerillas"?, 51 Am. J. COMp. L. 941, 953-54 & tbl.3 (2003) (noting that Germany requires
personal injury coverage of £1,635,000; England requires either a deposit of £500,000 or the
purchase of the minimum insurance protection offered by the market, which provides unlimited
coverage for personal injury).
409. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Jersey, 590 A.2d 191,195-98 (1991)
(describing New Jersey's successive (and ever more expensive) attempts to create a workable
assigned-risk system).
410. One way to address these enforcement problems would be to spend resources on
stricter enforcement of mandatory auto insurance laws. For example, Utah law now requires
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individuals' incentives to comply with mandatory insurance laws--even laws
that demand much higher levels of coverage than existing statutes do. The idea
is simple: threaten individuals with increased personal liability as a sanction
for noncompliance. Specifically, state laws could provide that exemptions from
collection apply to unintentional tort claims if, and only if, the tortfeasor is in
full compliance with all applicable mandatory insurance laws. 411 This rule
would give every individual with significant exempt assets-which is to say, all
but the poorest Americans-a powerful new incentive to comply with liability
insurance mandates.41 2
In one incarnation, this idea would furnish a substitute for legislation that
lowered the barriers to collecting tort judgments across-the-board. Legislatures
would leave exemptions at their current high levels (except for intentional
torts), but would substantially increase mandatory insurance coverages and
condition the availability of exemptions on compliance with the new mandates.
What might such mandates include, and what levels of coverage might they
require? I will venture only a rough sketch of answers to these hard questions.
A good place to start is with the risks of unintentional harm to others that
individuals create in their everyday lives.413 Because the most serious risks are
associated with driving, auto liability insurance of at least $250,000/$500,000
should be mandatory.414 (That would still be far less than many European
countries require.)
Most other risks are picked up by homeowners' personal liability
coverage, 415 as to which insurers have imposed a de facto mandate on the order
that if coverage lapses, the insurer must notify the Department of Motor Vehicles. This
coordination rule is said to have reduced the uninsured-motorist rate in Utah from 23% to 9%.
Ken Snyder, Proposition213 and Its Failureto Address the Uninsured Motorist Crisis in
California: Suggested Alternativesfor Solving the Crisis, 4 J. LEGAL ADvoc. & PRAC. 197,
203-04 (2002).
411. Because intentional tort claims are uninsurable, exemptions from collection would not
apply to them under this scheme.
412. Ideally, this approach would apply to tortfeasors' income as well. But that would
require a change in federal law, making the CCPA's limits on garnishment conditional on
compliance with mandatory insurance laws.
413. Most workplace risks are picked up by vicarious employer liability or workers'
compensation, so I omit them here.
414. This proposal is similar to current Canadian law, which requires $200,000 (Canadian)
in liability coverage (except in Quebec, which requires only $50,000). See George R. Keller &
Frank A. Amodeo, The Canadian Insurance Market, IRMI, Jan. 2001, http://www.irmi.
com/Expert/Articles/2001/Keller0l.aspx (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
415. The personal liability insurance that is provided by standard homeowners' policies
covers the insured for unintentional, non-auto-related torts committed anywhere, not only on the
insured premises. JERRY, supra note 268, at 537.
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of $100,000 to $200,000.416 A statute legally requiring the higher end of that
range would make a useful contribution by nudging those at the low end up to a
more realistic level of coverage. That leaves renters-who are free to decide
whether or not to purchase personal liability insurance, but who apparently
rarely purchase it. Since renters are at least as likely to injure others as
homeowners, the law should mandate that renters also purchase at least
$100,000 in liability coverage.
A mandatory liability insurance scheme that penalized noncompliance
with loss of exemptions and sharply increased the required coverages would be
an improvement on the status quo.4 17 It is unclear, however, whether it would
be better than simply eliminating the barriers to collection and leaving it to
individuals to buy more liability insurance to protect their newly exposed assets
and income. In any event, the two strategies are not mutually exclusive. We
could lower the barriers to collecting tort judgments and impose heightened
liability insurance mandates.4 18 Used in this way, mandatory insurance laws
could serve to direct individuals toward choosing sufficient liability insurance
to minimize the heightened risk of personal liability they would otherwise face.
Yet even a large mandatory liability policy only reduces the risk of
personal liability, rather than eliminating it. Buy a mandatory $500,000 auto
policy and you might still cause $1 million in personal injuries. To provide an
even greater incentive to comply, mandatory liability insurance could provide a
safe harbor from tort liability: So long as an individual purchased the (large)
416. I surmise that secured lenders played some part in this development. Although the
mortgages they hold would have priority over any tort judgment, secured lenders do not want to
be involved in foreclosure sales, bankruptcy, or the like. Rather, they want an uninterrupted
stream of payments.
417. The proposal in text takes for granted that mandatory insurance laws will require all
affected individuals to purchase the same levels of coverage. Although that is how our existing
laws are written, uniformity may be a mistake in this context. In thinking about how much
insurance coverage society should mandate, it seems appropriate to imagine how much
insurance individuals would buy if all their assets and income were at risk--that is, if there were
no barriers whatsoever to enforcing tort liability. The idea behind using this standard is that
exemptions from collection, discharge in bankruptcy, and all the rest should not be allowed to
distort each individual's own self-interested assessment of how much risk he or she poses to
others, how much in assets he or she has at risk, and (accordingly) how much liability insurance
he or she needs. Although we cannot intuit the actual amounts individuals would buy, we can
be confident that, on average, individuals with higher levels of assets and income would
purchase higher amounts of liability insurance. Instead of a one-size-fits-all statute, therefore,
minimum liability coverage should arguably vary with the individual's income and wealth. To
implement this suggestion, legislatures could specify (or leave to administrative regulation) a
schedule of mandatory liability insurance indexed to household income or net worth.
418. In addition to my proposal to mandate renters' liability insurance, another intriguing
possibility would be to mandate that every tax-qualified retirement savings account be covered
by personal liability insurance in an amount proportional to the account balance.
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required coverage, no excess claim would be allowed for any accident covered
by the policy. 4 19 This proposal would operate as a legally binding replacement
for the informal social bargain described by Tom Baker, in which tortfeasors
who purchase "adequate" amounts of liability insurance do not normally face a
serious risk of blood-money litigation. Yet despite that norm, plaintiffs'
lawyers routinely use the threat of a verdict in excess of the policy limits to
leverage a higher settlement offer within the policy limits. 420 If mandatory
liability insurance functioned as a ceiling as well as a floor, that practice would
come to a screeching halt.
Of course, this proposal could be criticized as tantamount to a cap on
damages, which indeed it is. But provided the mandatory coverage is set high
enough, what is wrong with a cap? Under the proposed rule, seriously injured
tort victims would, on average, receive substantially more compensation,
because the safe-harbor carrot would induce a higher level of compliance with
the liability-insurance mandate. Tort victims would receive less only in the rare
cases in which the tortfeasor was a wealthy individual with abundant collectible
assets and the damages were so high that they exceeded the mandatory
coverage limit. That seems like a small price to pay for the greater assurance
that tortfeasors will comply with a law that requires them to purchase far more
liability insurance than is required--or even customary-under current law.
B. Mandatory Liability Insurancefor Intentional Torts
There are serious-probably insurmountable-problems with using a
mandatory insurance strategy for intentional torts. Liability insurers have
traditionally included in their policies an exclusion for harms "expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured.",42 ' The vast majority of
intentional torts unquestionably fall within that exclusion, which is based
squarely on the moral hazard of insuring against losses that are within the
control of the insured and on the public policy against insulating intentional
wrongdoers from personal liability.
Nevertheless, where insurance coverage is mandatory, courts sometimes
require potential tortfeasors to purchase-and liability insurers to provide419. Cf Syverud, supra note 22, at 1650 (arguing that legislatures should consider
"specifying maximum policy limits"). As noted in Part V, supra, this proposal would remove
one of the strongest objections to eliminating exemptions: that even a well-insured individual
would face a residual risk of being "wiped out" by personal liability for a catastrophic accident
that exceeded the policy limits.
420. Baker, Blood Money, supra note 2, at 292.
421. See JERRY, supra note 268, at 479-80.
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coverage for intentional torts. Consider mandatory minimum automobile
insurance. If an insured driver commits an act of "road rage," deliberately
crashing into another vehicle, the policy language would bar recovery on the
ground that the harm was intended by the insured. Some state courts have held,
however, that this exclusion is contrary to the public policy behind the
mandatory liability insurance statute. 422
But it hardly follows that a state could feasibly mandate that everyone
purchase minimum liability insurance that would cover any torts the insured
might commit, including intentional ones.423 Intentional torts constitute only a
tiny percentage of automobile accidents. Forcing insurance companies to pay
for them has only a small effect on auto liability insurance rates-particularly
because these payments are capped at the mandatory minimum policy limits.
Imagine, on the other hand, a law mandating that homeowners and renters carry
personal liability insurance and further requiring that these policies include
intentional torts. These provisions would create serious problems. Insurance
companies would try to screen out persons at high risk for engaging in violent
behavior. The result would almost certainly be assigned-risk pools for these
individuals, with other insureds bearing a substantial fraction of the costs of
insuring them. It would probably be cheaper and more effective to raise the
same subsidy by general taxation and distribute it to the uncompensated victims
of intentional tortfeasors.
A full exploration of this important topic is beyond the scope of this
Article, and I do not claim that mandatory liability insurance cannot make any
contribution to minimizing the intentional-tort half of the judgment-proof
problem. My suggestion, rather, is that the more promising strategy for
deterring intentional tortfeasors is to increase their exposure to personal
liability. Even if, for whatever reasons, we fail to remove the barriers to
collecting unintentional tort judgments, we should at least eliminate the barriers
that enable intentional tortfeasors to keep their personal assets and incomes.
VII. The PoliticalEconomy of the Judgment-ProofProblem
Part V proposed that we try to minimize the judgment-proof problem by
lowering the barriers to collecting tortjudgments: Exemptions from collection
422. See id. at 1024-25 (collecting cases).
423. For proposals to require mandatory insurance in particular contexts, see generally
Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating EnvironmentalLiabilityInsurance, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'y F. 293 (2002); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121
(2001).
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should not apply to tort judgments; all tort claims should be nondischargeable
in bankruptcy; spendthrift trusts should be subject to garnishment by tort
judgment creditors; and it should be illegal to create an OAPT unless the trust
provides that tort judgments against the settlor will be paid by the trustee from
the corpus of the trust. Part VI proposed to supplement this strategy by
strengthening mandatory liability insurance laws. The issue I now take up is
whether proposals such as these have any realistic chance of passage by state
legislatures or Congress. This issue is part of a much broader topic (the history
and political economy of the barriers to enforcing tort liability) that I intend to
investigate in depth in future work. Accordingly, the analysis presented here
will be brief, impressionistic, and tentative-but I hope sufficient to sketch the
general nature of the problem.
A. Liability Insurersand Plaintiffs' Lawyers to the Rescue?
At the outset, there is ample reason for pessimism. If tort victims were an
influential interest group, we would not expect our laws to insulate tortfeasors'
assets from collection at every turn, as they currently do. Nor will it be easy to
mobilize potential tort victims to advocate barrier-lowering legislation. "Until
tort victims actually suffer, or become aware of, an injury, they do not know
who they are. Unless another group, such as trial lawyers, represents their
interests, tort victims often do not have a place at the bargaining table." 424
Even after being injured, tort victims are likely to be focused on their own civil
and criminal remedies, not on law reform. And because few victims will ever
have another tort claim, they have no continuing stake in reforming the
system.425
Who then might represent the interests of tort victims in reducing the
judgment-proof problem in tort law? The first candidate is liability insurers.
Clearly insurers would oppose a regime in which personal assets are never at
risk, because then individuals would simply not need liability insurance. By
extension, one might think that liability insurers would also support lowering
barriers to tort collection. These reforms will substantially increase individuals'
demand for liability insurance, and insurers should welcome that.426

424. SKEEL, supra note 222, at 150.
425. As I discuss in Part VII.F, infra, however, the "victims' rights" movement offers an
impressive example of organizing and lobbying by victims and their families.
426. See Syverud, supra note 22, at 1633 ("Liability insurance, it is clear, is promoted by
liability.").
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Yet it would be awkward, to say the least, for insurers publicly to
champion legislation that would greatly increase the exposure of their actual
and potential insureds to personal tort liability. The appearance of a conflict of
interest could do substantial reputational harm to insurers. Advocating
expanded liability would also clash with their own worldview (or at least their
own rhetoric), which tends to be highly critical of tort liability.427 Moreover,
the status quo is far from intolerable for liability insurers. We currently have an
intermediate regime in which the threat of personal tort liability is much
diminished, but still significant. Consequently, insurers can already market
liability insurance as providing protection to individuals against the risk of
personal tort liability, the risk of bearing legal-defense costs, and the risk of
being forced into bankruptcy.
The second interest group that might spearhead a drive to lower the
barriers to enforcing tort judgments is the plaintiffs' bar. Nowadays, plaintiffs'
tort lawyers are famously well-organized and influential, through the national
and local branches of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA).428
But for all its success in creating theories that allow deep pockets to be dragged
into litigation, the plaintiffs' bar seems generally to have avoided battles over
the barriers that exacerbate the judgment-proof problem. 429 At first blush, this
seems surprising. It is obviously in the interests of the plaintiffs' bar (and, to
some extent, the defense bar) to increase the scope of the tort system, and
plaintiffs' attorneys clearly prosper when the demand for liability insurance
increases.4 3 °
On closer examination, however, there are good reasons why the
plaintiffs' bar may be unwilling to make a concerted effort to lower the barriers
427. See id. at 1648 (suggesting that most insurers "sincerely believe liability is an evil
(albeit one on which they earn a profit)").
428. ATLA originated in 1946, when plaintiffs' workers' compensation attorneys
organized as the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys (NACCA). The
group gradually expanded to include the full range of personal injury lawyers. In 1972,
NACCA was reorganized as ATLA. Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America, ATLA and Trial
Lawyers, http://www.atla.org/about (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
429. For example, ATLA did not lobby against the CCPA limits on garnishment, nor did it
lobby for BAPCPA. Email from Dan Cohen, ATLA Director of National Affairs, to author
(Apr. 11, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Fuller investigation of the
stances taken by ATLA over the past fifty years (a project that is part of the larger research
agenda that includes this Article) may shed more (and possibly different) light on the plaintiffs'
bar's role with regard to exemptions and other barriers to collection.
430. See Syverud, supra note 22, at 1642 (arguing that it is in the interest of attorneys to
promote consumption of liability insurance). For the proposition that defense lawyers also have
a stake in expanding our lawyer-intensive system of tort liability, see Richard A. Epstein, The
UnintendedRevolution in ProductLiability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2193, 2219 (1993).
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to tort collection. In order for barrier-lowering to drive up the demand for
liability insurance, the threat of blood-money litigation must be perceived as
real. But most plaintiffs' lawyers specialize in recovering liability insurance
money, not collecting personal assets. 431 From their perspective, barrierlowering creates opportunities they are not personally well-positioned to
exploit.
Nevertheless, provided a critical mass of plaintiffs' lawyers is willing to
bring more blood-money cases, barrier-lowering should benefit the plaintiffs'
bar as a whole.432 But an upsurge in blood-money litigation might impose
serious reputational costs on the plaintiffs' bar. The perception that plaintiffs'
lawyers (and plaintiffs) are greedy is believed by many plaintiffs' lawyers to
have hurt their business by increasing jurors' reluctance to award plaintiffs'
verdicts.433 A campaign to make it easier to take people's personal assets could
be used to depict plaintiffs' lawyers as sinking to new depths. A backlash
attributable to blood-money litigation might also have repercussions for
ongoing legislative tort-reform battles about which the plaintiffs' bar is
intensely concerned.
There is also a powerful ideological reason why the plaintiffs' bar is not
enthusiastic about lowering the barriers to tort collection. Within the
Democratic coalition, the plaintiffs' bar tends to be allied with populist,
proconsumer, pro-debtor groups.434 It would be politically awkward for ATLA
to join forces with Republican-aligned banks and credit card lenders to push
435
for, say, more protection in bankruptcy for creditors (including tort victims).

It would also be rhetorically awkward: Plaintiffs' lawyers portray themselves
as champions of the little guy against the wealthy and powerful-not against
other little guys.
431. See Syverud, supra note 22, at 1634 ("[TIhe plaintiffs' bar finds it both easier to
collect judgments from insurance companies than from uninsured defendants and easier to
specialize in a field in which the real defendants (insurers) are, by and large, repeat players who
routinely pay judgments.").
432. There is an organized collection-lawyer's bar (the National Association of Retail
Collection Attorneys (NARCA)), but it is unclear how influential it is and whether collecting
tort judgments is more than a minor piece of its business. For basic information about NARCA,
which was founded in 1993, see www.narca.org.
433. See Daniels &Martin, supra note 298, at 472-76 (describing perceived impact of tort
reform campaigns on Texas juries).
434. See Mark Geistfeld, The PoliticalEconomy of NeocontractualProposalsforProducts
Liability Reform, 72 TEx. L. REv. 803, 839 n.98 (1994) (describing alliances between trial
lawyers and consumer groups).
435. See Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform andJudicial Selection, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv.
1483, 1491 (2005) (observing that trial lawyers are generally aligned with the Democratic party,
business groups with the Republican party).
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The odds are, then, that plaintiffs' lawyers will not fight hard to lower tortenforcement barriers. Yet that complacency may well be subject to change.
The reputational interests of the plaintiffs' bar might shift if organizations
representing tort victims succeeded in increasing public awareness of the
judgment-proof problem and the legal rules that exacerbate it. At some point,
the failure of the plaintiffs' bar to speak out on behalf of tort victims could
Moreover, the moral or ideological
become a major embarrassment.
commitments of some plaintiffs' lawyers may make them readily persuadable
on these issues. If even a fraction of the plaintiffs' bar could be enlisted as
advocates for lowering the barriers to collecting tort judgments, that would
greatly increase the chances of political success.
B. The Opposition
Even if liability insurers and plaintiffs' lawyers will not lead the charge for
reducing the barriers to collecting tort judgments, one might reasonably wonder
who would lead the charge againstdoing so? After all, individual tortfeasors
are not a highly organized and effective interest group, either.436 Yet it seems
clear that potential individual tortfeasors are better organized than potential tort
victims. None of us wants to be sued in tort, to have no exit option via
bankruptcy, or to face the threat of onerous personal liability. Consumer
groups and the consumer movement are likely to take their marching orders
from these preferences-even though, as potential tort victims, we would
obviously prefer lower barriers to collection. Picture, for example, how
consumer groups might react to a proposal to make tort judgments
nondischargeable in bankruptcy. It is easy to imagine effective grass-roots
opposition based on stories about how one mistake could lead to a tort suit that
would ruin the tortfeasor's innocent family.
In addition, some barrier-lowering proposals would predictably encounter
opposition from other, even better-organized groups. For example, any attempt
to change the spendthrift trust doctrine will encounter fierce opposition from
banks and other providers of trust-related services. This was recently
confirmed when, in Sligh v. First National Bank of Holmes County,437 the
436. Repeat-player defendants in tort cases are mostly corporations, which do not benefit
from exemptions, discharge in bankruptcy, spendthrift trusts, or OAPTs. The exception is
individual professionals, particularly doctors. Given that doctors (as a group) are already hostile
to tort liability, one would expect them to oppose barrier-lowering measures.
437. Sligh v. First Nat'l Bank of Holmes County, 704 So. 2d 1020 (Miss. 1997). The
exception recognized in Sligh applied only to intentional torts and gross negligence. Id. at

1028.
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Mississippi Supreme Court carved out an exception to the spendthrift trust
doctrine that allowed a tort victim to recover from a drunk driver's trust."' A
mere five months later, the Mississippi legislature passed a statute overruling
Sligh.439 Similarly, insurance companies, banks, and other firms that provide
pension- and retirement-plan related services would presumably oppose
legislation that made retirement benefits collectible. And the bankruptcy barwhich has been quite influential in shaping bankruptcy legislation440-might
well oppose making all tort claims nondischargeable.
C. Unsecuredand Secured Lenders-Friendor Foe?
The last best hope for potential tort victims might be to form a loose
coalition with better-organized secured and unsecured lenders, 44 1 for whom
judgment-proof defendants are also a problem. The fact that lenders,
particularly credit card lenders, were among the prime movers behind BAPCPA
provides reason for cautious optimism on this score. To some extent, tort
claimants were able to free-ride on the efforts of these creditors' groups
(though, as we have seen, BAPCPA's tougher abuse-of-bankruptcy provisions
remain limited to cases primarily involving consumer debt)." 2
Yet solidarity with contract creditors is a strategy that has obvious costs
for tort claimants. As we have seen, the general tendency of American law is to
refuse to give tort claimants priority over unsecured contract creditors, let alone
438. Id. at 1029.
439. The Family Trust Preservation Act of 1998, MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-9-503 (1999).
440. SKEEL, supra note 222, at 86-89.
441. Todd Zywicki points out that the creditors' side often faces collective action problems
because some issues involve zero-sum games for creditors and because different groups of
creditors (e.g., secured and unsecured creditors) have different interests. Todd Zywicki, The
Past, Present,and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2016,2022-23

(2003) (reviewing DAVID A SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION (2001)). Zywicki suggests that
BAPCPA is exceptional in that the creditor coalition held together over several years, partly
because the legislation provided benefits for a wide range of creditors. Id. at 2032.
442. Ideology may also have played some role here. As Zywicki notes, many of
BAPCPA's Republican sponsors invoked an ideology of personal responsibility for one's debts,
id. at 2026, and that ideology helps explain provisions that help tort victims, including the
expanded list of debts that are nondischargeable in Chapter 13 and the restrictions on homestead
exemptions in bankruptcy. On the other hand, although personal responsibility applies with no
less force to tort judgment debt than it does to credit card debt, Congress did not fix the
anomalous limitation of § 707(b)'s abuse of bankruptcy provisions to cases involving primarily
consumer debt. That said, BAPCPA confers significant benefits on a group (tort victims) that
plays little part in Republican politics, as well as on a group (plaintiffs' lawyers) that
Republicans normally regard as political antagonists.
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secured ones. In many instances, this parity puts the tort claimant at a large
disadvantage. Arguably, however, that is the best tort claimants can hope for.
If tort claimants tried to secure preferential treatment, they would likely face
resistance from better-organized lenders.
But perhaps this reasoning oversimplifies matters. Whether contract
creditors would be harmed depends on what type of preferential treatment tort
claimants receive. Consider two examples: a rule that exemptions do not apply
to tort claims and a rule that tort claims have priority over other unsecured
debts. The exemption-trumping rule would not directly harm contract creditors,
because it would not reduce the assets available to satisfy contract claims." 3
The priority rule, by contrast, would reduce the assets available to unsecured
lenders in any bankruptcy in which there was also an outstanding tort claim.
Clearly the latter rule would engender far greater opposition from unsecured
lenders.
On the other hand, there is an opportunity cost to each item of favorable
legislation. A creditors' coalition that is dominated by lenders might resist
preferential treatment for tort creditors on the grounds that the coalition would
have to spend political capital to obtain the legislation, while the benefits would
inure only to tort victims. This suggests that unless tort victims can contribute
to the coalition's political capital-for example, by serving as more appealing
"poster children" than commercial lenders or by forestalling opposition from
groups like ATLAa4 -their interests will often be given short shrift.
D. The Politics of MandatoryInsuranceLaws
The politics of mandatory insurance legislation seems to involve a
different constellation of interest groups. Historically, liability insurers have
often opposed mandatory liability insurance, while plaintiffs' lawyers have
lobbied for it. 44 5 Consumers who are already purchasing more than the
proposed minimum are likely to favor mandatory insurance laws, because (as
potential tort victims) they are better off. Consumers who would be forced to
increase their expenditures on liability insurance are likely to oppose the
increase.
443. It might harm them indirectly. For example, consider a tort victim whose judgment
depletes a tortfeasor-debtor's exempt assets-whereupon the tortfeasor-debtor converts
nonexempt assets into exempt ones.
444. BAPCPA may have helped tort victims in part to defuse potential opposition from
ATLA.
445. See Virginia Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Dean Leon Green and Enterprise(No-Fault)
Liability, 47 WAYNE L. REv. 91, 139 (2001) (noting insurance industry opposition).
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Increasing mandatory auto liability insurance twenty- or forty-fold, as I
have proposed, would greatly increase auto liability costs for the vast majority
of Americans. It would be surprising not to encounter substantial public
resistance to this idea. And my proposal to increase insurance mandates while
simultaneously lowering exemptions from collection is likely to face even
greater opposition.
E. Putting Together a PoliticallyAttractive Package
Even if the public would not support laws that sharply curtail exemptions
from collection-or make such exemptions inapplicable to tort claimsnarrower reforms might have a realistic chance of passage in some states. In
particular, two proposals could be presented as appropriate ways to penalize
and deter wrongdoing, and increase personal responsibility: (1) a law barring
intentional tortfeasors from invoking exemptions from collection, on the
grounds that they engaged in highly blameworthy conduct; and (2) a law
imposing the same penalty on unintentional tortfeasors who fail to comply with
mandatory insurance laws, on the grounds that they have committed two
serious wrongs. While these proposals might encounter opposition from some
quarters, they seem likely to resonate with the general public and could lay the
foundation for wider reform in the future.
At the federal level, the most politically feasible reform might be to make
all torts involving personal injury nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Congress
has already broadened nondischargeability to sweep in drunk drivers and closed
the Chapter 13 loophole for intentional tortfeasors. Better yet, secured and
unsecured creditors do not appear to have any strong incentives to oppose this
reform. Opposition from pro-debtor consumer groups might not be enough to
derail this proposal, particularly if the plaintiffs' bar were willing to support it.
F. Reason for Optimism? The Victims' Rights Movement and Victims'
Compensation
The analysis I have presented suggests that lowering the barriers to
collecting tort judgments will present formidable political challenges. Yet there
is an actual counterexample that may justify guarded optimism (and certainly
deserves further study): the "victims' rights" movement spearheaded in recent
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decades by groups such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and the
National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA). 446
The victims' rights movement has been called "probably one of the most
influential social movements in postwar American history." 447 Over the past
forty years, that movement has addressed a wide range of issues, ranging from
victim-impact statements at sentencing, to victims' rights amendments to state
constitutions, to enhanced punishments for various crimes." 8 But it is the
movement's original impetus-securing compensation for crime victims-that
is relevant here.449 Victims' rights groups have lobbied successfully for state
and federal legislation increasing the availability of criminal restitution awards
and establishing separate victims' compensation funds (typically funded 45by
0
criminal fines) for cases in which restitution is unavailable or insufficient.
The success of these efforts suggests that it might be possible for groups
that advocate on behalf of tort victims to organize, attract public attention and
support, and win parallel victories. But there are several differences between
crime victims and tort victims that may handicap the latter. Public perception
of crime victims is more favorable than that of tort victims (people complain
about "greedy plaintiffs," not "greedy restitution claimants"); the federal
government is far more actively involved in criminal law than in tort law, which
may make lobbying for legislative reform more difficult; and, at least in theory,
tort victims have long enjoyed far more rights than crime victims had when the
victims' rights movement began. In addition, victims' rights groups have had
446. MADD, an organization of indirect victims (i.e., those whose family members have
been killed or injured by drunk drivers), was founded in 1980 and has successfully lobbied for a
variety of measures to increase criminal and civil sanctions for driving while intoxicated. For
details of MADD's lobbying efforts over the twenty-five years since the organization was
founded, see Mothers Against Drunk Driving, http://www.madd.org/aboutus (last visited Nov.
4, 2005). NOVA, founded in 1975, has long been active in lobbying for victims' compensation
programs and criminal restitution, and also provides and coordinates services to crime victims.
National Organization for Victim Assistance, http://www.trynova.org/about (last visited Nov. 4,
2005). Other victims' rights organizations include the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
(CJLF) (founded in 1982, http://www.cjlf.org/infomain.htm (last visited Nov. 4,2005)), and the
Victims' Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR) (founded in 1979 as the Crime Victims Legal
Advocacy Institute, http://www.valor-national.org/history.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2005)).
447. Gary LaFree, Too Much Democracy or Too Much Crime? Lessonsfrom California's
Three-Strikes Law, 27 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 875, 893 (2002).
448. See generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002).
449. See id. at 8 (stating that, initially, "state intervention on behalf of crime victims took
the form of distributing palpable and direct financial benefits to crime victims").
450. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 348, at 325 (noting that California established the
first compensation program in 1965 and that "[tioday, all 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and the Virgin Islands operate victim compensation programs").
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considerably more success in securing formal rights to restitution than in
obtaining effective enforcement of those rights.4 5'
Nevertheless, the existence of established crime victims' organizations
should be helpful to potential tort victims' groups-not least because of the
potential alliance between crime victims and tort victims. Crime-victims' rights
groups recognize that tort law can be a valuable aid to victims of crime and are
actively pursuing measures to ensure that crime victims are aware of their
option to sue in tort. 452 Whether or not reforms to reduce the judgment-proof
problem would be a top priority for crime victims' organizations, it seems safe
to say that they would at least be willing to lend their support and expertise.
VIII. Conclusion
As applied to individuals, tort law and the tort system are undermined at
every turn by debtor-creditor, bankruptcy, and trust law. As this Article has
demonstrated, tort claimants face severe legal barriers to collecting from the
personal assets and incomes of tortfeasors. Our puny patchwork of mandatory
liability insurance laws makes only a small dent in the enormous judgmentproof problem created by these legal barriers. Voluntary purchases of liability
insurance by individuals concerned about the residual risk of tort liability
improve matters considerably. But far more people would voluntarily purchase
far more liability insurance were it not for the legal rules that shelter assetsand particularly income-from tort claimants. And far fewer individuals would
commit intentional (and uninsurable) torts if exemption laws excluded these
torts from their protection.
There is no good justification for these tortfeasor-friendly rules. The legal
barriers to tort collection could be sharply reduced without inhumanely
burdening tortfeasors and their families. Although the tort system has serious
shortcomings, it could do a reasonably good job of deterring tortious behavior
by individuals and of requiring those who are not deterred to make amends for
their wrongs. But it cannot play that role--except fitfully, inconsistently, and
arbitrarily-when exemption, bankruptcy, and trust laws are indiscriminately
allowed to trump tort claims. Reasonable people can disagree about how best
451. See RESTrrTlON FOR CRIME VICTIMS, supra note 347, at 2 (observing that restitution
"remains one of the most under-enforced victims' rights within the criminal and juvenile justice

systems").
452. See NEW

DIRECTIONS,

supra note 348, at 373-78 (describing efforts and offering

recommendations to increase crime victims' access to civil remedies). Interestingly, this
report's chapter on "Civil Remedies" makes no mention of the fact that the judgment-proof
problem severely hampers the use of the tort system by crime victims.
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to strike the tort creditor-tort debtor balance. Current law, however, falls
outside the broad range of reasonableness and systematically undervalues the
interests of tort claimants.
In corrective justice terms, too, the de jure judgment-proof problem is
deeply disturbing. If it is proper as a matter of corrective justice to require
corporations to compensate victims of torts committed by their employees (even
when the corporation's owners and managers were faultless), it would seem
imperative to require individuals who personally commit torts to compensate
their victims. Instead, American tort law typically lets even intentional
tortfeasors off with little more than the proverbial slap on the wrist. Taking
corrective justice seriously means fostering a legal culture that insists on
personal responsibility for one's torts. In today's tort system, we may have the
rhetoric of personal responsibility, but we certainly do not have the reality.453
For reasons described in Part VH, the political obstacles to changing all
this seem daunting (although much work remains to be done in understanding
the history and the political economy of exemption laws, mandatory insurance
laws, and the crime victims' rights movement). Interest-group politics aside,
one reason why the judgment-proof problem has gradually become so pervasive
may be that torts professors have ignored the issue for decades. Where were
the torts professors, for example, when the CCPA exempted 75% of every
tortfeasor's earnings from collection, or when the 1978 Bankruptcy Code
entitled every unintentional tortfeasor, regardless of income, to a speedy and
inexpensive Chapter 7 discharge-or when, in 2005, BAPCPA imposed a
means test to prevent high-income debtors from abusing Chapter 7, but only if
the debtor has "primarily consumer debts"? 454 I hope this Article will lead torts
professors, other legal academics, and policymakers to recognize that the
judgment-proof problem in tort law is largely traceable to income-sheltering
and asset-sheltering legal rules, that those rules mechanically equate
involuntary tort claims with voluntary contract claims, and that society would
benefit from curtailing or removing these barriers to collecting tort liability.
That would be a good first step toward reforming American law to induce more
individuals to buy adequate liability insurance and to enforce the rights of tort
victims against the personal assets and incomes of those who persist in
committing torts while underinsured.

453. This is not to suggest that there was ever a golden age when we did. The history of
barriers to enforcing tort judgments has yet to be written.
454. I have not yet discovered who should receive credit for the more tort-victim-friendly
provisions of BAPCPA. If there are any unsung law-professor heroes reading this, my
apologies-and please let me hear from you.
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